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The 27th Annual Klutznick-Harris-Schwalb Symposium took place on Octo-
ber 26 and October 27, 2014, in Omaha, Nebraska. The title of the sympo-
sium, from which this volume also takes its name, is “Mishpachah: The Jewish 
Family in Tradition and in Transition.”
Anyone who reads carefully and has a phenomenal memory (that sounds 
a lot like most of my colleagues!) will observe that the sponsors of the 2014 
symposium expanded to include as a full partner the Natan and Hannah 
Schwalb Center for Israel and Jewish Studies. Founded in 2009 at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO), the Schwalb Center and its faculty have 
had a notable presence at several of our symposia prior to 2014. The new title 
formalizes this close, productive relationship.
As in past years, the success of this symposium owed much to the unflag-
ging support of two of my colleagues: Dr. Ronald Simkins, Director of the 
Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society at Creighton University, 
and Dr. Jean Cahan, Director of the Harris Center for Judaic Studies at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska–Lincoln (UNL). To this number, I gratefully add Dr. Sidnie 
White Crawford of UNL and Drs. Moshe Gershovitz and Curtis Hutt of UNO.
Colleen Hastings, Administrative Assistant for the Klutznick Chair and 
the Kripke Center, continues her invaluable contributions at all stages in the 
planning and implementation of the symposium and in preparing this volume 
for publication. Equally efficient and dependable is Mary Sue Grossman, who 
is affiliated with the Center for Jewish Life, part of the Jewish Federation of 
Omaha. In this connection, I offer additional thanks to Kasey Davis, office 
assistant for the Schwalb Center. Among the innovations for this symposium 
was a Sunday morning session at UNO that would have been impossible with-
out her active involvement.
With this volume, we are completing seven years in our ongoing rela-
tionship with the Purdue University Press. Its staff, under the previous director 
Charles Watkinson and his successor Peter Froehlich, makes us feel welcome 
in every possible way. We look forward to many more years of collaboration 
with the Press.
In addition to the Harris Center, the Kripke Center, the Schwalb Cen-
ter, and the Jewish Federation of Omaha, this symposium is supported by the 
generosity of the following:
Creighton University Lectures, Films and Concerts
The Creighton College of Arts and Sciences
The Ike and Roz Friedman Foundation
The Riekes Family
The Center for Jewish Life
The Henry Monsky Lodge of B’nai B’rith
Gary and Karen Javitch









Dictionary definitions of the term mishpachah are quite similar: a Jewish family 
or social unit including close and distant relatives—sometimes also close friends. 
Although such definitions—or better, descriptions—are justifiably inclusive, 
even they fail to capture the diversity and vitality of real flesh-and-blood 
Jewish families.
The studies collected in this volume, each by a different scholar working 
in a different context, call attention to features of the Jewish family from a 
wide variety of perspectives. They explore historical developments, contem-
porary trends, and future possibilities for Jewish families. In the process, they 
identify both common and distinctive features in the makeup of, and expecta-
tions for, this basic building block of Jewish society and religion.
Jewish families, as messy as they are essential, have been part of Jew-
ish life from the biblical era through the rabbinic period, from the advent of 
modernity through the threshold of the future. We have not sought to cover 
every aspect of the Jewish family from all cultural, social, historical, and theo-
logical eras. No single volume, however lengthy and weighty, can do that.
Rather, we have given essentially free rein to these scholars and research-
ers to write about what they know best. Moreover, we have allowed, in fact 
encouraged, all authors to express themselves in the style in which they are 
most comfortable and with the emphases they select as most valuable.
We do not apologize that the resultant collection is not comprehensive. We 
would, however, be disappointed if readers come away with no new insights, 
questions, or layers of appreciation for an institution that exhibits and embod-
ies so many elements of Judaism’s rich and complex experience.
The thirteen papers collected here, all originating as oral presentations 
at the 27th Annual Klutznick-Harris-Schwalb Symposium, divide chronologi-
cally into three groups: six deal primarily with the past, from the biblical period 
through the nineteenth century; five center on aspects of the Jewish family today; 
and two look to technological developments that are bound to become increas-
ingly popular for Jews, as for many other groups, in the future. For the reader 
of this volume, we present each paper under one of these chronological rubrics.
Susan Marks, New College of Florida, is the author of the first essay, 
“Uncovering the Ongoing Parental Role in Education in the Rabbinic Period.” 
Through it, she examines the family’s ongoing impact on the study of the 
Torah in early rabbinic Judaism, particularly the father-son relationship. 
In doing so, she pushes back against scholarly discussions emphasizing the 
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significance of the disciple-mentor relationship and the Talmudic replacement 
of the father with the sage, which thereby creates a new way to trace lineage. 
While this is important, she argues against essentializing this aspect of rabbinic 
Judaism at the expense of understanding the continued role played by the dis-
ciple’s parents. Marks focuses on the Babylonian Talmud tractates Hullin and 
Berachot, especially their descriptions of the active role taken by the father in 
educating his son concerning meal practices, on the one hand, and the topic 
of sexual relations, on the other, with mixed reception.
Marks’s analysis attends to dynamics of ritual practice and lived religion 
(in light of work by Pierre Bourdieu and others) to suggest that the questions of 
the son’s relationship with the family in which he grew up is more complicated 
than previous scholarship acknowledges. In examining these fraught encoun-
ters, this study reveals the depth of ongoing engagement with family and the 
need to reexamine the nature of learning as rabbinic Judaism invents itself.
David Brodsky, Brooklyn College, follows with his study, “Mishnah Git-
tin: Family Relations as Metaphor for National Relations.” While the rest of 
Mishnah Gittin lays out the laws of the commissioning, writing, and delivery 
of the bill of divorce in a fairly orderly manner, the beginning, middle, and end 
of the tractate stand out. Brodsky argues that the three work together to point 
the reader to the central theme of the tractate, a theme that works simultane-
ously on the individual and national levels. By opening with the demarcation 
of the boundaries between that which is in and outside of the land of Israel, the 
tractate is pointing to divorce as an act that is marking the same boundaries on 
the individual level.
The middle section of Mishnah Gittin explains why these boundaries 
need to be established: originally [ba-rishonah] one ruling was made, but since 
then things have not turned out the way they were intended, and a corrective 
must be instated. For the sake of the public welfare, indeed for the sake of 
peace, things cannot always remain as they were originally established. Some-
times a corrective is necessary. Here, divorce is precisely that corrective for the 
marriage that is not working. The final mishnah clarifies that while divorce 
was permitted by the School of Shammai only in cases of adultery (reading the 
“unchaste matter [‘ervat davar]” of Deuteronomy 24:1 as truly unchaste [devar 
‘ervah]), the School of Hillel and, later, Rabbi Akiva offered their own correc-
tives, permitting it ultimately any time that the couple were not getting along.
This final mishnah of the tractate (9:10) points us even further to who 
would seem to be intended here, as it contains one of the only parallels in all of 
the Mishnah with the New Testament, with the School of Shammai’s position 
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directly paralleling Jesus’s position in the Sermon on the Mount rather than in 
opposition to Deuteronomy 24:1. Thus, in this nascent period for both Chris-
tianity and rabbinic Judaism, the two may have converged more than they 
diverged, at least regarding the laws of divorce and their derivation from the 
Bible. Mishnah Gittin, Brodsky proposes, is attempting to declare that there 
was an earlier period [ba-rishonah] before the corrective was needed.
By using the national boundaries as a metaphor for individual boundar-
ies vis-à-vis divorce, the redactor is reversing the prophetic use of divorce as 
a metaphor for the nation and its ruptured relationship with God (Isa 50:1; 
Jer 3:1–8; Mal 2:13–16). By linking the two, the redactor opens up the pos-
sibility of reading in both directions—of national boundaries as metaphor 
for individual boundaries and as the marking of these personal boundaries as 
metaphor for the nation. In this essay, Brodsky explores the implications of 
that connection.
The first of two essays on the Hebrew Bible is “All in the Family: Ancient 
Israelite and Judahite Families in Context” by Cynthia Shafer-Elliott, William 
Jessup University. Historically, she observes, Syro-Palestinian archaeology and 
biblical studies have focused on monumental places, people, material culture, 
and the texts that reflect them. Major urban settlements contained palaces, 
temples, and fortifications. The elite men who oversaw their administration 
left no shortage of artifacts and texts for analysis.
However, a shift of interest into the daily lives of the average ancient Isra-
elite has occurred. This shift recognizes that in order to understand the daily 
life of ancient Israel and Judah, the focus needs to change from monumental 
to minor, from the macro to the micro. In other words, more attention needs to 
be given to the stage where daily life occurred—the home. This is exactly what 
Schafer-Elliott accomplishes.
The home was (and indeed still is) the nucleus of the everyday. The home 
was where the average ancient Israelite mishpachah [family] in both urban and 
rural environments lived out their lives. The purpose of Schafer-Elliott’s con-
tribution is to illustrate how the average ancient Israelite family lived within 
its physical environment, the home, within the Iron Age. Utilizing household 
archaeology and textual evidence from the Hebrew Bible, Schafer-Elliott’s 
essay examines the typical Israelite household including its dwelling and its 
members and their activities.
Charles David Isbell, Louisiana State University, has written the second 
essay that features the Hebrew Bible: “Family Values and Biblical Courtship 
and Marriage: Spanning the Time Barrier.” As he observes, the importance of 
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family within the broader community of Judaism has its roots in some of the 
most significant narratives in the book of Genesis. From the outset, marriage has 
stood as the cornerstone of the biblical family. The politically motivated call for 
a return to biblical marriage in modern America appears to be grounded in non-
Jewish ideas of marriage rather than in biblical narratives that actually describe 
the customs of our ancestors. As is often the case, we are compelled to span the 
difference between the Bible and the twenty-first century in this matter.
In the attempt to build a bridge from modernity back to the Bible, 
Isbell raises three questions, each one leading to a clearer understanding of 
the purpose(s) of family grounded in marriage: (1) When is a house a home? 
(2) When does “son” or “daughter” mean more than a biological offspring? 
(3) When are economic considerations important in biblical marriage?
Once these questions have been addressed, we are prepared to discuss 
the ways in which marriage in the Bible might inform our modern minhagim 
[customs] and values. Isbell’s investigation shows that the external customs of 
biblical marriage and family life are not the crux of the matter, and frantic calls 
for a return to biblical marriage based on the facile linkage of modern practices 
to a simplistic interpretation of the Bible merely obscure the real issues. Still, 
biblical narratives that underscore appropriate partnerships capable of contrib-
uting to familial and societal stability can guide us to embrace enduring values 
that are worth cherishing.
We may, Isbell argues, find it necessary to modernize, redefine, and even 
reformulate the customs of marriage and the definition of “family,” and that 
is as it should be, for each generation should be granted and must accept the 
responsibility of such freedom of expression. But we need not abandon the goal 
of marriages and families that are formed to serve the moral values of the larger 
human community and built to endure because they consist of partners who 
share a system of values and ideals that has stood the test of time.
Gail Labovitz, American Jewish University, moves us forward chrono-
logically with her essay, “Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the Status 
of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage.” She begins with this observation: 
according to Jewish law and practice since at least the time of the Mishnah, 
the legal basis for Jewish marriage is the act of kiddushin, in which a man 
“acquires” a woman. Once this act is performed, the relationship is binding 
and can be severed only by his giving her a divorce document.
Yet, Labovitz continues, even a cursory study of legal and other sources 
suggests that Jewish men and women have long engaged in relationships involv-
ing sexual relations and/or long-term commitments to one another outside the 
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rubric of kiddushin. Examples include cohabitation outside marriage, concu-
binage, marriage by rites of other religions (where the participants might be 
forced converts to Christianity or Islam), and, in modernity, civil marriage.
Most recently, there have been some proposals toward new means of mar-
riage beyond the gendered assumptions (and material harm for women) of kid-
dushin and the halachic divorce process. Significantly, halachic decisors have not 
considered these relationships to be outside the purview of the Jewish legal sys-
tem. Lebovitz traces this topic through Jewish legal literature with an eye toward 
when, how, and why decisors have attempted to assimilate these relationships 
into Jewish marriages or to dismiss them as beyond the bounds of the system.
Haim Sperber, Western Galilee College, looks at the nineteenth century 
in his essay, “Agunot, Immigration, and Modernization, from 1857 to 1896.” 
Through his research and analysis, he presents the agunot phenomenon in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, especially in Eastern Europe.
In the first part of his essay, Sperber analyzes the phenomenon and its 
main databases. In this part, he discusses the volume of the phenomenon and 
different variations of agunot. Sperber also shows that the main databases— 
the Jewish media and rabbinical sources—present two different narratives of the 
phenomenon; he attempts to explain this.
The second half of Sperber’s essay analyzes the phenomenon and its 
effect on the family institution in Jewish Eastern Europe. The discussion also 
features a section on relations between the agunot issue and immigration and 
changes in the role of rabbis in East European Jewish society.
Broadly speaking, the first six essays speak to the Jewish family as it 
was. While the implications of such studies are clearly relevant today, their 
emphasis was on the past. By contrast, the next five essays offer descriptions 
and analyses of phenomena that characterize large numbers of Jews and their 
families in the present.
The first essay in this section, “Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies 
of DNA in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism,” is coauthored 
by Sarah Imhoff, Indiana University, Bloomington, and Hillary Kaell, Con-
cordia University. They begin with the observation that American Jews have 
embraced their family trees. With rapid advances in the accessibility of both 
genetic testing and Internet-enabled ancestry tracking, the potential for 
“knowing” about oneself and one’s family has left the dusty archives and elite 
laboratories and come into living rooms.
Imhoff and Kaell ask: why and how does family lineage and popular 
DNA testing matter religiously?
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Messianic Jewish congregations—conservative Christian congregations 
that retain some Jewish practices alongside belief in Jesus as the Messiah—have 
about twice as many gentile believers as they do believers of Jewish descent. 
However, only ethnic Jews are considered to be directly descended from the 
tribes of Israel—and thus part of the lineage of Jesus himself. As Imhoff and 
Kaell discover, one result of this imbalance is an ongoing discussion among 
congregants about whether gentile believers do in fact have Jewish lineage. 
They interpret their own stories of self through secular websites, such as 
 ancestry.com, and through those targeted specifically at non-Jews seeking Jew-
ish roots (e.g., offering lists of Jewish names).
Jews, more traditionally defined, also use ancestry websites and DNA 
testing to craft narratives for themselves and their families. These narratives, 
drawing on the cultural importance of yichus [family background], often make 
connections to Jewish peoplehood and even ancient Israelite priestly lineages. 
Imhoff and Kaell’s research uses interviews, media analysis, and history to 
show the differences and unexpected overlaps in these two groups’ theologi-
cally freighted stories of family.
The next essay is “Contemporary Modern Orthodox Guidance Books 
on Marital Sexuality” by Evyatar Marienberg, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. In his research, Marienberg discovered that young women and 
men who are about to be married in haredi [Ultra-Orthodox] communities 
and in some Modern/National Orthodox circles are encouraged to have a few 
meetings with a specialist on the matter, a person of the same sex whose role is 
to instruct them about the marital act. In addition, he uncovered a wide range 
of specialized books and booklets that are available to them. In recent years, 
manuals were written also for, on the one hand, parents to help them explain 
sexuality to their young children and, on the other hand, to older adults to 
help them solve problems in their own sexual life. Schools are also slowly start-
ing to realize that they need to deal with these issues as well, and a growing 
number of curricula target this market. Marienberg’s essay examines several 
Jewish Orthodox works of these quite various kinds published in Israel and in 
the United States in the last few decades.
Often written for specific audiences—men, women, couples, Ultra-
Orthodox, Modern Orthodox, Chasidim, Sephardim, Ashkenazim, students, 
parents—these compositions present a broad view of the many ways sex is pre-
scribed in today’s Jewish Orthodox world. As part of his analysis, Marienberg 
found that some of these differences are related to historical and ideological 
tendencies and some to concepts about the “correct” structure of a good Jewish 
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family. Where relevant, he compares information gathered about oral guidance 
with the content of these books. He also addresses possible implications of 
these different prescriptions on the reality in bedrooms.
The next essay is “Challah from Abba: The Modern Jewish Father” by 
Rabbi Joshua Brown of Omaha’s Temple Israel. Since its birth, Judaism has 
been concerned with the effects of one generation’s actions upon another. The 
rabbis understand not only that every generation is different but also that each 
generation is dependent upon the ones that came before it and those to come 
after it.
As Brown sees it, we are currently at a crossroads in gender roles in 
America. As women increasingly move into being the dominant worker in 
the American workforce, men are being asked, or at times forced by their fam-
ily situation, to become the primary parent. This is a role that men have rarely 
played in the history of parenting but one that Judaism knows well.
In his essay Brown looks at the modern father and the many challenges 
he faces both at home and in his career as he strives to be an active parent. In 
particular, Brown focuses on the challenges facing Jewish fathers in the twenty-
first century as informed by modern psychology and the potential benefits that 
Jewish tradition has to offer them should they choose to accept the challenge.
Parenting also forms the subject of the next essay: “‘Jewish Education 
Begins at Home’: Training Parents to Raise American Jewish Children after 
World War II” by Joshua J. Furman, Rice University. During the post–World 
War II baby boom, Americans increasingly turned to child-rearing authori-
ties such as Benjamin Spock and Arnold Gesell for advice on how to raise 
happy, healthy sons and daughters. As Furman notes, Jewish parents relied 
on these same volumes, but they also used and learned from Jewish baby 
books. These texts offered parents detailed information about the significance 
and performance of Jewish birth ritual, advised readers on the process 
of choosing meaningful English and Hebrew names for their newborn, 
and allowed them to record important milestones in their child’s physical and 
spiritual development.
In Furman’s analysis, authors of these texts endeavored to teach mothers 
and fathers the knowledge and skills they would need to impart a strong sense 
of Jewish identity to their children. At the same time, the aesthetic and sub-
stantive resemblance of these sources to those authored for a broad American 
audience suggests an interest, on the part of both publishers and purchasers, 
to render and receive information about Jewish child rearing in a thoroughly 
contemporary format. This choice, Furman determines, reflects a broader 
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desire on the part of most American Jews to blend seamlessly into American 
life while simultaneously making some effort to maintain Jewish distinctive-
ness. This tension between modernity and tradition, between acculturation 
and preservation, flows through the heart of postwar American Jewish child-
rearing literature.
The final essay in this section is by Jennifer Sartori, Northeastern Uni-
versity: “Modern Families: Multifaceted Identities in the Jewish Adoptive 
Family.” In discussions of changes in the American Jewish family, attention 
often focuses on the dramatic increase in the number of interfaith families. Yet 
American Jewish families, like American families more broadly, are becoming 
increasingly “multi” in other ways as well: multiracial, multicultural, multi-
ethnic, multinational. In Sartori’s analysis, over the past several decades Jewish 
adoptive families have been at the forefront of these changes. The general trend 
in adoption toward adopting across boundaries of identity has been even more 
pronounced in the American Jewish community, with disproportionately high 
rates of transracial, transnational, and transcultural adoption.
Sartori’s analysis explores the ways Jewish adoptive families negotiate their 
multiple identities. Although adoption experts today emphasize the need for 
adoptees and their families to engage actively with the adoptees’ birth heritage 
and/or families of origin, the Jewish community, concerned about continuity, 
often seems to be pulling in the opposite direction, emphasizing the impor-
tance of a strong and exclusive Jewish identity for children. Important aspects 
of Jewish identity—including ideas about race, ancestry, and genetics—may 
also complicate adoptees’ sense of belonging within the Jewish community. 
Despite these challenges, many Jewish adoptees and their families draw strength 
from their diverse identities. The experiences of these families, as Sartori shows, 
can shed valuable light on the growing number of Jews and other Americans 
whose identities span religious, racial, and ethnic lines.
The first six essays, while set in earlier historical contexts, exhibit dis-
cernible links with the present. Likewise, the next five essays, set in the pres-
ent, find their full significance only through their links with the past. The 
final two essays, while pointing to the future, cannot be understood apart 
from issues of technology in the present and questions of ethics that stretch 
back into the past.
The first of these two essays—“The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human 
Embryos Using Cloning Technologies”—is by John D. Loike, Columbia Uni-
versity. He begins with a discussion and analysis of recent scientific discoveries 
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that have enhanced the capacity of scientists and clinicians to generate human 
preimplanted embryos in the laboratory. These embryos can be transferred into 
a woman’s uterus to allow the development of a healthy child.
Beginning in 2013, new technologies in the area of human cloning 
could also be applied to human reproduction. Loike describes one such bio-
technology, known as somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), which involves 
fusing a blood or skin cell that contains all forty-six chromosomes of DNA 
into an egg whose nuclear DNA has been removed. This reconstituted egg 
can now be induced to divide and differentiate in the laboratory to generate 
a four- to six-day-old human embryo that can be transplanted into a woman’s 
uterus to gestate.
As Loike sees it, one potential clinical advantage of SCNT is the capac-
ity to use nonsperm cells of infertile men to generate a healthy embryo. Yet 
from a Jewish legal perspective, this technology raises many issues, such as 
(a) Is human cloning permissible according to Jewish law? (b) What is the 
status of fatherhood in an embryo generated by “fertilizing” an egg without 
male sperm? (c) Is it permissible to use SCNT to clone a woman? As part of 
his essay, Loike addresses these issues from a Jewish legal perspective.
This volume’s final essay, by Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, University of Dayton 
Law School, is titled “Multiplying Motherhood: Gestational Surrogate Moth-
erhood and Jewish Law.” As she relates, Jews are some of the most aggressive 
users of assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Having children is both a 
halachic [legal] obligation for observant Jews and a cultural tradition for many 
Jews who do not live halachically observant lives.
According to Laufer-Ukeles, the push to reproduce among Jewish fami-
lies comes from biblical commandments, a desire to re-create a Jewish popula-
tion decimated by the Holocaust, cultural traditions that surround family life, 
and demographic concerns about sustaining Jewish culture and cultural tradi-
tions. The use of ART to help couples who struggle to reproduce the Jewish 
family is therefore a natural integration of tradition and transition in the use 
of modern technology.
In her research, Laufer-Ukeles has determined that Jewish law largely 
embraces ART with some reservations, particularly regarding artificial insemi-
nation by donor. Jewish families use ART in all its varieties with great and joy-
ous success. But problems do arise for those who engage in the use of ART. In 
particular, controversies have arisen regarding (1) when conversion is necessary 
to sustain the Jewishness of children born of ART; (2) when ART should be 
xviii
allowed, given the importance of biologically based legal parenthood in Jewish 
law as well as Jewish ethics that weigh against exploitation and commodifica-
tion of surrogates and gametes; and (3) whether children born of ART could 
potentially have a compromised legal status [mamzerut] that could prevent 
them from marrying within the Jewish religion and thereby creating their own 
Jewish families. Some potential problems can be solved relatively easily; oth-
ers cannot. In this essay, Laufer-Ukeles discusses potential problems for those 
using ART in the context of surrogacy, artificial insemination by donor, and 
egg donation. She then considers what the Jewish community can and should 
do to support the use of ART in creating Jewish families while avoiding ethi-
cal or legal pitfalls that can hurt ART participants or children born of ART.
Laufer-Ukeles’s essay has both theoretical and practical appeal, as many 
in the Jewish community are faced with these dilemmas or may be unaware of 
the potential consequences. Discussions of the meaning of the Jewish family 
and the use of fertility treatments can be beneficial to a wide potential audi-
ence of scholars and laypeople alike.
While of necessity not doing full justice to the wealth of insights and 
nuances that these essays contain, an editor such as myself does have a respon-
sibility to provide some sort of summation. For this volume, I shall do so 
simply by recalling some of the points that remain fixed in my mind:
1.  The family has consistently played a major role in Judaism as experi-
enced over countless generations in innumerable cultural and histori-
cal contexts.
2.  The makeup of the Jewish family has typically gone beyond the 
nuclear family to encompass a wide circle of relatives and nonrela-
tives. In real life, mishpachah is almost as likely to exclude some blood 
relatives as it is to include those with no genetic connections.
3.  The role of family members could on many occasions be expressed 
in terms of a hierarchical flow chart, but even for traditional societies 
these charts often mask rather than mirrored the way in which real 
power and influence are wielded.
4.  Jewish families have been, are, and almost certainly will continue to 
be dynamic rather than static. To a considerable extent, this is due 
to the fact that Jews, even the most traditional Jews, are innovators 
whose respect for the past is typically balanced by recognition of the 
realities of the present.
xix
5.  And finally (though in no particular order), Jewish families are dif-
ferent from others and are largely the same. For the most part, except 
when living in forced (or self-imposed) isolation from others, Jews are 
not immune to larger social and cultural influences, which they can 
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Uncovering the Ongoing Parental Role 
in Education in the Rabbinic Period
Susan Marks
Parents today involve themselves in their children’s higher education in 
myriad, often contradictory ways. On the one hand, privacy laws now insist 
that eighteen-year-olds need not share college transcripts with their parents. 
On the other hand, many students rely on their parents to pay a portion of 
tuition, and twenty-first century “helicopter” parenting does not always end 
at high school graduation. From this perspective, we might wonder why we 
so often think of rabbinic disciples—many of whom were certainly younger 
than today’s college students—as taught only by rabbis. Certainly, their 
mothers and fathers could have continued to play formative roles. Identify-
ing those ongoing educational functions of the rabbinic parent is the aim of 
this essay.
Educating young adults is, almost by definition, a fraught affair. I hap-
pened upon a wonderful outside-the-classroom reminder of this at the newly 
renovated Salvador Dalí Museum in St. Petersburg, Florida. The audio tour 
first led us through Dalí’s early paintings and then narrated the end of his art 
school career: he declined to take final exams because, he explained, none of 
his teachers knew as much as he did. Teachers will likely join me in recalling a 
student or two who felt that we had nothing new to teach them. Perhaps Dalí 
was correct, albeit not particularly politic, in his self-assessment. (Whether the 
self-satisfied students we have encountered could claim genius on the level of 
Dalí’s I leave to our own recollections.) There is, of course, also another player 
in this educational equation: the one paying the bills and looking out for the 
future of the student and the family. Need I add that Dalí’s father blew up 
at his son when he heard that his son withdrew? This is the relationship that 
interests me. The analogous dynamic deeply hidden within rabbinic litera-
ture—whereby a parent offers guidance, which is then met with the child’s 
acceptance or rejection—is ripe for dissection.
The historic focus on rabbi and disciple obscures the teaching relation-
ship between father and son.1 Rhetorically, rabbis put their own importance 
as teachers ahead of fathers, a high valuation that culminates in a prescription 
requiring that if faced with such a dilemma, a disciple must redeem his teacher 
from captivity before his father:
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If his father and his teacher were each taken captive, he must first 
ransom his teacher and afterwards ransom his father; but if his father 
was also a Sage he must first ransom his father and afterward ransom 
his teacher.2
Research into issues of redeeming captives examines the complexities of these 
prescriptions;3 here I want us only to recognize this attempted sleight of hand, 
which emphasizes that a father’s authority should have limits.4 When we look 
behind this veil, the importance of the father can be appreciated.
Our sense of the significance of rabbis as educators owes something to 
the fame of the rabbinic schools of Sura and Pumpaditha. Nevertheless, recent 
research challenges the power of these so-called academies and the place of 
formal education in the earliest rabbinic periods as discussed in the Mishnah 
and talmudic literature.5 This research argues instead that teachers are taught 
not in academies but rather in small circles of disciples. Extending this line 
of interrogation, my research challenges us to consider another overlooked 
relationship revealed by this new model of more intimate education: the rela-
tionship of the father and son, which continued despite rabbi-centric rhetoric.
Concerning the dietary matter of waiting between eating meat and milk, 
one disciple invokes his father as a standard:
Said Mar ‘Ukba, “In this matter of [waiting between eating meat 
and milk] I am lax compared with my father’s stringency [chala 
bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For if my father were to eat meat now he 
would not eat cheese until the very hour tomorrow, whereas I do 
not eat [cheese] in the same meal but I do eat it in my next meal.”6
Is the son accepting the greater knowledge of the father or challenging its 
appropriateness? Elsewhere also, these nuances have not been visible until the 
salient question concerning the pedagogical relationship of father and son was 
asked. Finding evidence that the son’s relationship to his father continues to 
loom over his education requires a portrait of education capable of including 
this complexity.
Analyzing education and considering ritual and lived religion, I argue, 
reveals the ongoing, important, and ambivalent educational relationship 
between parent and child, refining our understanding of transmission of ideas 
in the rabbinic period. Our present examination of largely underappreciated 
dynamics is in line with recent studies that have destabilized the image of 
rabbinic education as formal, institutional instruction. If we also take into 
account certain ideas that are well accepted in social theory but have not yet 
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been applied to the study of education in the rabbinic era, we can come to a 
more nuanced understanding of how the sons in these narratives might per-
ceive their world. These critical advances enable us to see anew the father-son 
relationships that have until now been hidden in plain sight.
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENERATIONAL SHIFTS
When the ninth century Babylonian rabbinic academies of Pumbedita and 
Sura traced their own histories, they portrayed their institutions as dating 
back to the third century and perhaps even earlier.7 That backdated pedigree 
had been accepted until David Goodblatt spearheaded a recent move toward 
historical skepticism about these early academies, a skepticism that appears 
to be coalescing into a new consensus. A consideration of linguistic evidence 
began the challenge: why should we translate “yeshiva” or metivta as “academy” 
when other possibilities, such as “study session,” exist?8 The terms beit midrash 
and bei rav, Hebrew and Aramaic, respectively, for “house of study,” appear 
about five times as often as the terms “yeshiva” and metivta, so perhaps this 
“academy” concept is not as foundational as has been assumed.9
The scholars examining early Jewish higher education argue persuasively 
that by bracketing our own emotional investment in the image of the academy, 
we come to recognize it as an anachronism. Study circles would have been 
more fluid—powerful as long as a particular rabbi was teaching, and then at 
some point students would move elsewhere. The resulting analytical frame-
work has already led to insights about early Jewish and Christian education, 
since the latter also seems to have not so immediately developed the formality 
once assumed.10 This paradigm shift opens a great many questions concerning 
how teachers related to their students, to one another, and to others—all are 
matters of communication and of power.11
Given this focus on the more informal and direct dynamics between 
teachers and students, it is not much of a leap to insert the question of how 
parents figure into this picture. In the area of meal studies, where I have done 
much of my research, Gil Klein has recently argued for the importance of 
considering the banquet hall space as an important locus for halachic discus-
sions.12 He insists that the meal itself functions not only as a setting for com-
munal reflection but also as an interactive space for the making of halachic 
decisions.13 Taken together, this suggests that we move our thinking from a 
model of academies to multiple and porous households as a context for law 
and, I would add, learning. Spilling over into mealtimes, this instruction was 
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hardly the classroom-bound phenomenon that earlier critics might have retro-
jected onto rabbinic-era settings.
The model of the removed and ascendant academy is being supplanted 
with more intimate alternatives. This is one step toward viewing the peda-
gogical relationship of father and son anew. Social science methodologies 
that examine community change over time, such as discussions of cohort 
replacement, provide additional steps, mapping the changing attitudes of 
new generations.14 In considering rabbinic literature, we do not have a mass 
of data, but these mathematically based methodologies do a service nonethe-
less: they reverse the landscape for us. They suggest that despite appearances 
to the contrary, rabbinic emphasis on transmission of tradition is only part of 
the story. They cause us to ask how rabbinic literature, as it conserves earlier 
wisdom, presents these moments of change. The tensions in rabbinic texts 
start to surface.
Of more help than simply revealing the underlying tensions, Pierre Bour-
dieu theorizes the self-reflexive aspect of acting from a differing point of view. 
Bourdieu expects us to look at change, but he also insists on our examining the 
structure that precedes this change as a prior moment. This is not, he explains, 
the Lévi-Straussian “structure” but instead is a continually revised “structur-
ing structure” that will serve as social context for actions that will, in turn, 
restructure this context and so forth.15 In our case, these “symbolic struggles 
over the perceptions of the social world” mean that students understand, act, 
and develop social capital in a world that never overlaps entirely with that of 
their parents or teachers.16 Our challenge becomes recognizing this disjuncture 
or lack of overlap in the discrete points of view concealed or revealed when 
fathers and sons contest each other’s ability to know and act.
RABBINIC FATHERS AND SONS
In recent years, a sugya, or talmudic grouping from the Babylonian Talmud 
tractate Berachot, has received much attention because of the clues it offers 
concerning rabbinic ideas about women, asceticism, and the construction 
of gender.17 Despite this flurry of study, little attention has been paid to the 
ongoing appearance of fathers in this set of narratives. As explained above, 
researchers had expected education and learning to happen within the acad-
emy, so there was no need to examine these interactions as peculiar. Contrary 
to this expectation, each example depicts a different fraught teaching and 
learning relationship between father and son. I will examine these three cases 
Uncovering the Ongoing Parental Role in Education in the Rabbinic Period 7
out of order so as to consider the most successful, the scariest, and, only then, 
the one with the most ambiguity.
Despite the fact that the father may send his son to a disciple circle, the 
father is responsible for helping the son find a bride. As becomes apparent 
below, this is a teachable moment. Or, in other words, the father persists in 
teaching his son about other aspects of life, including the importance of get-
ting married:
Later he was engaged in preparations for the marriage of his son into 
the family of R. Jose b. Zimra. It was agreed that [the son] should 
spend twelve years at the house of study [bei rav]. When the girl 
was led before him he said to them, “Let it be six years.” When they 
made her pass before him [a second time] he said, “I would rather 
marry [her first] and then proceed [to the house of study].” He felt 
abashed before his father, but the latter said to him, “My son, you 
have the mind of your creator; for in Scripture it is written first, ‘You 
will bring them and plant them,’ and later it is written, ‘And let them 
make Me a sanctuary that I may dwell among them.’”18
The father arranges for the chosen bride to pass before his hesitant son. When 
the son chooses marriage, he stands sheepishly before his father. And we do 
see the power relationship: the father has a hold on his son, and the son has fil-
ial obligations. In this particular glimpse, the father teaches his son about this 
balance of sexual relations and asceticism. His son does not know more than 
his father; the son comes to recognize a truth that his father has understood. 
Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s insights concerning struggles over perception help us 
realize that the separate perspective he represents is not altogether absent: had 
he (or someone like him) not perceived this question of marriage differently 
and not thought that his need to go study trumped his need to marry, there 
would be no purpose to telling the story.
The peaceful communication of father and son concerning the balance 
of Torah and family characterizes the narrative. Toward the end of this sugya 
we learn of a more violent clash. This father also presents his own opinion of 
how to balance study and sexual activity:
R. Joseph the son of Raba [was] sent [by] his father to the house of 
study to study before R. Joseph, and they arranged for him [to stay 
there for] six years. Having been there three years and the eve of the 
Day of Atonement approaching, he said, “I would go and see my 
family.” When his father heard [of his premature arrival] he took 
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up a weapon and went out to meet him. He said to him, “You have 
remembered your whore!”
Another version: He said to him, “You have remembered your 
dove!” They got involved in a quarrel and neither the one nor the 
other ate of the last meal before the fast.19
Things became so tense between this father and son that they began Yom Kip-
pur without a last meal. The weapon in the father’s hand certainly represents 
a contest of power, but the narrative underscores the incomplete success of 
the father’s argument. Aside from his need to resort to violence, the father’s 
language itself seems to be uncomfortable for the talmudic compilers. An 
additional angle is offered: some accounts read “dove” instead of “whore.” 
Those hearing the story have even wondered whether both father and son miss 
the meal because they are dead, each killing the other in the culmination of the 
violence percolating throughout.20 Ultimately, whatever the outcome there 
is no question here that the episode involves (a) an argument, (b) different 
perspectives, and (c) teaching from father to son. Regardless of what learning 
may occur, the father offers his son another perspective.
One more parental story appears in this sugya. In this narrative, the 
father finds his son’s behavior as fantastic as the previous father found his son’s 
opposition:
R. Hama b. Bisa went away [from home and] spent twelve years at 
the house of study. When he returned he said, “I will not act as did 
b. Hakina [surprising and thus scaring his wife to death].” He therefore 
entered the [local] house of study and sent word to his house. Mean-
while his son, R. Oshaia, entered, sat down before him and addressed 
to him a question on [one of the] subjects of study. [R. Hama,] seeing 
how well versed he was in his studies, became very depressed. “Had 
I been here,” he said, “I also could have had such a child.” When he 
entered his house his son came in, whereupon he rose before him, 
believing that [the other] wished to ask him some [further] legal 
questions. His wife chuckled. “What father stands up before a son?!”
[As an epilogue to this story, since from Bisa to Hama to Oshaia is 
the three generations,] Rami b. Hama applied to him [the following 
scriptural text:] And a threefold cord is not quickly broken is a refer-
ence to R. Oshaia, son of R. Hama, son of Bisa.21
Here, the father, like the son in our earlier text, balances marriage and study. 
He does wed first, but then he goes off to study before settling into his marital 
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home. Upon his return, he encounters a model young man: one well educated 
and respectful. We see him indulge in a private dream that this could be his 
son, which turns out to be true on one level. But isn’t such a compliant son 
still a fantasy, especially when the father has been absent? He encounters his 
son twice, and they don’t argue! We have the modern language of those who 
study adoption reminding us that he is only the biological father.
The wife of the absent father guffaws as he mistakenly rises before his 
son, for this father is turning the expected roles upside down. It would be 
appropriate to rise before a guest scholar but not before his own son.22 This 
erroneous posture becomes a joke, as the text both reveals and calls into ques-
tion the appropriateness of behavior between this father and this son. The son 
has inadvertently assumed the father’s role of the one who commands honor, 
thus transforming the relationship into a very different fantasy involving a 
weak father and a usurping son. The text does not tell us how this pair will 
move from the fantasy roles of father and son to a real relationship, but it does 
reveal a disconnect. The epilogue celebrates Oshaia as the third generation, the 
threefold cord that cannot be broken, but in doing so it may also be answering 
a concern that the father’s absence has endangered this legacy.
The three texts above, situated in this single sugya, offer a range of 
visions: a relationship between father and son that is productive of learning, 
a relationship based only on biology that can serve as a fantasy for at least a 
moment or two, and, in the final vignette, a father greeting his son with 
violence. Despite the backdrop of students going off to study, the learning 
relationship between father and son still exists, however successful or unsuc-
cessful. In fact, this variety suggests the tenacity of this relationship despite 
available alternatives. Because all the stories describe the encounters using the 
third person, however, we don’t have the sons’ perspective on this learning. 
That point of view resurfaces when we turn to the text examined briefly at the 
beginning and its twin:
Said Mar ‘Ukba, “In this matter of [waiting between eating meat 
and milk] I am lax compared with my father’s stringency [chala 
bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For if my father were to eat meat now he 
would not eat cheese until the very hour tomorrow, whereas I do 
not eat [cheese] in the same meal but I do eat it in my next meal.”
 Samuel said, “In this matter I am lax compared with my 
father’s stringency [chala bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For my father 
used to inspect his property twice a day, but I do so only once 
a day.” Samuel here follows his maxim, for Samuel declared, 
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“He who inspects his property daily will find a half-zuz coin [or 
the equivalent as profit].”23
In these accounts we see two sons, each in the same position and each offering 
an account of his personal practice. Each declares that his father is “stricter” 
than he is about these matters of dining and accounting. Each son describes 
his father’s practice and his own, neither denying what he learned from his 
father nor following it exactly.
Ironically, despite the first-person presentation, ambiguity remains. 
What does it mean when a son says that his father is “stricter”? A couple of 
translations try to decide the issue: “I [the son] cannot hold a candle to my 
father” or “I am as vinegar is to wine compared with my father,” working 
to make it clear that the son envies the father and would, if he could, aspire to 
such a pinnacle.24 But “stricter” does not always convey this nuance; it can 
also mean mulish and stubborn. For whatever reason, each son has arrived at 
a practice different from his father’s, even though he is aware of his father’s 
position. Does the son know more? Bourdieu would remind us that the social 
structure in which he operates differs from that of his father and will differ 
again through the son’s acting within and through these structuring structures. 
In this last case, the son’s actions diverge from his father’s actions because he, 
the son, lives in a world that is wholly other.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING
This study is an early exploration of these questions of fathers and sons. It 
has considered only a handful of examples and makes no claim that these are 
necessarily representative of other rabbinic presentations of parenting. Never-
theless, all of these encounters between fathers and sons prove both significant 
and ambiguous. The texts shows fathers who continue to teach their sons and 
who stand as models for their sons even after the sons have gone to study with 
other teachers. The texts also reveal sons who may or may not follow the guid-
ance their fathers offer.
This picture complicates a son’s obligation to ransom his teacher first. In 
their array, these fathers together reveal that while the rabbis may have aspira-
tions of replacing fathers with teachers, we must not assume that we know 
where one role leaves off and the other begins. This understanding urges us 
to revisit, from a refreshed perspective, texts that advocate an exploration of 
asceticism. Each young man who lives away from his wife and home also has 
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a natal family with whom to contend. We understand these young men dif-
ferently when we focus on the parent-child relationship. While some of the 
fathers explored above certainly count as sages in their own right, they act here 
as fathers. Further, the above struggles reveal the possibility of generational 
change, since the son’s point of view must be different than that of his father 
for such a contest to be required.
We would not have been able to observe either the involvement of the 
fathers or the ambivalent responses of their sons if research into anachronistic 
assumptions about the academies had not paved the way for conceiving more 
intimate environments for learning. Similarly, even the vivid distance sepa-
rating the house of study from the family home in some of these narratives 
does not sever the household relationships. By following learning back to the 
family, we witness aspects of family relationships too long overlooked. Just as 
we can begin to glimpse sons framing their own lives in dialogue with their 
fathers, attention to ritual and lived religion may have the power to reveal 
other consequential aspects of household activities and relationships.
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Mishnah Gittin: Family Relations as Metaphor  
for National Relations
David Brodsky
DIVORCE IN THE HEBREW BIBLE
The biblical heritage on divorce is brief and enigmatic.1 In the whole of the 
Torah, only one passage in Deuteronomy discusses the topic at all, and even 
that passage addresses a specific case, taking the general category for granted. 
Deuteronomy 24:1–4 states:
1. When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her, it shall 
be that if she does not find favor in his eyes because he found in her 
some unchaste matter [‘ervat davar], and he wrote [ve-khatav] her a 
writ of separation and put [ve-natan] it in her hand and sent her [ve-
shilleh>ah] from his house,
2. and she went out from his house and was to another man,
3. and the latter man hated her and wrote her a writ of separation and 
put it in her hand and sent her from his house, or if the latter man 
who took her as a wife passed away,
4. her first husband who sent her away may not take her again to be 
his wife after she has been defiled, for it is an abomination before 
the Lord, and you shall not cause the land which the Lord your God 
gave you as an inheritance to sin.2
Verses 1–3 are a long conditional case (protasis), with verse 4 being the conclu-
sion (apodosis), the ruling regarding the case described in verses 1–3. The case 
is that of a divorced wife who remarried and then was divorced or widowed by 
her second husband. The ruling is that she is no longer free to remarry her first 
husband. Such a union is described as an abomination and leading the land into 
sin. I would concur with the medieval Jewish commentator Nahmanides that 
the Deuteronomist is attempting to close a loophole. While the author allows 
for divorce and remarriage, he (and I do assume a male, patriarchal voice here) 
is against two men sharing a single wife, and he recognizes that divorce with 
remarriage could be used to allow two men to share a wife, divorcing her as they 
pass her back and forth between them. As Nahmanides explains, “The purpose 
of this negative commandment is so that [men] should not exchange their wives 
with one another, writing her a divorce document in the evening, and in the 
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morning she returns to him” (Nahmanides on Deut 24:4). Closing this loop-
hole, the Deuteronomist declares that once the divorcée has married another 
man, she may never return to her first husband.3
The problem for those attempting to formulate a more general biblical/
rabbinic law of divorce (as the author of tractate Gittin of the Mishnah clearly 
needs to do) is that they lack a biblical source that lays it out, since verses 1–3 
are descriptive of this specific case rather than prescriptive of the general law. 
That is, read this way, verses 1–3 do not define how divorce in general must 
be conducted; they merely describe a specific case that the author wishes to 
proscribe. They do not prescribe that a bill of divorce must be written and 
given by the husband to the wife; they merely indicate that if said bill has 
been given (which could be but one of many ways for a couple to divorce 
legally) and if she then goes and marries another man and divorces him, she 
may not return to her first husband.4
When read out of the context of verses 2–4, however, verse 1 can be 
read prescriptively, with its own protasis and apodosis, simply by reading vav-
conjunctive as vav-consecutive:
A. When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her, it shall 
be that if she does not find favor in his eyes because he found in her 
some unchaste matter,
B. he shall write [ve-khatav] her a writ of separation and put [ve-natan] 
it in her hand and send her [ve-shilleh>ah] from his house.
Section A therefore becomes the necessary condition for a generic divorce, 
with section B the required action to be taken. It is this reading that seems 
to motivate the rabbinic law of divorce delineated in this tractate. Thus, most 
of Mishnah Gittin (a second to third century rabbinic code on the laws of 
divorce) focuses on qualifying what constitutes the proper writing [ve-khatav] 
and delivery [ve-natan be-yadah] of the divorce document, and Mishnah Gittin 
9:10 debates what constitutes an “unchaste matter” [‘ervat davar] now required 
for a divorce.
DIVORCE AT ELEPHANTINE: A PRE-RABBINIC 
INTERPRETATION OF DEUTERONOMY?
While the later Rabbinic reading of Deuteronomy 24:1 permitted the man 
alone to give the bill of divorce, the Jews of fifth century BCE Elephantine, 
an island outpost along the Nile River in upper Egypt allowed both women 
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and men to divorce the other party. Thus, a Jewish marriage contract found 
in Elephantine dated to 449 BCE offers the following egalitarian pair of 
provisos:
Tomorrow or [the] next day, should Anani stand up in an assembly 
and say: “I hated Tamet my wife,” silver of hatre[d] is on his head. 
He shall give Tamet silver, 7 shekels [2 q(uarters)]5 and all that she 
brought in in her hand she shall take out, from straw to string.
 Tomorrow or [the] next day, should Tamet stand up and say: 
“I hated my husband Anani,” 2 q[uarters] silver of hatre[d] is on her 
head. She shall give to Anani silver, 7 shekels and all that she brought 
in in her hand she shall take out, from straw to string.6
This is a world away from the divorce law of the Mishnah some five hundred 
to seven hundred years later.7 In Elephantine, divorce is not unilateral and a 
written document is not required. Rather, either party may simply stand up 
and say “I hate So-and-So my husband/wife” and pay a relatively small fine 
(the Mishnah will later institute a much larger fine). Therefore, in fifth cen-
tury BCE Elephantine it would seem that the Jewish community was either 
ignoring Deuteronomy or reading Deuteronomy 24:1 as describing a specific 
case rather than prescribing how to conduct a divorce, leaving the divorce pro-
cess much more open than it would later become. How mainstream this prac-
tice was among Jews is unclear. For example, this is not the only practice of the 
Elephantine community that seems to conflict with common Jewish readings of 
Deuteronomy, leading us to question whether the Jews of Elephantine had Deu-
teronomy or chose to follow its proscriptions. Thus, for example, Deuteronomy 
repeatedly ordains that various sacrifices shall be made “in the place that the 
Lord shall choose” (Deut 12:14 and 18; 14:23; 15:20; and 16:2, 7, 11, 15, 
and 16), which Jews have classically taken to refer to the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem, implying that sacrifices shall be offered in Jerusalem (and nowhere 
else). Yet the Jews of Elephantine built a temple in their enclave in which they 
offered sacrifices in seemingly flagrant violation of this commandment.8 Of 
course, Deuteronomy never specifies where this place is that the Lord shall 
choose, and indeed, not all descendants of the ancient Israelites have taken 
it to refer to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (or to refer to all sacrifices). 
The Samaritans, descendants of remnants of the inhabitants of the North-
ern Kingdom, interpret those self-same verses as referring to Mt. Gerizim in 
Samaria, outside of Shechem, and Onias IV, son of Onias III, the high priest 
in Jerusalem, built a temple in Leontopolis in Egypt in which sacrifices were 
offered from 154 BCE until its destruction in 73 CE (Josephus, Antiquities 
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XIII, 62–73). Thus, not all Israelites and not all Jews seem to have inter- 
preted these verses as limiting all sacrifices to Jerusalem, although that is 
generally how those verses tend to be understood. So, while the Elephantine 
community may simply be an aberrant community that either barely knew 
or did not observe the laws of Deuteronomy, they may just as plausibly have 
been rather mainstream for their time in their practice and simply had dif-
ferent interpretations of the relevant verses in Deuteronomy from those that 
became prevalent later on.
THE MISHNAH
Returning to our topic of divorce, this leaves us unclear as to what Jewish 
divorce practice was before the Mishnah.9 Nevertheless, what is clear is that 
once the rabbis came to read Deuteronomy 24:1 as prescriptive rather than 
descriptive, a Jewish divorce would now come with the requirement that the 
husband (1) write a bill of divorce, which he must then (2) give to his wife. 
Interestingly, with this stringency in place, the Mishnah spends most of its 
time exploring the leniency of permitting him to designate others as his agent 
for both tasks. Thus, most of the tractate is concerned with the details of how 
the husband can designate agency for others to write the bill of divorce for him 
and how and when his messenger may deliver the bill to his wife.
While this exegetical history helps explain both the Mishnah’s rulings 
and its focus, it fails to explain the Mishnah’s organization. Rather than lead 
us into or through these laws in a clear and organized fashion—starting with 
the more general principles and working its way to the more technical details, 
or beginning with the laws in Deuteronomy 24:1 and walking us through the 
laws that ensue therefrom—the Mishnah begins by plunging into the highly 
specific case of a bill of divorce that has been brought to Israel from outside 
of the land, which immediately requires a detailed delineation of Israel’s 
borders. Thus, the Mishnah opens by stating that “One who brings a divorce 
document from the province of the sea10 must say, ‘it was written in front of 
me and signed in front of me’” (Mishnah Gittin 1:1), which leads to R. Judah 
defining “From Reqem to the east, and Reqem is like the east. From Ashkelon 
to the south, and Ashkelon is like the south. From Akko to the north, and 
Akko is like the north” (Mishnah Gittin 1:2)11—marking off the eastern, 
southern, and northern borders of the land of Israel, with the western border 
presumably marked off by the Mediterranean Sea.12 From a logical perspec-
tive, starting with this sub-subcategory of the law is a terrible place to begin. It 
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assumes knowledge of the general category of bills of divorce and even assumes 
knowledge that such bills may be sent by messenger, a caveat that is not intui-
tively obvious from the Bible. I would argue that this is not the product of 
sloppiness or disorganization but instead is a concerted effort on the part of 
the author to signal from the beginning that the purpose of this tractate is 
much more than simply to delineate the laws of divorce.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MISHNAH IN LIGHT  
OF SECOND TEMPLE LITERATURE
Scholars have shown that the Mishnah is a carefully structured text with 
an organization that is not classically modern but nevertheless is carefully 
planned.13 Second Temple and rabbinic period Jewish texts in general (par-
ticularly the works of Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha) often deftly signal the 
central theme of the work through the framing of the text—that is, through 
subtle references embedded in the opening and closing sections of the work. 
Where the modern author will write an overt introductory and concluding 
thesis statement, the late antique Jewish author may camouflage it. Thus, 
for example, the Septuagint’s version of the book of Esther adds a prophetic 
dream that Mordechai receives at the beginning of the story and then is 
referenced again, envelope style, at the end, completely reframing the older 
Hebrew story, which had conspicuously lacked any mention of God, as now 
entirely God’s plan.
Indeed, often the theme is signaled to the reader in the beginning, mid-
dle, and end of each work. Thus, 2 Maccabees opens with a seemingly unre-
lated wish by the authors for the Jews of Egypt to whom they are writing that 
God grant them “a heart to worship and do his will with a strong heart and a 
willing spirit,” that he open their hearts “to his law and his commandments, 
and may he bring peace,” and that he hear their prayers and be reconciled to 
them and not forsake them in time of evil (2 Macc 1:3–5).14 While this letter 
is technically just a formal greeting and is ostensibly unrelated to the story 
that follows, it is the central theme of the text and the way that the author 
wishes to (re)frame the story of the revolt: it is only through worshipping and 
keeping God’s laws and commandments that God will have mercy on the Jew-
ish people again and restore his Temple. This theme is reiterated in a crucial 
martyrdom scene centrally located in the middle of the story in which—unlike 
their predecessors at the beginning of the story who had brought God’s wrath 
upon Israel for abandoning God’s ways—the martyrs now stay faithful to 
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God’s commandments even at the cost of their own lives. As the youngest of 
the seven sons admonishes the Seleucid king in 7:30–33:
I will not obey the king’s command, but I obey the command of the 
law that was given to our ancestors through Moses. But you, who 
have contrived all sorts of evil against the Hebrews, will certainly 
not escape the hands of God. For we are suffering because of our 
own sins. And if our living Lord is angry for a little while, to rebuke 
and discipline us, he will again be reconciled with his own servants.
This crucial chapter acts as the turning point in the story, and it is immediately 
followed by the Maccabees’s change in fortune, “for the wrath of the Lord 
had turned to mercy” (2 Macc 8:5). Finally, in the last battle at the end of 
the book, Judah Maccabee “stretched out his hands toward heaven and called 
upon the Lord who works wonders; for he knew that it is not by arms, but as 
the Lord decides, that he gains the victory for those who deserve it” (2 Macc 
15:21). Together, the beginning, middle, and end of 2 Maccabees signal the 
central theme of the text: God will protect those who obey his law and aban-
don those who abandon it.15
Let me offer one more brief example. The book of Jubilees, which coin-
cidentally is divided into exactly fifty chapters (at least in the Ethiopic version, 
the only complete extant version), matching the fifty years of the Jubilee, is 
framed at its beginning and end by chapters that emphasize the importance of 
the Sabbath. Thus, from its very opening and closing sections (chapters 2 and 
50), the book of Jubilees emphasizes the importance of the Sabbath, which 
is the culmination of the week of days, even as the book as a whole emphasizes 
the Jubilee, which is the culmination of the week of weeks of years. Indeed, 
in chapter 50, the author marks the giving of the book of Jubilees as follow-
ing on the Jubilee of Jubilees since the opening of the book with the days of 
Adam (and the first Sabbath). The framing of the book of Jubilees, opening 
and closing with its central theme of the Sabbath and the week (of days/years), 
seems striking.
What is less clear is whether the book of Jubilees also uses its center to 
establish its theme. On the one hand, I do not believe that all ancient Jew-
ish texts necessarily use the exact same structure, and therefore, perhaps we 
should leave Jubilees as using its beginning and end (and not the middle) to 
establish its central theme. On the other hand, it is possible that the central 
chapter (25) is being used as well to help establish the core theme of the 
book. If part of the purpose of keeping the Sabbath is to be holy, to be right 
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with God, and to be allowed to dwell in the land thereby (as Jubilees puts it, 
“the land will keep its Sabbaths when they dwell upon it” [Jub 50:3]),16 then 
Rebecca’s exhortation of Jacob in chapter 25 not to marry the daughters of 
the Canaanites and her subsequent blessing of Jacob—that he may follow in the 
way of righteousness, multiply and inherit the land, and have “a blessed and 
holy seed” (25:16–18)—may be no less central to the theme of the book than 
its opening and closing sections on the Sabbath. It is through the keeping of 
the Sabbath and through the separation from the ways of the Canaanites that 
Israel, the seed of Jacob, follow in the path of righteousness and that they merit 
to multiply and inherit the land and ultimately become a blessed and holy 
seed. Thus, these three sections seem to be working together to establish the 
central theme of the book.
Many more examples of this type of structure can be offered from the 
literature of the Second Temple period, but these three should suffice for 
the moment. The point is that late Second Temple period texts sometimes 
(I would argue often) (1) signal their thesis in the beginning, middle, and end 
of the text, and (2) they sometimes do so covertly through passages that at 
first blush appear to be ancillary, such as in the greeting in the opening letter 
of 2 Maccabees.
WHAT MISHNAH GITTIN’S STRUCTURE CAN TEACH US 
ABOUT ITS MESSAGE
I would argue that the Mishnah should be read very much in context of this 
relatively contemporary Second Temple period genre: at times signaling its 
intent in the beginning, middle, and end of the tractate.17 I shall demonstrate 
that Gittin is a prime example of this phenomenon. In Mishnah Gittin, the 
beginning, middle, and end of the tractate are strikingly out of place where 
they are found, drawing attention to themselves.18 The opening section, as we 
have seen, addresses a bill of divorce that is brought from outside of the land of 
Israel, forcing a discussion of the borders of Israel: what is in and what is out. 
At the center of the tractate is a lengthy tangent about those rulings that were 
made for the sake of the public welfare. While they begin with divorce-related 
rulings, they quickly digress to list the numerous other rulings that were made 
for these purposes, wandering from there to those rulings that were made for 
the sake of peace, a related though separate category. The final mishnah of the 
tractate has little to do with the mishnayot that precede it, though it is central 
to the topic of divorce, delineating the three main rabbinic interpretations 
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of Deuteronomy 24:1 and the conditions required for divorce. In fact, this 
mishnah is so central to any delineation of the rabbinic law of divorce that 
it is difficult to understand why the redactor of the tractate saved it until the 
very end. It is one of only two places where the Mishnah makes any attempt 
to connect its law back to this key biblical verse and the only place where the 
Mishnah explains its ideology behind divorce. Ostensibly, the tractate should 
have opened with this explanation before moving into the detailed laws rather 
than the reverse.
While the rest of the tractate lays out the laws of the commissioning, 
writing, and delivery of the bill of divorce in a fairly orderly manner, the begin-
ning, middle, and end of the tractate stand out. I would argue that the three 
work together to point the reader to the central theme of the tractate, a theme 
that is simultaneously on the individual level and the national level. By open-
ing with a marking of the boundaries between that which is inside and outside 
of the land of Israel, I would suggest that the tractate is pointing to divorce 
as an act that is marking the same boundaries on the individual level. The 
middle section explains why these boundaries need to be established: originally 
 [ba-rishonah] one ruling was made, but since then circumstances have not 
turned out the way they were intended, and a corrective must be instituted. 
For the sake of the public welfare, indeed for the sake of peace, matters cannot 
always remain as they were originally established. Sometimes a corrective is 
necessary. Here, divorce is precisely that corrective for the marriage that is not 
working. The final mishnah clarifies that while divorce was only permitted by 
the School of Shammai in cases of adultery (reading the “unchaste matter 
[‘ervat davar]” of Deuteronomy 24:1 as truly unchaste [devar ‘ervah]), the 
School of Hillel and later Rabbi Akiva offered their own correctives, permit-
ting it ultimately any time that the two were not getting along.
By using the national boundaries as a metaphor for individual boundar-
ies vis-à-vis divorce, the redactor is reversing the prophetic use of divorce as a 
metaphor for the nation and its ruptured relationship with God (Isa 50:1, Jer 
3:1–8, and Mal 2:13–16). Yet by linking the two, the redactor opens up the 
possibility of reading in both directions—of national boundaries as metaphor 
for individual boundaries and as the marking of these personal boundaries as 
metaphor for the nation.19 Indeed, most of the rulings “for the public welfare” 
and “for the sake of peace” delineated in the epicenter of the tractate (from 
Mishnah Gittin 4:2 to 5:9, one mishnah shy of two full chapters), which 
have little if anything to do with divorce, point to the welfare of the nation 
as a whole, culminating in the final mishnah of this central section, which 
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addresses the issue of peace between members of the h>avurah [the rabbinic 
community] and nonmembers of the h>avurah [the non-rabbinic commu-
nity] and ultimately between Jews and gentiles (5:9). The importance of this 
middle section cannot be overemphasized. It comprises more than one-fifth 
of the tractate. It is placed smack in the middle of the tractate, and except for 
one or two mishnayot used to segue into it, it has almost nothing ostensibly 
to do with the topic of divorce. These very facts call attention to this sec-
tion and force us to ask what its role is here. I would argue that it gives the 
central theme to the tractate on several levels. Its theme is laws that originally 
[ba-rishonah] were one way but then were changed “for the sake of the public 
welfare” or “for the sake of peace.” While divorce is never mentioned as one of 
these rules that was changed for the public welfare or for the sake of peace, it 
is thematically the prime candidate.
In the Gospel of Mark (10:2–12, discussed in more detail below), Jesus 
challenges the Pharisees (i.e., the predecessors to the rabbis) on the law of 
divorce in Deuteronomy 24. Basing himself on the creation story (“male and 
female he created them” [Gen 1:27] and “For this reason a man shall leave his 
father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one 
flesh” [Gen 2:24]), Jesus argues that two people whom God has joined, no 
man should put asunder. The Damascus Document in the Dead Sea Scrolls 
is only slightly more lenient. Interestingly, it too uses Genesis 1:27 to argue 
against divorce (or, more accurately, against remarriage), stating, “[They] are 
caught twice in fornication: by taking two wives in their lives, even though 
the principle of creation is ‘male and female he created them’ (Gen 1:27). 
And the ones who went into the ark ‘went in two by two into the ark’ (Gen 
7:9).”20 As Lawrence Schiffman has argued, the addition of the words “in 
their lives” implies something more than just a proscription against polygamy. 
The additional words would seem to imply that a person should only marry 
one person in their lifetimes. While this may not be a proscription against 
divorce in general (the Temple Scroll [54:4], for example, acknowledges the 
existence of divorcées without making an issue of it), it does seem to proscribe 
remarriage by either party should the couple separate.21 Similarly, Paul prefers 
that husbands and wives not separate (mē chōristhēnai; 1 Cor 7:10), but if 
they do, he exhorts the woman to remain unmarried (menetō agamos; 1 Cor 
7:11). Likewise, in Mark 10:2–12 (cf. Matt 9:3–9) Jesus is quoted as saying, 
“Whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity [mē epi porneia], and mar-
ries another, commits adultery [moichatai]” (Matt 19:9).22 Thus, even as the 
early Christian sect and the Dead Sea sectarians allowed for some couples to 
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divorce (i.e., to separate, at least in cases of porneia), they seem to counter one 
of the key elements of mishnaic divorce: that the wife (both parties, really) be 
completely free to remarry (Mishnah Gittin 9:1–3).
I would argue that the Mishnah is subtly using the section on policies 
that change for the sake of peace and for the public welfare as a way to respond 
to Jews such as Paul, Jesus in the Gospels, and the Dead Sea sectarians, arguing 
that indeed, originally marriage (and not divorce) was the correct law for the 
divorcing couple, but their circumstances changed (they no longer get along), 
and now a corrective is needed for the sake of peace, for the public welfare. 
That is on the individual level. On the national level, I would argue that the 
Mishnah is using this central theme coupled with the overriding theme of 
the tractate to demarcate the people. Originally those boundaries were broader, 
but for the sake of the public welfare the Mishnah is now marking who is in 
and who is out. Thus, this section culminates with Mishnah Gittin 5:9, point-
ing to the groups who are outside the bounds of the rabbinic community:
A. A woman may lend her fellow, who is suspected when it comes to 
sabbatical year produce, a nafah-sieve, a kevarah-sieve, a millstone, 
or an oven; but she may not winnow or grind with her. The wife of 
a Fellow may lend the wife of an ‘am ha’aretz [a Jew who is not a 
member of the rabbinic fellowship]23 a nafah-sieve, a kevarah-sieve, 
and she may winnow, grind, and sift with her; but, once she pours 
water [on it], she may not touch it with her, because one may not 
encourage those who commit sin.
B.  And all of these they only said for the sake of peace.
C.  One may encourage gentiles on the sabbatical year, but not Jews. 
And one may inquire about their welfare for the sake of peace.
In ever widening circles, section A delineates relations first between properly 
and not properly practicing rabbinic Jews, broadening to delineate relations 
between rabbinic and non-rabbinic Jews. Section C finally widens to delineate 
relations between Jews and gentiles, all for the sake of peace. I would argue 
that it is not happenstance that the focal section of the tractate ends by pre-
scribing rulings for the sake of peace between rabbinic and non-rabbinic Jews 
and between Jews and gentiles, pointing to what I believe is the larger national 
agenda of this tractate. The tractate opened by delineating what was in and 
what was out of the land of Israel, and mishnah 5:9 points us to those who 
are in and out, first of the h>avurah, the rabbinic community, and finally of the 
people of Israel.
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The final mishnah of the tractate (9:10) points us even further to who 
would seem to be one of the key groups intended here. That passage con-
tains one of the only parallels in all of the Mishnah with the New Testament. 
When the School of Shammai states that “A man should not divorce his wife 
unless he found in her a matter of unchastity [devar ‘ervah], as it is said, ‘if he 
found in her an unchaste matter [‘ervat davar]’ (Deut 24:1),” this directly par-
allels the position attributed to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount: “I say to 
you that whosoever divorces his wife, except for a matter of unchastity [logou 
porneias], makes her an adulteress” (Matt 5:32; cf. Matt 19:9). While the 
Gospel of Matthew sets this up as being in conflict with Deuteronomy 24:1 
(Matt 5:31), the School of Shammai’s exegesis in the final mishnah of our 
tractate demonstrates that this position was as easily derived from the verse 
as it was in opposition to the verse. Indeed, the Greek logou porneias can be 
read simultaneously as the direct equivalent of both the School of Shammai’s 
Hebrew devar ‘ervah and the biblical ‘ervat davar, which the latter interprets 
through the reversal of the construct (if we read according to the printed 
edition of the Mishnah).24 In fact, while the parallel in the Gospel of Luke 
(“Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and 
whoever marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery”)25 
lacks the exception regarding unchastity that connects the ruling both to 
Deuteronomy 24:1 and the School of Shammai, it also lacks the claim that 
Jesus stated this in opposition to the biblical law, leaving open the possibility 
that the law was developed from rather than in opposition to Deuteronomy 
24:1. Indeed, even in Mark 10:2–9 (and its parallel in Matt 19:3–9), Jesus 
only counters the Pharisees’ plain reading of Deuteronomy 24:1 by explain-
ing it (midrashically) in light of Genesis 1–2:
Some Pharisees came, and to test him they asked, “Is it lawful for 
a man to divorce his wife?” He answered them, “What did Moses 
command you?” They said, “Moses allowed a man to write a cer-
tificate of dismissal and to divorce her.” But Jesus said to them, 
“Because of your hardness of heart he wrote this commandment for 
you. But from the beginning of creation, ‘God made them male and 
female’ (Gen 1:27). ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father 
and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one 
flesh’ (Gen 2:24). So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore 
what God has joined together, let no one separate.”
Even here in Mark, the Pharisees’ position can be read in line with the School 
of Hillel in Mishnah Gittin 9:10 (And the School of Hillel say, “Even if she 
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ruined his dinner, as it says, ‘because he found in her an unseemly matter 
[devar ‘ervah]’”26 [Deut 24:1]), and Jesus’s position could still be quite close 
to that of the School of Shammai, making this conflict no greater than the 
internal rabbinic debate. Thus, in this nascent period for both Christianity 
and rabbinic Judaism, the two may have converged more than they diverged, 
at least regarding the laws of divorce and their derivation from the Bible.27
CONCLUSION
What I would like to argue from the structure of the Mishnah is that 
when we read the beginning, middle, and end of the tractate together, the 
redactor would seem to be claiming that this period of commonality was 
an earlier period [ba-rishonah], before the corrective was needed.28 When 
these three key sections of the tractate are brought together, two pictures 
thus form—one on the individual level and the other on the national. The 
individual level is a case for divorce (contra the Mishnah’s contemporary 
Christian interlocutors), basing it in the general position that sometimes 
earlier rulings and transactions—even when made with the best of inten-
tions—are flawed and need to be fixed, with the national level delineating 
what and who is in and outside of the land and people of Israel. In other 
words, this tractate would seem to be attempting to establish a parting of the 
ways from non-rabbinic Jews (Christians among them), arguing that while 
perhaps these non-rabbinic Jews and their positions were once considered 
within the boundaries of Israel (as evidenced, for example, by Jesus’s posi-
tion on divorce generally conforming with that of the School of Shammai), 
a corrective is now needed for the sake of the public welfare: non-rabbinic 
Jews, including Christians, ought henceforth to be considered outside the 
bounds of Israel. Interestingly, even by using the dispute on the interpreta-
tion of Deuteronomy 24:1 as a way of both engaging non-rabbinic Jews and 
Christians in the internal dialogue and simultaneously rejecting them as 
outside the bounds of the community, Mishnah Gittin may be only further 
continuing its uncanny likeness to the Gospels, especially the Gospels of 
Mark and Matthew. Mishnah Gittin 9:10 and Mark 10:2–12 (and its paral-
lel in Matt 19:3–12) use the dispute (between the Schools of Shammai and 
Hillel and between the Pharisees and Jesus, respectively) on the context in 
which to read Deuteronomy 24:1 as both the way of including Jesus and the 
Pharisees/rabbis in the same exegetical world yet simultaneously as the way 
to reject the Pharisees/Jesus as outside of acceptable exegesis and practice. 
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In other words, both the Mishnah and the Gospel of Mark are using this 
exegetical dispute as a way to demarcate their ideological community and to 
reject the other as outside those bounds.
In 2003, Adam Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed edited an important 
book that challenged the long-standing notion that Jews and Christians had 
“parted ways” by the second century CE. In this iconic volume The Ways That 
Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, 
they and a number of other scholars argue that Jews and Christians continued 
to interact and intermingle and mutually to affect another long after the sup-
posed “parting of the ways” in the first and second centuries.29 The present 
essay does not attempt to answer whether Jews (rabbinic and non-rabbinic, 
Christian and non-Christian) were interacting with one another in actu. How 
the communities were behaving is beyond the scope of this essay. What this 
essay does attempt to show is that in the late second and early third centuries, 
the redactor of Mishnah Gittin attempted to use the theme of divorce as a way 
of mapping out the boundaries of Israel both geographically and metaphori-
cally, the land and the people.
And in this sense, the author should be seen as a parallel to his near 
contemporary, Justin Martyr, whom Daniel Boyarin has argued was one of the 
first to use the notion of heresy as a way of marking the ideological boundar-
ies of his community.30 Boyarin has already argued that the Mishnah ought to 
be read in light of Justin Martyr’s heresiology as itself attempting to mark its 
ideological territory.31 I would here like to add Mishnah Gittin to the places 
and ways in which the redactor of the Mishnah is attempting to create those 
boundaries and separate the rabbinic community from non-rabbinic versions 
of Judaism. Interestingly, Ishay Rosen-Zvi has argued that Mishnah Gittin 
9:10 better reflects the ideology of the second century CE than that of the first 
century, which it claims through its attributions to represent.32 This modifica-
tion would make the ideology behind that Mishnah contemporary with Justin 
Martyr and thus date it to precisely the time in which Boyarin has argued that 
the notion of heresiology and attempts to bound communities based on ideol-
ogy were developing among some Christians and rabbinic Jews.
One final comment: we should note that we are interpreting a text about 
gender (divorce) as addressing the national and the political. Here, gender and 
the marital couple are being used as a metaphor for the nation, and national 
boundaries are being drawn through the description of marital boundar-
ies. That is, gender is never merely gender, and the act of defining who is a 
Jew is never genderless. What are traditionally seen as gender-related topics 
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concurrently transcend gender. That is, in much of rabbinic literature, gender 
is inextricably part and parcel of rabbinic ideologies and modes of thinking 
that range far beyond what is traditionally considered a gender-related topic.
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All in the Family: Ancient Israelite 
and Judahite Families in Context
Cynthia Shafer-Elliott
INTRODUCTION
Today we often hear about the decline of the modern family. Ask any politi-
cian and he or she will provide you with statistics on divorce, abuse, consum-
erism, and lack of parental involvement—just to name a few. However, when 
we think of family, typically several images come to mind: we think of the 
members of our own family, family meals and get-togethers, and the occa-
sional conflicts that arise at them. We all have stories we could tell about the 
last family holiday or dinner that ended in disaster, but we also think about 
those moments when joy and sorrow are shared among related people who 
care about each other.
Many disciplines study the family, and I am pleased to say that within 
the fields of biblical studies and archaeology, the family has become a subject 
of research. I have long been interested in the study of ancient Israelite and 
Judahite families,1 but my academic curiosity about the subject grew with the 
expansion of my own family. I found that considering the ancient Israelite 
family not only aids in our understanding of ancient Israel and Judah but also 
helps us appreciate our own family and its traditions more fully. The scope 
of this essay is not to argue for or against any particular aspect of the ancient 
family; rather, in this essay I describe the context of the ancient Israelite and 
Judahite family. More specifically, I address who was considered part of the 
family, how they lived, and what their daily lives consisted of. The sources used 
for this discussion include textual descriptions from the Hebrew Bible and 
archaeological remains viewed through the lens of household archaeology.2
DEFINING THE ANCIENT ISRAELITE FAMILY
Before a discussion of who was part of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family 
can occur, the terminology used must be clarified. Within the Hebrew Bible, 
there are several terms that denote various degrees of “family.” The largest 
social group was the tribe [shebet, matte], while the smallest social group was 
the bayit ‘ab or bayit ‘em, translated as “house of the father” or “house of the 
mother.” The middle social group was the mishpachah, and this term is used 
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in a variety of ways: in reference to nations or large social groups (e.g., Gen 
10:5, 32; 12:3; Amos 3:2), as species of animals (Gen 8:19), and of Israel as 
a whole (Amos 3:1), or separately as the northern kingdom of Israel and the 
southern kingdom of Judah (Jer 33:24). However, most of the occurrences of 
mishpachah within the Hebrew Bible indicate a clan or extended family (Exod 
6:14, 25; Num 1:2).3 J. Blenkinsopp further defines mishpachah as “a group 
of individual families or households forming a major unit of the tribe and 
claiming common, unilineal descent from a real or fictitious ancestor.”4 Rarely 
was a person considered an individual; rather, a person was considered in light 
of who he or she was connected to—the group the person was a part of: the 
person’s bayit ‘ab [or immediate family], mishpachah [extended family or clan], 
and shebet [or tribe].
A second clarification regarding families in ancient Israel and Judah 
also needs to be made. It is often thought that a household solely consists of 
immediate family members who live together; however, anthropologists and 
sociologists who study families in various geographical locations and chrono-
logical periods make a distinction between family and household. A family 
is defined by kinship, descent, and marriage, while a household is defined 
by coresidence and/or the sharing of domestic functions.5 In other words, a 
family is a group of people who are related to each other either biologically 
or through marriage, but they may or may not live together. A household is a 
group of people who typically live and/or work together but may or may not 
be related. For instance, an ancient Israelite household could include immedi-
ate and extended family members but also nonrelated members such as slaves, 
guests, concubines, or hired workers. These same members of the household 
could live together in the same house or compound, while others (such as a 
hired worker) could live elsewhere but come to the household land to work.6
Ancient Israel and Judah practiced a social residence pattern that anthro-
pologists refer to as “patrilocal.” Patrilocal residence is when a married couple 
resides with or near the husband’s parents or household. In other words, a son 
remains in his father’s household [bayit ‘ab] after reaching maturity and brings 
his wife to live with his family after marriage. Conversely, when a daughter 
marries she leaves her father’s house and resides within the household of her 
husband’s father or household. Most Israelite marriages were endogamous, 
which is the custom of marrying only within the limits of a local community, 
clan, or tribe, as opposed to exogamy, which is the custom of marrying outside 
the limits.7
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The nucleus of the Israelite family, the bayit ‘ab, could therefore be 
defined as a household, since it included related and nonrelated members 
who worked together and, more than likely, lived together. The mishpachah 
[clan] would have consisted of several of these households living within close 
proximity to each other, often forming their own village. Several clans that 
claimed a common ancestor made up a tribe and lived within the boundaries 
of their tribe’s geographical territory. An example of an Israelite household 
can be found in Judges 17–21, where the household of Micah the Ephraimite 
is mentioned. Within this narrative, Micah is the patriarch of the household 
that includes his widowed mother, his sons, and more than likely their families 
(17:2, 18:22). The household expands when Micah hires a young Levite to 
serve as the household priest (17:10–12). The members of the household lived 
in several dwellings surrounded by a boundary wall (18:14–16, 22). This nar-
rative helps illustrate the Israelite and Judahite household and its members and 
also introduces the second aspect of the household—the physical house itself.
THE ISRAELITE HOUSE
At present, who was part of the Israelite/Judahite household has been estab-
lished, yet a description of what the houses may have looked like is just as 
important to include when attempting to understand the ancient family. 
Using archaeology to study the ancient household has become its own spe-
cialization called “household archaeology.” Even though the household is the 
smallest and most common of the social groups, it is also the most plentiful. 
There are three main aspects of the household to study: (1) the material aspect, 
which consists of the dwelling, secondary buildings and features, areas where 
household activities took place, and its possessions; (2) the social aspect, mean-
ing the members of the household and their relationship to each other; and 
(3) the behavioral aspect, which looks at the activities the household members 
performed.8 Taking these aspects into consideration, household archaeology 
can be characterized as the archaeological study of a household’s buildings, 
possessions, and members and the activities they engaged in. Through this 
investigation information regarding the activities and behaviors of the mem-
bers of the household can be better understood, providing a more comprehen-
sive picture of the daily life of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family.9 While 
the social aspect of the household was discussed above, the material aspect 
of the physicality of the house needs to be addressed.
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The Israelite/Judahite house itself has been extensively researched and 
has no shortage of analysis. In the 1970s archaeologists began to notice that 
the excavated houses from Israel’s Iron Age (ca. 1200–586 BCE; i.e., the 
time of Israelite and Judahite kings) had a similar plan and common features. 
The typical house had two floors and a flat roof. The first floor consisted 
of a back broad room with one to three (oftentimes three) rooms running 
perpendicular to it. The first floor had wood or stone pillars supporting the 
second floor; these pillars often had short boundary walls between them to 
help segregate space. Houses were small but still ranged in size depending on 
whether the house was in an urban or rural environment.10 For this reason, 
it is best to think of the Israelite house as being multifunctional, with several 
household chores and activities taking place in the limited space available. 
The first floor was used for a variety of domestic activities, including storage, 
production (such as pottery making), food preparation and consumption, 
and religious ritual. The second floor was the family’s sleeping quarters and 
could also have been used for some light domestic activities, such as weav-
ing. The flat roof of the house also served as a space in which to conduct 
production chores, such as drying flax (Josh 2:6), or for sleeping in the hot 
summer months.
What to call these houses is a matter of some debate. Some scholars 
call them “the four-room house” because the floor plan typically includes 
four rooms; other scholars call them “pillar houses,” since most of them 
have pillars, while still others call them “the Israelite house.” It must be said, 
however, that many of these houses had more or less than four rooms, and 
some had no pillars (at least not found); similarly, it is difficult to say with 
certainty if these houses were used only by the Israelites. What is known is 
that this style of house was the popular form in ancient Israel/Judah dur-
ing the Iron Age; thus, perhaps it is best to call it the Iron Age house until 
proven otherwise.11
Regardless of what it is called, the basic features of the house during 
the Iron Age are consistent and would include space to conduct a variety 
of household activities. Household space on the bottom floor was multi-
functional, with several household chores taking place in the limited space 
available. Some of the common features of an Iron Age house include stone 
floors, storage space, ovens, and courtyards. In many Iron Age houses, the 
perpendicular side room closest to the front door contained a stone floor. It 
has been argued that the location coupled with the stone flooring suggests 
that this is where some of the smaller herd animals, such as sheep and goats, 
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were stabled. The stone floor would have withstood the heavy trampling 
of animal hooves and would also allow for easier cleanup.12 Households 
were self-sufficient and needed space to store their grain, wine, and other 
household goods. When Iron Age houses are excavated, large concentra-
tions of storage jars are often found in the other side room and/or the back 
broad room.13 Ovens used for cooking and baking, called tabun or tannur, 
are often found in the central living space and in the outside courtyard.14 It 
seems that most Iron Age houses had an open area or courtyard in front of 
the house that was used as a communal space to conduct household chores, 
especially in the hot summer months.
DAILY LIFE OF THE ANCIENT ISRAELITE 
AND JUDAHITE FAMILY
The final aspect of studying households is the behavioral aspect, which looks at 
the activities the household performed. The average ancient Israelite/ Judahite 
household was the basic economic unit; whether a family lived in the city or 
the country, Israel and Judah consisted of agrarian communities where the 
household was the nucleus of everyday life. The household economy evolved 
from a simple subsistence level in the early Iron Age (ca. 1200–1000 BCE) to a 
more complex system under the monarchy in the Iron II period (ca. 1000–586 
BCE). In the early Iron Age, Israel’s household economics were agrarian and 
pastoral in nature and were generally free from taxation by a dominating class. 
However, with the establishment and evolution of the monarchy in the second 
Iron Age, the economics of the Israelite household changed as well. The Israel-
ite household was still predominantly agrarian and pastoral, but the monarchy 
extracted surplus from households through taxation, unpaid labor, interest on 
debt, and rental fees.15
The daily concern of most ancient people was survival, and ancient 
Israel/Judah was no different. Subsistence economies rarely have the luxury 
of gender roles. Gender roles refer to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, 
activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men 
and women.16 Each member of the ancient Israelite/Judahite household was 
expected to participate in their survival, regardless of sex, age, or other dif-
ferentials. C. Meyers writes that the survival of any group is dependent upon 
three factors: procreation, protection, and production. The fertility of both 
the household’s members and its land made the difference as to whether or 
not that household survived. The procreation factor was predominated by 
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female biological factors, such as menstruation, pregnancy, birth, lactation, 
and weaning. Consequently, the procreation factor often fell under the female 
domain and dictated that her daily household activities oftentimes occurred 
within or near the dwelling. Similarly, the protection factor was managed by 
the household males, more often the patriarch of the household whose role it 
was to protect the members of the household, especially the females and chil-
dren.17 Production was the factor that certainly joined the household together 
in its daily activities, since all members of the household were required to par-
ticipate. Production involved agriculture, animal husbandry, and the making 
of various goods, such as pottery. Certain times of year, such as planting and 
harvest, required that all able members of the household contribute. With that 
said, during times of war the women of the household were required to bear 
more of the production responsibilities.18
ROLES OF THE HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
The ancient Israelite/Judahite household was a subsistence economy; hence, 
every member of it was important and vital to its survival. While this type of 
economy may not have had so-called gender roles, certain household members 
had more specific roles to perform: in particular, the role of the patriarch and 
matriarch, who possessed the most power and authority within the household. 
A brief look at these two important roles will further enhance our understand-
ing of the Israelite/Judahite family and household.
THE PATRIARCH
The patriarch was the protector of the household. Employment of his author-
ity included how the household would farm and herd and the power over life 
and death within the household. Even though the patriarch had this seemingly 
massive amount of power, his authority was not absolute; his authority was 
primarily over his wives, sons, and daughters. Issues of life and death would 
include officially adopting a baby into the household when it was born and 
being the household judge in cases of dishonor and disobedience. For instance, 
the commandment to “honor your father and mother” (Exod 20:12) may 
seem like a quaint rule to teach children, but in reality the commandment 
held more weight for adult children living within their household bayit ‘ab. 
Children, even adult children and their families, were expected to obey their 
patriarch and matriarch by participating in the farming and herding of the 
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household property and by having children. If the child, even as an adult, is 
unwilling to herd and farm as the patriarch dictates, it is the father’s role to 
decide the outcome.19
Part of the patriarch’s role of protector over his children included deter-
mining when they were eligible for marriage. Marriage in ancient Israel and 
Judah was more about political and economic issues and less about romance. 
In fact, V. Matthews and D. Benjamin describe marriage as
a delicately negotiated covenant sealing a significant political or 
economic contract [that] was designed to bring together two house-
holds that were willing to exchange substantial goods and services 
with each other over a significant period of time. Marriage was more 
a matter of business than pleasure.20
When the patriarch decided that it was time for his daughter to marry (most 
likely soon after puberty), an arrangement was made typically within the house-
hold’s clan [mishpachah] or tribe [shevet]. These types of endogamous marriages 
were intended to keep property within the clan or tribe. Given that ancient 
Israel and Judah were patrilocal societies, marriage of a daughter signified the 
loss of a contributing member of the household, which impacted its economy 
greatly. Consequently, a mohar, or a betrothal gift in the form of money, goods, 
land, or service from the groom’s bayit ‘ab, was given to the bride’s bayit ‘ab (Gen 
34:8–17, Exod 22:16). Examples of bridal betrothal gifts in the Hebrew Bible 
can be found in the narratives of Dinah and Shechem in Genesis 34:12, Michel 
and David in 1 Samuel 18:25, and Gomer and Hosea in Hosea 3:2. Two of 
the three narratives have the patriarch requesting the betrothal gift as a service 
in the form of incapacitating the enemy (Dinah/Shechem and Michel/David), 
but the third narrative in Hosea provides a more realistic gift in that Hosea paid 
fifteen shekels of silver, a homer of barley, and a measure of wine (Hos 3:2).21 
The bride’s household also gave a shillukhim, translated as a dowry or betrothal 
gift to the household of the groom, also in the form of money, goods, or transfer-
able land (1 Kgs 9:16). However, the shillukhim was also seen as a way to provide 
security for the bride, who in theory maintained possession of it.22
THE MATRIARCH
The matriarch also possessed a great deal of authority within the household. 
A large aspect of production includes the preparation of food, which took 
place in the dwelling or its courtyard. As was mentioned earlier, because of 
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women’s reproductive roles it was often necessary for them to conduct house-
hold chores closer to the dwelling. One of the more important tasks conducted 
at the dwelling included the preparation of food and, consequently, was pri-
marily under female control.
When Iron Age houses are excavated, artifacts such as cooking ovens, 
pots, grinding stones and slabs, pestles and mortars, bowls, and storage jars 
are found within the dwelling and its courtyard. The triad of the Israelite diet 
included olives, grapes, and cereals. Olive oil was essential in cooking and 
the lighting of lamps. Grapes were dried but, more important, were made 
into wine. Since fermented beverages were safer to drink than stagnant water, 
wine was an imperative foodstuff. However, it was the cultivation of cereals 
that became the most important part of the Israelite diet, so much so that the 
Hebrew word for bread, lechem, is synonymous with food. Cereals were used 
for a morning porridge or daily bread. Processing grain into an edible form 
involved a complex chain of activities: soaking, milling, and grinding grain 
into flour that would be made into dough—a process that would occupy at 
least two hours per day. Ovens are often found in a centralized location, which 
would enable women to conduct other household chores and the sharing of 
baking resources, such as the oven itself and dung used for fuel. A centralized 
location and the sharing of ovens also encouraged social relationships and 
cohesion among the group (Lev 26:26).23
The matriarch was in essence the manager of the household. She con-
trolled the operations of the household, including the manufacture of such 
goods as soap, pottery, baskets, cloth, and tools. One of her most important 
tasks as the household manager was the authority over one of the major aspects 
of production: the preparation, storage, distribution, and consumption of 
food. It was the matriarch who dictated what and how much produce was to be 
prepared as a meal or prepared into and stored as other foodstuffs, such as beer, 
wine, oil, parched grain, and dried fruit. Who was going to perform these tasks 
and when were also under the command of the matriarch. In essence, it was 
she who decided who ate, when, what, and how much—the authority over the 
household food contained much power. The capable wife in Proverbs 31 sings 
the praises of the matriarch as the manager of the household:
She is like the ships of the merchant, she brings her food from 
far away. She rises while it is still night and provides food for her 
household and tasks for her servant girls. . . . She looks well to the 
ways of her household and does not eat the bread of idleness. (Prov 
31:14–15, 27)
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Indeed, the matriarch’s role as the manager was essential to the survival of her 
household and would have required exceptional skill, expertise, and diplo-
macy, resulting in a significant amount of household power and prestige.24
SUMMARY
This essay discussed the context of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family; 
more specifically, it addressed who was considered part of the Israelite fam-
ily, how they lived, and what their daily lives consisted of. The study of the 
material, social, and behavioral aspects of an ancient household clarified what 
the daily lives of the average ancient Israelite/Judahite man, woman, and child 
would have looked like during Israel’s Iron Age. Sources such as the Hebrew 
Bible and archaeological remains helped visualize the form and function of the 
household. To truly understand ancient Israel and Judah better, we must shift 
our attention away from what Carol Meyers calls “places of prestige,” mean-
ing the palaces, temples, and battlefields that hardly represent what daily life 
would have included for the average Israelite and Judahite; rather, our atten-
tion should shift to focus on the stage where daily life occurred—the home.25 
Could we even be so bold as to say that the concept of household and family 
meant more to the ancient Israelites than we could ever imagine? Indeed, 
every member of the household was imperative to its survival regardless of sex, 
age, or any other differential; the family and its members were highly valued. 
In today’s world, where the importance of family is often overlooked or dis-
missed, perhaps we can look to the Israelite and Judahite family to remind us 
of the value and significance of family.
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Family Values and Biblical Courtship 
and Marriage: Spanning the Time Barrier
Charles David Isbell
INTRODUCTION
The importance of family1 within the broader community of Judaism has its 
roots in some of the most significant narratives of the Hebrew Bible, and in 
each case marriage is portrayed as the cornerstone of the biblical family. And 
marriage is very much in the news these days. From one end of the political 
spectrum comes an impassioned plea for the legalization of gay marriage, 
which, we are repeatedly assured, is the only way to provide full enfranchise-
ment to the homosexual segment of our population and thus a moral and legal 
imperative.2
Those at the opposite end of this spectrum warn that such a legal move 
is certain to usher in the apocalypse. Especially significant is the accompany-
ing view that this particular apocalypse could easily be avoided by the admin-
istration of a few doses of “reparative therapy.”3 Equally prominent at the 
apocalypse-fearing end of the religio-socio-political spectrum, and a close ally 
of the opposition to homosexual marriage, is the simplistic position of those 
who call for a return to biblical marriage, which, we are assured with deadly 
fervor, is among “the fundamental unchanging truths that have been ordained 
by God in the Bible”4—and thus another of those monolithic and immutable 
scriptural principles upon which Christian America was founded.
Were they not so morbidly serious, we might be tempted to chuckle at 
our fundamentalist friends when they pound on the Bible regarding marriage. 
But at the least, these proponents of biblical marriage should be required to 
spell out exactly what parts of marriage they intend to import from the world 
of the Bible into modern society. And since they insist on being fully dedicated 
to their proposal, we should be allowed to ask some basic questions, begin-
ning with this one: If biblical marriage is the goal, should biblical customs of 
courtship also be followed?
BIBLICAL COURTSHIP CUSTOMS
Do proponents of biblical marriage support the courtship method used to 
find a wife for Isaac?5 His father dispatched to a friendly tribe in the home 
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country a trusted emissary at the head of a ten-camel cavalcade laden with 
gold, an ample supply of those alluring and ever-popular nose rings, and other 
visible symbols of the family’s great wealth. Launching his search at a popular 
drinking establishment, the faithful servant quickly located an appropriately 
beautiful and healthy female, whom he showered with expensive gifts and 
effusive compliments before cleverly finagling an invitation to spend the night 
at her family home. The vulgar show of wealth proved to be highly effective, 
for when the young lady returned home and her older brother “spied the 
expensive nose ring and the bracelets on the arms of his sister” (Gen 24:30), 
he rushed back to the oasis to find the emissary. There he not only repeated the 
invitation of his sister to spend the night with the family but also invited 
the man to supper with warm and friendly words: “Come in, O blessed of the 
LORD. Why are you standing outside? I have already prepared the house [for 
you], and even a place for your camels” (24:31).
The biblical narrative clearly implies that Laban lacked adequate time 
to complete a full background investigation or even a cursory credit check 
on Isaac, and this fact leads Rashi to explain that the phrase “All the good 
stuff of his master in his hand” (Gen 24:10) refers to a written document6 
from Abraham signing over “all his possessions to Isaac, so that they should 
be eager [yiqpǝtzu] to send their daughter to him.” This accords well with the 
statement later in the narrative that the servant, seated in the family home of 
Nahor, described the wealth of Abraham in detail but assured his hosts that 
“he [Abraham] has given him [Isaac] everything he owns” (24:36).7 Clearly, 
with or without the midrashic explanation of Rashi, the force of the story is 
that the opportunity to marry his sister to an ostentatiously wealthy suitor, 
even a man whom no one in the country had ever seen, provided adequate 
biblical grounds for big brother Laban.
Perhaps modern marriage should begin with the type of biblical court-
ship illustrated by the actions of Jacob and Moses. Both of these men fled from 
the land of their birth, one to escape a murderous twin brother (Gen 27:41) 
and the other to avoid prosecution as a murderer (Exod 2:15). Arriving in a 
foreign land, both men followed the biblical precedent set by the emissary of 
Abraham and headed immediately to the local watering hole to meet chicks.
Jacob moved to the head of the eligible bachelor line, waited for the 
appropriate moment, and showed off his physical prowess by rolling a huge 
stone from the entrance to the communal well of water (Gen 29:10). This 
proved to be precisely the kind of testosterone exhibition guaranteed to 
impress the lovely Rachel and intimidate all other potential suitors.
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Moses, dressed as an Egyptian (Exod 2:19) rather than a fleeing felon or a 
lowly Hebrew slave, faced down the local tough guys who regularly stole water 
from hapless female shepherdesses (2:17) in his own display of masculinity. 
Two significant aspects of Mosaic courtship stand out. Not only did he present 
himself as an Egyptian aristocrat who would obviously be considered wealthy, 
but he also combined his appearance of wealth with a display of the kind of 
physical prowess that had proved so successful for Jacob.
Soon after their showy displays, Jacob and Moses each married the pret-
tiest girl in town, and each man took a job with his new father-in-law. In fact, 
as a reward for his faithful service in the family business, Jacob was awarded 
two wives!
Maybe the biblical courtship custom our conservative friends are push-
ing is chronicled in the narrative about the marriage of Dinah to the son of 
the regional prince, H>amor (Gen 34). After he had raped her, Shechem now 
wanted to marry Dinah (34:4),8 and we can only hope that this is one bibli-
cal custom that modern proponents of biblical marriage will have difficulty 
in reviving. Swayed in part by the promise of an unusually hefty bridal price 
(34:12), the brothers of Dinah agreed to the marriage but insisted that not 
only the prospective bridegroom but also every other male in the city of 
Shechem be circumcised. They then waited until the men of the town were 
recovering from surgery and slaughtered them all (34:25). They even killed 
the new groom and his father before bringing their sister back to the family 
home, of course without returning the bridal price (34:25–26)! Finally, they 
seized the material wealth, the children, and the wives of the slaughtered 
males (34:29).9
Perhaps the biblical template for courtship leading to marriage is to 
be found in the example of Ruth and Boaz. Here, we recall, a saucy widow 
tarted herself up a bit and hied off to waylay the slightly inebriated Boaz in 
the middle of the night, boldly uncovering his genitals (“feet”) before hopping 
into bed with him in what was clearly an audacious marriage proposal from 
a determined young lady to the wealthiest bachelor in town.10 This was not 
only sex before marriage but sex employed to induce marriage. What could be 
more biblical?
Yet another biblical courtship custom appears in the account of the 
union between Michal and David. According to the narrative recounted in 
1 Samuel 18:20–29, the prospective father-in-law (King Saul) was not happy 
with the idea of having David in the family. So, he proposed that the young 
suitor bring one hundred Philistine foreskins in place of a dowry, certain that 
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the attempt would result in the death of David (18:25c). David, perhaps aware 
that Saul would have preferred a nice Jewish doctor instead of a humble shep-
herd for his daughter (18:23), presented his future father-in-law with double 
the requested number of Philistine foreskins (two hundred instead of merely 
one hundred), thereby earning his way into the royal family (18:27).11
BIBLICAL MARRIAGE: ROMANTIC LOVE  
OR JUST GOOD BUSINESS?
Surely the plea for biblical marriage cannot be referring to Abraham, the 
righteous father of us all. We need not tarry over the open marriage arrange-
ment he enjoyed with Sarah that allowed him to impregnate her female slave 
Hagar.12 But we cannot ignore his polygamy in the context of the discussion 
about current marriage customs. I refer here to the marriage of Abraham and 
Keturah, the wife who produced six sons with Abraham (Gen 25:2). Since 
Abraham, falling down laughing, had noted forty years earlier that he was too 
old to sire children (Gen 17:17), since the discovery of Viagra was still some 
years in the future, and since the notation of the marriage to Keturah in Gen-
esis 25:1 simply notes that “Abraham took another wife” without specifying 
a time frame, biblical scholar Nahum Sarna believed that the account of his 
marriage with Keturah did not “relate to a time subsequent to Sarah’s death 
and Isaac’s marriage, but to many years before.”13 This would be consistent 
with the rabbinic dictum that ‘eyn mȗqdam ȗmǝ’u ̑h>ar ba-tôrah [there is no 
early or late in the Torah]—that is, that the narratives of the Torah are not 
always in strict chronological sequence. But it also makes Abraham the hus-
band of two women at the same time and the father of children by both wives 
as well as one slave girl.14
These narratives about some of our most famous ancestors, especially 
the report of the marriage between Abraham and Keturah, require that we 
examine the legitimate purposes of marriage in biblical times. Only then can 
we ask whether any of those purposes still obtain in the twenty-first century.
We note first that romantic love, as popularly understood in the modern 
world, plays virtually no role in the biblical institution of marriage.15 Proposals 
did not occur in the moonlight between two young people who were scarcely 
mature enough to distinguish the difference between being in love and being 
in heat. Most frequently, they were arranged as a business or political transac-
tion between the heads of two families that shared mutual interests, customs, 
and culture.
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The fact that the name of Abraham’s second wife is linked with the word 
for “spices” [kǝtoret] lends plausibility to the idea that the Keturah tribes were 
involved in the production, shipment, and distribution of spices, a precious 
commodity and a valuable source of income. Of the six Keturah tribal leaders, 
three bear names well known from nonbiblical sources and are associated with 
oases along the international trade routes.16 Thus, the linkage of Abraham 
and Keturah secured a vital connection between the Abraham tribes and other 
important members of the economic cartel in the region.
This leads to a second observation about the biblical concept of marriage. 
Not only does the Torah regularly describe an economic and political linkage 
between two groups of people friendly to each other, but such alliances are also 
often described in familial terms “arranged in a genealogical pattern.”17 That is, 
terms such as “brother,” “son,” “father,” “sister,” etc., often referred to the social 
standing of the persons described rather than simply to the biological cellular 
unit. Thus “brothers” or “sisters” were social equals, “sons” or “daughters” ranked 
below “fathers” or “mothers,” and so forth. Clearly the relationship between 
Abraham and Keturah is better understood as an economic alliance between the 
“family” of Abraham and at least six tribal groups affiliated with Keturah rather 
than as a marriage between one male and one female.18
Third, apart from the existence of an economic, military, or social alli-
ance between groups of people with mutual interests, the primary purpose of 
marriage was the production of offspring. And this is indicated in multiple 
ways, not least of which is the biblical conception of feminine beauty. Rivkah 
is a clear example. Not only did she come from an acceptable family headed by 
a “brother” of Abraham (Gen 24: 15), but her physical ability to draw enough 
water to satisfy ten thirsty camels that had just completed a long journey leads 
directly to the biblical description of her as “beautiful.” This was no mere slip 
of a lass, no delicate flower of femininity, but a woman hardy and healthy 
enough to do strenuous physical labor and above all to bear children.
THE CORE VALUES EXEMPLIFIED IN BIBLICAL MARRIAGE
What I am suggesting is that it is impossible to draw directly upon the bibli-
cal customs of marriage as templates for our own day. The world has changed 
radically from their time to ours, and it is necessary to look not at the external 
customs with which the biblical personalities were familiar and comfortable 
and instead to probe more deeply into the core values of family and social con-
structs that were important to them, apart from the ways in which those core 
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values were expressed externally in their era. Clearly, biblical marital compat-
ibility was defined in ways that we have difficulty comprehending.
And yet, the biblical ideas of marriage have much to teach us about 
responsibility to a goal larger than our own selfish interests. To limit the idea of 
marital love to physical compatibility alone is perhaps the height of arrogance 
on our part. We see daily the results of a system that allows marriage to begin in 
the deceptive glow of moonlight, only to end when the moonlight fades and the 
temporary physical attraction it induced no longer exists. The dashing suitor 
whose body is ravaged by illness or the stunning beauty whose body succumbs 
to gravity and time are realities that cannot be avoided. If a relationship is built 
solely on the physical, age or disease can dull the ardor of both partners and can 
ultimately render meaningless all thoughts of a “better or worse” clause. To put 
it bluntly, when moments of illness or physical deterioration arrive, something 
more is required than romance and moonlight. Seen in this manner, it would 
be well for us to examine once again the biblical concern with the creation of a 
unit that serves the larger societal development. I submit that there are at least 
three aspects of biblical marriage worthy of our careful consideration.
First, it should not be unthinkable that the choice of appropriate partners 
might be made, or at least assisted, by adults whose experience and wisdom 
can see past the external markers of physical beauty and who are not bewitched 
by the moon, bothered by alcohol, or bewildered by physical characteristics 
that will change with time all too quickly. In other words, our modern ideas 
about the basis or proper foundation for marriage need to be reexamined.
Second, there can be no question about the sad fact that when a modern 
marriage fails because it was built on a shaky foundation or because the two 
principals grow in different directions, it is the children who suffer the most. 
We surely owe it to our world to emphasize the responsibility of a marital part-
nership to the nurturing of children who will enhance society and advance the 
moral and ethical ideals of Judaism and indeed of all humanity. This should 
not mean a simplistic rule forcing two people to remain married “for the sake 
of the children,” but it surely requires the acknowledgment of the fact that the 
dissolution of a marriage is almost never an issue that involves only two people.
DIVORCE
These concepts lead us to examine the biblical and rabbinic views of divorce. 
The key verse from Scripture is Deuteronomy 24:1: “If a man takes a woman 
and marries her, and she does not find favor with him because he finds 
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something obnoxious about her, he may write a bill of divorce for her and 
send her away.” Now, “something obnoxious” is the difficult Hebrew phrase 
‘ervat davar [literally, a matter of nakedness], which the Septuagint renders by 
aseksemon pragma [a dishonorable deed], itself as ambiguous as the Hebrew it 
translates. Matters of nakedness or deeds of dishonor could include adultery, 
of course, but would not be limited to that single example.
The Mishnaic discussion of divorce19 ends by citing three competing rab-
binic opinions about the meaning of this Hebrew phrase ‘ervat davar. (1) The 
conservative School of Shammai ruled that “a man may not divorce his wife 
unless he has found unchastity in her,” specifically citing Deuteronomy 24:1 
and interpreting ‘ervat davar to mean adultery.20 (2) The liberal School of Hil-
lel ruled that divorce was permissible “even if she spoiled a dish for him” and 
cites the same biblical phrase as its authority!21 (3) Rabbi Akiva offered yet a 
third ruling, still more liberal than that of Hillel, authorizing divorce even if 
a man found another woman who was prettier, which he also links to Deu-
teronomy 24:1 but from which he highlights a different phrase: “she has not 
found favor in his sight.”22
There is yet another Hebrew phrase in Deuteronomy 24:1 that demands 
attention: “a writ of divorce” [sepher kǝrı̑ tȗt], a term not discussed specifically 
by the three rabbinic authorities.23 The rabbinic word for this phrase is get., 
and the Tanna’im considered it such an important issue that they devoted a 
complete tractate (Gittin) to the subject. But to understand the rabbinic views 
of divorce, we must turn to a related tractate devoted entirely to the matter of 
marital agreements, Ketubbot. A ketubbah was/is a marriage contract that a 
man was required to give to his bride at the time of the betrothal, similar 
in many ways to a modern prenuptial agreement. It sets forth in writing the 
obligations to a wife that the groom agreed to fulfill, including his legal obliga-
tion to her if he should decide to divorce her. Adultery by the wife, of course, 
could invalidate the entire marital contract and trigger a release of the husband 
from his obligation to continue to support her. This is the context in which 
Shammai offered such an apparently restrictive opinion about the rights of a 
man to divorce his wife. But if the reason of a husband were only that he did 
not like a wife’s cooking (Hillel) or that he had found someone more attractive 
(Akiva), he would be required to complete all of his financial obligations to her 
set forth in the ketubbah. Because the ketubbah would have been negotiated 
before the wedding and thus before anger or disillusionment with the relation-
ship had begun, and because the bride would have been represented by a per-
son who was committed to protecting her (a father or a brother), her security 
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would virtually always be safeguarded. Lacking a reason to invalidate the 
ketubbah, such as adultery or a comparable act of lewdness or prostitution, 
the unsatisfied husband could gain his divorce but would have no legal way to 
avoid his continuing financial responsibilities.
Modern Jewish wives may well wish to quarrel with the uncomplicated exit 
from marriage available only to a husband, and many modern Jewish authorities 
have expressed a concern to provide comparable exit strategies for a wife who 
is dissatisfied, perhaps because her husband has burned the supper once too 
often.24 Yet from the perspective of our spiritual ancestors, surely our practice of 
turning to secular courts to settle the dispute between estranged Jewish partners 
would be hardly more satisfactory at the end of a relationship than our facile 
acceptance of sexual attraction as the major basis for its beginning, especially 
when at the end of the dispute it is often only the lawyers for both sides who 
profit financially from the quarrel while husband, wife, and children are left 
with far less to divide among themselves. Especially if it could be expanded to 
include equality of opportunity to both partners, the classical rabbinic idea of 
an agreement negotiated before anger and disillusionment begin to eat away at 
the partnership quite conceivably could mitigate the economic losses typically 
faced by the wife and children and thus serve the larger community far better.
CONCLUSION
No, the external customs of biblical courtship and marriage are not the crux 
of the matter, and frantic calls for a return to biblical marriage simply obscure 
the real issues. But the value of developing customs resulting in appropriate 
partnerships that contribute positively to family and society is a biblical exam-
ple worth following. We may find it necessary to modernize and reformulate 
these time-bound biblical customs, and that is as it should be. Each generation 
should be granted such freedom to express itself. But we need not abandon the 
goal of marriages that are (1) formed to serve the moral values of the larger 
human community, (2) produce children who contribute to the growth and 
survival of society, and (3) result in unions that endure because they consist of 
two partners who share values that have stood the test of time.
NOTES
1. The exact referential fields denoted by the biblical terms bayit, mišpah>ah, and ševet. 
must be teased out contextually. For bayit and its allomorph beyt-’av, meanings as diverse 
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as an actual physical dwelling place or the people who reside in it are possible, as are the 
ideas of a royal dynasty (David) or a family that survives through numerous generations 
(the midwives in Exodus). For mišpah>ah, reference is sometimes to a cellular family, but 
at other times it implies an entire clan (including slaves and their children), (foreign) 
hired servants, and concubines or second wives and their offspring as well. Sometimes 
it describes a collection of several clans that have formed a political and social alliance. 
A third biblical category to be defined is ševet., usually translated as “tribe.” Its relation-
ship to “house” and “family” is difficult to describe simply, but ševet. must be examined 
as a third major social unit in biblical Israel. All three terms presume the importance of 
marital relationships that serve to ensure the continuity of the group as well as to foster 
the inculcation of moral and spiritual values to successive generations.
2. I have yet to hear an impassioned plea for the inalienable right of the gay community 
to experience the joy of bitter and costly legal disputes once the gild is off the lily and 
divorce rears its ugly head. In addition, while it may not be doubted that granting true 
legal equality to all citizens is a worthy goal that has been too long delayed, we might 
be excused also for worrying about the unintended consequences of foisting in-laws on 
people who have surely suffered enough already.
3. This is the term adopted into its party platform by Texas Republicans at their 2014 
annual convention in Fort Worth. In the section “Celebrating Traditional Marriage,” 
homosexuality is defined as “a chosen behavior that is contrary to the fundamental 
unchanging truths that have been ordained by God in the Bible.” The following platform 
plank boasts the actual title “Reparative Therapy” and notes that the Texas GOP recog-
nizes “the legitimacy and efficacy of counseling, which offers reparative therapy and treat-
ment for those patients seeking healing and wholeness from their homosexual lifestyle.” 
The complete platform is available at www.texasgop.org.
4. See note 3 above.
5. See Genesis 24.
6. Literally, “a gift deed” [šǝt.ar mattanah].
7. This is the point where Rashi has the servant show the family the “gift deed.”
8. This is the remedy called for in Deuteronomy 22:28–29. But note the comment of 
Robert Alter on this motif in the ancient world: “Rape was a dire fate, but one which 
could be compensated for by marriage, where the violated virgin rejected and abandoned 
by her violator was an unmarriageable outcast, condemned to a lifetime of ‘desolation.’” 
See Robert Alter, The David Story (New York: Norton 1999), 269–70.
9. Although the physical evidence at the site is somewhat unclear, archaeologists have 
speculated that the attorney handling this divorce might have based his fee on a body 
count rather than on the standard contingency basis.
10. See my “Nice Jewish Girls: Liquor, Sex, and Power in Antiquity,” in Women and Juda-
ism: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Philip M. and Ethel Klutznick 
Chair in Jewish Civilization, October 28 and 29, 2001 (Studies in Jewish Civilization 14; 
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ed. Leonard Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins, and Jean Cahan; Omaha: Creighton Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 23–32.
11. Although this particular biblical custom has much to commend it, I am not opti-
mistic about its chances of becoming federal law. The Philistines are well represented in 
Washington, and their powerful anticircumcision lobby would easily defeat any proposal 
involving foreskins.
12. This was a custom that may have had legal precedents in the area of Mesopotamia, 
where Abraham was born.
13. Nahum Sarna, Genesis: The JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: JPS, 1989), 172.
14. The text is interesting. In Genesis 25:1, Keturah is clearly labeled a “wife” [’ishah], 
precisely the designation applied to Sarai in Genesis 11:29 and also to Hagar in 16:3. But 
25:6 mentions “concubines” in the plural [pı̑ lagšı̑m] as having born children to Abraham. 
JPS Tanakh translates ’ishah as “concubine” in Genesis 16:3, apparently anticipating that 
the plural in Genesis 25:6 appears to link Keturah and Hagar together. Thus, either Abra-
ham (a) was married with three women (all designated by ’ishah) at the same time, (b) he 
impregnated concubines during the time he was married to Sarah, or (c) he was married 
with two wives simultaneously and also fathered a child with Hagar. Neither Hagar nor 
Keturah is dubbed a “concubine” [pı̑ legeš] in the text, and except for the notation in 16:3 
calling her a “wife” [’ishah] Hagar is referred to either as a “maidservant” [šifh>ah] or a 
“[female] slave” [’amah]. Regardless of the way the text describes them, Abraham fathered 
children with all three ladies in the same time period. I suspect that this biblical custom 
will have trouble achieving legality in at least forty-nine of the fifty states.
15. See the essays on love in Love—Real and Ideal—in the Hebrew Bible and the Jew-
ish Tradition: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Symposium of the Klutznick Chair in 
Jewish Civilization—Harris Center for Judaic Studies, September 18–19, 2005 (Studies 
in Jewish Civilization 18; ed. Leonard Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins and Jean Cahan; 
Omaha: Creighton University Press, 2008).
16. Sarna, Genesis, 172.
17. Ibid., 171.
18. Parenthetically, this concept brings modern Jews great relief by helping us to realize 
that Isaac did not marry his biological first cousin but rather the daughter of a tribal leader 
who was the social equal of his own father Abraham (see Gen 24:24).
19. See Tractate Gittin. The citations of Shammai, Hillel, and Akiva are in Gittin 9:10.
20. This was the position later espoused by Jesus, according to Matthew 5:31.
21. Shammai and Hillel lived only about fifty years before Jesus, and it is likely that he 
would have been aware of their schools of thought and teachings.
22. It is clear that while the ruling of Jesus was radically different from those of Hillel and 
Akiva, the conservative Shammai had interpreted the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy itself 
in a manner very close to what Jesus appears to teach in Matthew. And, as we know from 
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rabbinic discussions of other issues, there was no movement among the rabbis to decide 
once and for all among the three opinions of Shammai, Hillel, and Akiva, all of whom 
were well-known and respected authorities. Contrary to an assumption sometimes made 
about the teachings of Jesus serving to loosen the strictures of Jewish law, we may note 
that both Shammai and Jesus are offering not a more liberal but a far more restrictive and 
conservative interpretation.
23. And although it is cited from the Septuagint in the Greek text of Matthew, it likewise 
receives no comment or explanation from Jesus.
24. The excellent book of Perry Netter, Divorce Is a Mitzvah (Woodstock: Jewish Lights, 
2002), addresses concerns of this nature. The title of the book was suggested to Netter 
by a phrase from Rashi, mitzvah ‘alav lǝgaršah, commenting on Deuteronomy 24:1. 
The bibliography included by Netter is also invaluable.
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Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the 
Status of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage
Gail Labovitz
INTRODUCTION
When (now Rabbi) Amitai Adler and Rabbi Julie Pelc Adler stood together under 
the huppah, their wedding may not, at first glance, have looked especially dif-
ferent from other Jewish weddings most of us are familiar with. But once there, 
they did not ritually enact their union as might have been expected, through the 
giving of a ring and the traditional formula “Behold you are betrothed to me by 
this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel.” Instead, they chose to cre-
ate a binding relationship between them by means of the innovative ceremony 
of B’rit Ahuvim, or Lover’s Covenant—devised, in fact, by the groom’s mother, 
Rachel Adler, in her critical book of feminist theology, Engendering Judaism1—
rather than by the traditional Jewish procedure known as kiddushin. The Lover’s 
Covenant is constituted through a ritual/legal act in which the couple creates 
a partnership between them, modeled on Jewish laws of creating partnerships 
for business, trade, and other financial endeavors;2 this is done by each putting 
something of value into a bag and then lifting the bag together. B’rit Ahuvim is 
also enacted by means of a document in which the couple asserts their intent 
to make a covenant of commitment and fidelity between them and delineates 
emotional and practical obligations they agree to take on toward each other; 
the language is both poetic (including biblical and rabbinic citations) and legal.
The document drafted and signed by this bride and groom contained an 
intriguing additional provision, however, as follows:
This Lover’s Covenant is not kiddushin, and the sexual relations of 
the groom and the bride are not with the intent of kiddushin, and not 
with the intent of licentiousness, but only and solely with the intent 
of the expression of love. In the event, God forbid, that the groom 
and the bride should want or need to undo this partnership, it will 
be undone by means of mutual agreement between them, by a 
document and their own signatures and the signatures of two valid 
witnesses, before a just beit din [rabbinical court]; or by the declara-
tion of the desire of one of them, and his/her own signature and the 
signatures of two valid witnesses, before a just beit din. . . . And all 
of this is without the need for a get of divorce.
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 Therefore, this partnership is established on the condition that 
no beit din in Israel, in the event that the groom or the bride want 
or need to undo this partnership, will call this partnership kiddushin 
out of doubt, and rule that the groom and the bride require a get 
of divorce for the kiddushin. But if this condition is met, then this 
partnership will be annulled retroactively.3
It is the purpose of this essay to explore, and eventually explain, one key reason 
why this couple might deem such a provision necessary.
According to Jewish law and practice since at least the time of the Mish-
nah (approximately 200 CE), the legal basis for Jewish marriage is the act 
of kiddushin, a unilateral process in which a man “acquires” a woman. As Mish-
nah Kiddushin 1:1 has it, there are three methods by which this is accomplished:
A woman is acquired in three ways, and acquires herself in two ways. 
She is acquired by money, by document, and by sexual intercourse. 
By money—Beit Shammai say by a dinar (a silver coin), or by the 
equivalent of a dinar; and Beit Hillel say by a p’rutah (a copper coin; 
the smallest unit in rabbinic currency), or by the equivalent of a 
p’rutah. . . . And she acquires herself by a divorce document, and by 
death of the husband.
The mechanics of each of the methods is further spelled out in the Tosefta, 
a collection structurally parallel to the Mishnah and containing materials 
roughly contemporaneous with those of the Mishnah.4 In the first three para-
graphs of Kiddushin in this work, each of the methods is explained:
Halachah 1
By money how (is the acquisition effected)? He gave her money [or the 
equivalent of money], [and] he said to her “Behold, you are betrothed 
[m’kuddeshet] to me,” “Behold, you are betrothed [m’oresset] to me,” 
“Behold, you are a woman/wife to me,” she is m’kuddeshet.
Halakhah 2
And by document? . . . even if he wrote (the document) on a pot-
sherd and gave it to her, [or] on blemished parchment and gave it to 
her, she is m’kuddeshet.
Halakhah 3
And by sexual intercourse? Any act of sexual intercourse that is for 
the sake of kiddushin, she is m’kuddeshet; that is not for the sake of 
kiddushin, she is not m’kuddeshet.
The common elements are that (a) the man conveys the appropriate item (an 
item of value or a document) or performs the appropriate act (consummating 
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the relationship), and (b) the man specifies his intent to betroth the woman 
by his act. Once this occurs, the woman is m’kuddeshet—betrothed, legally 
bound to the man in a form of inchoate marriage. That is, although the couple 
still needs to undergo the ceremony of nissu’in—full marriage marked by the 
recitation of the Sheva Berachot, the seven blessings—and are not yet expected 
to cohabitate, once kiddushin/acquisition is performed, any sexual encounter 
the woman has with another man would be considered adulterous, and the 
relationship can be severed only by the man giving the woman a get, a divorce 
document. Divorce in Jewish law, it should also be noted, is thus constructed 
in the same manner, as a unilateral act that mirrors and reverses betrothal; at 
the core of Jewish divorce procedure and document (the get) is a statement 
from the husband: “Behold you are permitted to any man” (see Mishnah Git-
tin 9:3). Since it is he who “acquired” her, it is he who must release her.
The challenge of kiddushin from a feminist perspective is thus both 
practical and fundamental. On the practical level, because a man must grant 
a halachic divorce of his own free will, it is within his power to withhold 
the divorce or set onerous conditions, effectively “ransoming” the get and the 
woman’s freedom to remarry. Such cases in fact occur with some frequency, 
particularly in Orthodox communities and in Israel where marriage and 
divorce are adjudicated under (Ultra-)Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law. 
A great number of proposals have therefore been put forth and debated to 
ameliorate the worst effects of this imbalance of power (though far fewer have 
found general acceptance and been put into practice).5 But on a more founda-
tional level, marriage by a unilateral act, one that is furthermore constructed 
through metaphors of acquisition and ownership of the female partner6 and 
nonreciprocal exclusive sexual access to her, is simply not a model that can 
be made to comfortably fit with feminist ideals of equal and egalitarian com-
mitments and obligations between life partners.7 One of my areas of personal 
scholarly interest over the last several years has thus been in studying newly 
developing proposals—such as B’rit Ahuvim—that reflect the intent of their 
creators to devise ceremonies that do not meet the halachic requirements of 
kiddushin (although they may bear some resemblance to kiddushin) and that 
will not be taken as such by others.8
PRESUMPTUOUS HALACHAH
Any attempt to disentangle Jewish marriage from the gendered categories of 
the traditional halachic system is complicated by some important additional 
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factors built into halachic conceptualizations of marital and other sexual con-
tact between Jewish men and women. In order to understand how this is so, let 
us begin by taking a further look at Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3. What I would now 
like to highlight is that this passage considers the possibility of a sex act not 
for the sake of creating betrothal between a Jewish man and a Jewish woman 
who are otherwise permitted and free to be married to each other. What 
Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3, along with many subsequent legal and other sources, 
therefore indicates is that rabbis and halachic decisors have long been aware 
of the possibility and reality of Jewish men and women engaged in relation-
ships involving sexual relations and/or long-term commitments to one another 
outside the rubric of kiddushin. These include relationships initiated through 
what the rabbis deemed to be (toraitically) ineffective kiddushin, through legal 
or ceremonial means other than kiddushin (such as through the rites and ritu-
als of another religion or by civil marriage) or through no set rite or legal act 
at all (as in the Tosefta).
Rabbinic authorities were, over the course of Jewish history, called on 
to evaluate the nature of these relationships and their status under Jewish law. 
A great deal has been written on this topic—both in actual halachic analyses 
and arguments and codes and rulings themselves, and in secondary studies of 
the responsa and related literature. There are thus many lenses through which 
scholars could and have analyzed rabbinic treatments of marriage outside 
the bounds of kiddushin—considering, for example, how they reflect deci-
sors’ theories of the nature of marriage or sociological conditions that have 
influenced decision making. It is therefore not my intent to try to cover all or 
even a significant portion of this vast body of material—an impossible task. 
Rather, I will focus on what I see as one critical factor that recurs regularly in 
the multiple approaches by which halachic authorities of the past and present 
have attempted to address the halachic status of committed heterosexual rela-
tionships between Jews, even given the multiple forms that these relationships 
have taken over history. This factor is yet one more element that emerges from 
Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3, in which the evaluation of a sex act as effective betrothal 
hinges on a matter of intent (whether the act is “for the sake of kiddushin” or 
not)—thereby raising the question of how intent is to be determined. I will 
then conclude by addressing how this factor becomes relevant to the possibility 
of creating new ceremonies and forms of Jewish marriage today.
I am guided here most significantly by the work of Rachel Adler, who has 
addressed in depth the feminist critique of classical halachah in her aforemen-
tioned work of Jewish feminist theology and theory, Engendering Judaism.9 
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Adler also elaborates and expands on this topic in an article in which she ana-
lyzes the writings of Rabbi Zvi Schachter in opposition to the phenomenon of 
“women’s prayer groups” in Orthodoxy, which I will also cite below.10 Based 
on these works, I would like to highlight two concerns in particular that I 
find relevant to my inquiry here. First, Adler notes the ways in which classical 
halachic discourse is prone to prioritizing certain questions and issues while 
rendering others invisible: “The method . . . determines the choice of ques-
tions, rather than the questions determining the choice of method. Questions 
that do not conform to the system’s method and categories are simply reclassi-
fied as non-data and dumped out.”11 She continues: “The presumptions select 
the questions. The categories shape them.”12 To the extent that the arbiters 
of the halachic system did recognize these forms of relationship outside of 
kiddushin, Adler’s analysis would suggest that a strong impulse existed (and 
still exists) to frame them in such a way that they fit the preexisting categories 
and methods of the classical halachic system. To some degree, of course, this 
sort of process is necessary to and representative of any legal system, as not all 
cases that will arise could ever be anticipated, and the system must use what 
resources it already has to assimilate them. The concomitant risk, however, is 
that this process may facilitate a tendency to distort the circumstances of the 
case in question and the issues it raises into ill-fitting but already known cat-
egories if the decisor is reluctant to innovate new categories and understand-
ings or if using the preexisting categories advances the interests of the decisor.13
What is more, Adler elaborates an additional related concern in “Inno-
vation and Authority”: “The male elite who claim responsa literature as their 
domain continue to converse only with one another and to render anonymous 
the outsiders whose acts provide the content for the elite conversation.”14 
In the context of women’s prayer groups, this means that even though the women 
who first contributed to the development of these groups are known and iden-
tifiable and that they themselves and/or their writings on this subject could be 
consulted, instead “There is a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to converse about rather 
than with these mothers of inventions so that their accomplishments may be 
reframed for the purposes of the responsa literature as problems detected by 
one rabbi and referred to another for solution.”15 Thus, although the creators 
of and participants in ceremonies through means other than kiddushin (such as 
Adler’s son and daughter-in-law) potentially stand before halachic authorities 
to explain their decisions, choices, and intents, this phenomenon identified by 
Adler suggests that they cannot presume that they will actually be granted such 
opportunities or be properly heard and understood if they are. Thus, to think 
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about alternatives to kiddushin and how they are likely be received by the legal 
experts and arbiters of halachic communities16 first necessitates consideration 
of the varying ways in which the more established halachic system might be 
able to absorb marriages enacted by such ceremonies into its existing catego-
ries and the ways in which decisors have already attempted to absorb (or not) 
and interpret other forms of non-kiddushin–based relationships into halachic 
categories. To this end, in the remainder of this essay I will demonstrate that 
halachic literature addressing the multiple questions of marriages and rela-
tionships established without the rituals of kiddushin is rife with assumptions, 
generalizations, and rabbinic principles that claim to interpret and speak for 
the motives of the parties, particularly the male party, involved.
WHAT DOES A MAN INTEND? FURTHERING THE RABBINIC 
PICTURE OF KIDDUSHIN
First, a bit of critical background for what follows is necessary: it should be 
noted that a number of rabbinic passages strongly imply that marriage via 
kiddushin is ideally the only context in which Jewish men and women should 
engage in sexual relationships with each other. In the very next paragraph in 
Tosefta Kiddushin after those considered above (1:4), for example, Rabbi Lazar 
[Elazar] interprets Leviticus 19:29—“Do not degrade your daughter and make 
her a harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry and the land be filled with deprav-
ity”—to refer to sexual relations between unmarried partners without marital 
intent. In the tannaitic midrashic commentary to Leviticus, Sifra (Kodashim 
perek 7), the same verse receives a similar exegesis, in this case anonymously 
and as an uncontested view:
I spoke only of defilement that is for the sake of licentiousness. And 
which is this? This is one who hands his daughter over to his fellow 
without the intent of marriage, and similarly the one who hands 
herself over without the intent of marriage.17
This source also designates sex without marital intent as a form of zenut,18 
meaning “licentiousness” or “fornication”; in rabbinic Hebrew, this term 
encompasses a broad range of sexual acts that take place outside of rabbinically 
sanctioned parameters even if they do not violate explicit biblical prohibitions 
such as the incest laws of Leviticus 18 and 20.19 That is, according to the Sifra, 
any intimate relationship between a man and a woman for which intent to 
create kiddushin had not been explicitly specified would fall under this rubric.
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Thus, based even on just this source and others seen above so far, those 
authorities addressing the status of relationships outside of kiddushin would 
confront the dilemma expressed by legal scholar David Novak:
In the rabbinic sources there seem to be only two possible hetero-
sexual unions between Jews: either Jewish marriage [kidushin], or 
fornication [be’ilat zenut]. . . . In working up from these sources one 
has basically two options: (1) everything which is not explicitly kidu-
shin is, therefore, fornication; (2) everything which is not explicitly 
fornication is, therefore, kidushin. At this level the argument can 
move, with equal ease, in either direction. On the one hand, one 
can argue that Jewish marriage requires that one’s intention be for 
Jewish marriage and all that it entails. . . . On the other hand, one 
can argue that a couple, who have taken upon themselves the public 
responsibility of living together as husband and wife, can hardly be 
equated with a couple spending some time together in private lust.20
As already noted, a number of factors could and did influence the reasons 
and means by which individual rabbis and scholars over time have decided to 
pursue one approach or the other, including personal inclinations and under-
standings of the nature of marriage, historical circumstances in which decisors 
found themselves, and the unique details of each specific case that came before 
a decisor. In order to understand some of the later legal history relevant to this 
question, several important implications of the sources we have already seen 
need to drawn out and a few additional rabbinic sources considered. In par-
ticular, I would like to highlight those that relate to the intent of the parties to 
a marriage or other relationship.
First is the Talmudic elaboration on the theme of male agency in enact-
ing kiddushin, known in subsequent halachic literature as the requirement 
of natan hu v’amar hu—“he gives, and he speaks.” After citing the definition of 
betrothal by money as in Tosefta Kiddushin 1:1, the Babylonian Talmud, Kid-
dushin 5b, adds a discussion of several permutations of actions and statements 
between the two parties:
But if she gave (an item of value to him), and she said, “Behold, 
I am betrothed [m’kuddeshet] to you,” “Behold, I am betrothed 
[m’oresset] to you,” “Behold, I am a woman/wife to you”—she is not 
m’kuddeshet.
 Rav Pappa objected to this: The reason (why she is not betrothed) 
is (because we require that) he gave and he spoke, but if he gave and 
she spoke, she is not betrothed.
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 But take note of the latter part (of our opening tradition): But if 
she gave to him and she said (one of the formulas)—it is not (binding) 
kiddushin. This implies that if he gave and she spoke—it would 
be kiddushin! . . .
 Rather, this is what it means to say: If he gave and he spoke—it 
is obvious that it is kiddushin. If he gave and she spoke—it becomes 
as if she gave and she spoke and it is not kiddushin.
 And if you like I can say (as an alternate answer): If he gave and 
he spoke—it is kiddushin; if she gave and she spoke—it is not kid-
dushin; if he gave and she spoke—it is a doubtful case, and we are 
concerned on the level of rabbinic (rather than Torah) law.
Only regarding a betrothal in which the man is the sole and fully active 
party—initiating the betrothal and stating the intent that his actions create a 
betrothal—is it certain that a binding betrothal has taken place. 
This is not to say that the will and intent of the woman are immaterial, 
as an earlier Talmudic passage on 2a–b makes clear—although here too the 
discussion is framed around male agency and the question of why the mishnah 
is worded in such a way that the woman is the grammatical subject of a passive 
verb (“is acquired”) rather than specifying that the man actively acquires her:
If it had taught “he acquires,” I might have said even without her 
consent. [Since] it teaches “A woman is acquired” (this indicates 
that) by her consent—yes (she is betrothed); without her consent—
no (she is not betrothed).
However, in keeping with the rule just noted that the man is the one who 
acts and speaks in the optimal betrothal procedure, it may be no surprise to 
find that the woman need not overtly state or mark her acceptance. Short of 
a purposeful, discernible rejection of the kiddushin (for example, immediately 
discarding the item given to her), the woman is usually deemed to have freely 
consented to become betrothed. As we shall thus see, because kiddushin is 
fundamentally a unilateral act in which the man acquires the woman, but not 
vice versa, it will be the will and intent of the man—and rabbinic presump-
tions about the will and intent of the man—that become central to much of 
the discussion on this topic.
One of the key instances in which this kind of attention to the man’s 
intent becomes apparent is in a discussion found in Bavli Gittin 81b. The 
mishnah to which this passage is commentary describes a couple who has pre-
viously been married and divorced, who then (after the divorce) share a room 
Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the Status of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage 65
in an inn. Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree as to whether the woman 
needs a second divorce document (Beit Hillel rules yes, Beit Shammai no):
And Rabbi Yohanan holds like this tanna, as it was taught: Rabbi 
Shimon ben Elazar said: They Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai did 
not dispute about [a case in which] they did not see that she 
engaged in sexual intercourse—that [in that case] she does not 
need a second divorce document. About what did they dispute? 
When they did see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, for Beit 
Shammai say that a man may intend his sex act to be licentious 
(i.e., nonmarital) sex, and Beit Hillel say a man does not intend his 
sex act to be licentious sex.
 And as for the Mishnah, which we established as referring to 
[a case in which] they did not see that she engaged in intercourse—
about what did they dispute? When there are witnesses to the seclu-
sion (the man and woman being alone together) and there are not 
witnesses to sexual intercourse—Beit Shammai hold [that] we do not 
say that witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual 
intercourse, and Beit Hillel hold [that] we do say that witnesses to 
seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual intercourse.
The case hinges on the question of whether there is reason to be concerned 
that the couple has reestablished kiddushin and their marital relationship 
by means of sexual intercourse. As the Gemara analyses the dispute in the 
mishnah, it thus considers these factors: (1) Is it possible to presume intent 
(notably the man’s intent) for kiddushin even when not explicitly stated? (2) If 
there is credible evidence that the couple was alone together such that sexual 
intercourse could have or even was likely to have taken place but no definitive 
evidence that it did take place, should it nonetheless be assumed that it did?
Given that Jewish law has typically followed Beit Hillel, two things thus 
emerge from the passage, each framed as a broad legal principle. The first of 
these is the legal presumption ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut; that is, a man 
does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex. This principle also appears a 
few additional times in the Babylonian Talmud in a few additional distinct 
circumstances.21 As in this case, the issue at hand in each is the possibility 
that the couple, and more particularly the man, was of the intent to initiate 
kiddushin through sexual intercourse. Since the alternative is to define the sex 
act as z’nut, outside the bounds of proper Jewish behavior, the proposal here 
is to give the man the “benefit of the doubt” through a presumption that his 
intentions instead must certainly have been legitimate, that is, marital. Second 
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is Beit Hillel’s assertion that hen hen edei yihud v’hen hen edei bi’ah, or wit-
nesses to seclusion of a man and a woman together are deemed equivalent to 
witnesses to sexual intercourse between them. Even though it is not known 
for certain that a sexual encounter took place, the seclusion itself is sufficient 
grounds to be concerned, or even presume outright, that one did. Putting 
these two factors together, the legal result is that at least in this case there do 
not need to be either witnesses to the sexual act itself or an explicit statement 
of intent in order to establish a reasonable concern that kiddushin may have 
taken place; rather, if the couple has been in seclusion together in circum-
stances conducive to sexual contact, there is at minimum a suspicion and at 
maximum a legal presumption that (a) sexual intercourse has taken place and 
(b) that the man intended the intercourse as an act of betrothal. The woman’s 
understanding of what is happening during the seclusion and/or sex acts is not 
considered directly. Perhaps her participation alone is taken as her consent.
When subsequent authorities begin to develop their legal stances on (het-
erosexual) sexual relationships between Jews outside of kiddushin, it is consid-
erations about the scope of this case (and others like it) and most particularly 
the legal principles that emerge from it that take center stage. To recap, at this 
point several key points and presumptions have been established:
1. Kiddushin is an act of male agency, and not a mutual process; a Jew-
ish couple does not “get married to each other.” Put another way, kiddushin 
is enacted through a model of acquisition. The man “takes” or “acquires” the 
woman, and in doing so he becomes entitled to exclusive sexual access to her; 
she has no reciprocal legal entitlement to his sexual exclusivity.
2. Acquisition must be done with his intent and her consent. Therefore, 
because sexual intercourse between two parties who are free to become hus-
band and wife is a means of initiating kiddushin, knowing the intent of such 
a sex act is critical.
3. A sex act without marital intent is classified as licentiousness, improper 
behavior not to be engaged in by Jews observant of the rabbinic halachic sys-
tem. Therefore, we presume that a Jewish man would certainly not engage in 
licentiousness. At least under certain circumstances, then, if he did have sexual 
relations with a woman not already legally his wife, it may be further presumed 
that his intent was for kiddushin instead [ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut].
4. If there is a reasonable possibility that a couple might have had sexual 
relations, although proof is lacking, this is sufficient to be concerned that such 
an act took place [hen hen edei yihud v’hen hen edei bi’ah] and may be grounds 
to impose the legal ramification of that sex act at least as a measure of caution.
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POST-TALMUDIC DEVELOPMENTS: RESPONSA AND CODES
It is in the post-Talmudic period that we begin to have records of rabbis 
attempting to apply this set of principles and legal assumptions to actual cases 
that are brought before them. These cases are also then considered by oth-
ers through the lens of their theoretical underpinnings and in the process of 
codification in works such as the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam. I will single 
out here just a few cases and rulings that are especially critical in terms of their 
impact on the development of halachic jurisprudence on this topic and the 
deployment of some of the rabbinic principles and presumptions about mar-
riage, sexual conduct, and (male) intent surveyed just above.
In the course of answering a question on a related topic, Hai Gaon, a 
leading scholar of the Babylonian Jewish community at the turn of the mil-
lenium, makes reference to a cause célèbre that roiled the Jewish Babylonian 
community in the seventh century (and had continuing ramifications for 
several generations after). In the case at hand, the Resh Galuta, the “Head of 
the Exile” and representative of the Jewish community to the Arabic/Muslim 
authorities, had fathered a son by his slave woman (who had been given to 
him by the Arabic king).22 The question arose as to the status of the child. It is 
a general principle in Jewish law (as in many other, but not all, slave systems) 
that the child of a slave woman has the status of the mother (i.e., is also a slave) 
and as such has the status of a possession that would be inherited by his bio-
logical siblings as part of his biological father’s estate. Jewish law and tradition 
also, however, discourages if not outright prohibits sexual contact between a 
free Jewish man and an enslaved woman (and similarly or all the more so an 
enslaved man and a free Jewish woman); by law there can be no binding kid-
dushin with a woman who is enslaved. Hence, by the understandings of non-
marital sex already discussed above, sexual contact under such circumstances 
would necessarily be understood as z’nut [licentiousness]. Thus, the geonic 
authorities of the time were presented with a social, moral, and quite possibly 
political quandary: could it be that the political leader and representative of 
the Jewish community would act in this manner?
Some geonic authorities of the time thus invoked the principle of the 
Talmud, ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut, to propose a novel “solution”:
However, this is a dispute on the matter among the later Geonim, 
and the root of it is [the case of ] Bustanai the Resh Galuta (who is 
the same [person] as Haninai23) who had sexual intercourse with 
his slave woman, the daughter of Kansari the king of Persia, given 
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to him by Amar son of Katav, king of the Ishmaelites as a gift, and 
she gave birth to a son, and he [Bustanai] died, and his [the child’s] 
brothers rose up to sell him. And the sages of the yeshivot disputed 
over this. There were those among them who said, so long as 
he [Bustanai] did not free him [the son], he is a slave and needs to 
be freed by his brothers. . . . And there were those among them who 
said: Bustanai was a head of the community, and it was in his power 
to free her, and if he had not freed her he would not have had sexual 
contact with her, since Beit Hillel held that a man does not intend 
his sex act to be licentious sex, and all the more so the head of the 
community.24
Since it is within a man’s power to free his slaves, if Bustanai wanted to have 
a legitimate relationship with his slave woman he could free her and immerse 
her in a mikvah [ritual bath], at which point she would become a legitimate 
convert to Judaism (and eligible for Jewish marriage). Given the principle that 
a man will seek to avoid licentious sex—read quite broadly—and since it was 
within Bustanai’s power to make the sex legitimate, some geonic authorities 
argued that one must allow for the possibility that this is precisely what Busta-
nai did; moreover, as a result, both she and the child must be considered as full 
Jews at least out of doubt that this happened.
It should not be difficult to see, though, that the logic of this case— 
and the way in which the principle that presumes the righteous intent of Jew-
ish men has been deployed here to “resolve” it—could be readily expanded 
from the original circumstances to cases of other men who fathered children 
by their slave women (which was the context in which Hai Gaon considered 
the issue) and well beyond. Thus, it is not surprising to find that while some 
contemporary and later authorities cited and/or adopted the reasoning of this 
case, others expressed significant resistance. Most notable of these is the great 
codifier of Jewish law Moses Maimonides (the Rambam), who took up this 
issue in conjunction with the case of the couple at the inn in his explication of 
the laws of divorce (Mishneh Torah, “Laws of Divorce” 10:19):
Some of the Geonim ruled that any woman with whom a man had 
sexual intercourse in the presence of witnesses needs a divorce docu-
ment, on the presumption that a man does not intend his sex act to 
be licentious sex. And they expanded and added to this matter that 
arose in their minds such that they ruled that [in the case in which] 
one who has a child by his slave woman, we are concerned regarding 
him . . . lest perhaps he freed his slave woman and [only] afterwards 
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had sexual intercourse with her, and there is one who rules that he 
certainly freed [her] since a man does not intend his sex act to 
be licentious sex. And all these things are extremely far-removed in 
my eyes from the ways of proper ruling and it is improper to rely 
on them. For the sages did not articulate this presumption except 
regarding his wife whom he divorced . . . since she is [has been] his 
wife, and it is with his wife (e.g., only with a woman with whom 
he has already had a marital connection) that it is presumed of him 
that a man does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex, until he 
specifies that it is licentious sex. . . . But with all other women, every 
fornicator is under the presumption that he had sexual intercourse 
for the purpose of licentiousness, until he specifies that it is for the 
purpose of kiddushin.
In the Rambam’s understanding, if the principle is taken to its logical 
extreme,25 we would have to be concerned about the possibility of kiddushin 
any time there was reasonable evidence of sexual contact between an unmar-
ried Jewish woman and a Jewish man—which we also know from Bavli Gittin 
81b means evidence not necessarily of the sex act itself but even seclusion of 
the couple together [hen hen edei yihud . . .].
While the Rambam did not explicitly spell out the ramifications of such 
a position, his rhetoric does suggest that it does not comport with reasonable 
conclusions about human behavior. While it might be nice to suppose that all 
Jewish men had “honorable” intentions when engaging in sexual relations out-
side of already established marriages, such an assumption stretches the bound-
aries of credulity. Rather, the Rambam argues, the Bavli invoked this principle 
only in a small set of circumstances, all of which share a common feature: 
that is, that some form of marital relationship had already been established at 
some time between the couple. Only when there is reason to suspect that the 
man’s thoughts and intentions are already focused on a marital relationship 
can we legally presume that his intent in this sexual encounter is for the sake of 
(re)establishing marriage. And indeed, this reading is confirmed in the Ram-
bam’s discussion of the status of the slave child in regard to his father’s estate 
(is he an heir to it or part of it?) in the laws of inheritance (Mishneh Torah, 
“Laws of Inheritance” 4:6):
One who had a slave woman and fathered a child from her, and 
acted towards him [the child] in the manner of [legitimate] children, 
or if he says “He is my son and his mother has been freed”—if he 
were a scholar or a man of good reputation who is very punctilious 
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in the details of the commandments, then this [child] inherits from 
him. . . . But if he were from among the other ordinary folk—and 
it goes without saying if he was among those who act freely in this 
[type of behavior]—then this [child] is under the presumption of 
being a slave in all matters, and his [biological] brothers from his 
father may sell him.
Although the Rambam does not invoke the principle of ein adam . . . directly 
here, he is clearly trying once again to limit the scope of its applicability by 
distinguishing cases in which the father was known to be a scholar and/or a 
religiously scrupulous man, whereas other more “ordinary” Jewish men do not 
get presumptions of having acting in a proper manner.
Finally, in this portion of our discussion there is the highly influential 
responsum of Rabbi Yitzhak ben Sheshet, known as the Rivash (Responsa of the 
Rivash, 6), which would come to be cited in nearly every analysis of this ques-
tion that followed. This responsum discusses the case of a female forced convert 
from Majorca during the Inquisition who had married another forced con- 
vert under Catholic rites. The woman bore a child, but the husband subse-
quently went abroad and disappeared. The woman was eventually able to return 
to a Jewish community and Jewish practice. Since both parties were Jewish 
by birth, were there grounds to consider the marriage between them a 
Jewish marriage, kiddushin at least after the fact, in which case the woman 
would need to (locate the man and) get a divorce before being allowed to 
remarry in the Jewish community? The Rivash musters a number of arguments 
to deny any halachic significance to the marriage, and I cannot review them all 
here. But what I would like to emphasize is how he assembles together many 
of the considerations we have already been discussing to bolster his argument.
The Rivash begins with the claim that only relationships established 
knowingly and intentionally as kiddushin, through the recognized and correctly 
performed procedures of kiddushin (the couple is eligible for kiddushin, the kid-
dushin is properly witnessed, etc.), thereby have the status of kiddushin:
There is no doubt that the betrothal or marriage, call it what you 
wish, which were done in the religion of idolaters and by the priests 
of their gathering places—there is not even a suspicion of kiddushin 
in them, even if there were valid witnesses at them, because [the 
requirement of ] “he gave and he spoke” was not fulfilled by them 
(the rites performed). . . . And in any case, in this situation he did 
not give her anything; rather only the priest blesses them aloud and 
gives a ring to each one.
Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the Status of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage 71
The Rivash quickly moves on, however, directly to the question of whether the 
presumption ein adam . . . should be relevant here. It was, after all, known to 
others, including other originally Jewish forced converts, that the couple lived 
together as husband and wife. Under the additional principle of Beit Hillel in 
Bavli Gittin 81b—witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual 
intercourse—perhaps that knowledge of cohabitation between the man and 
the woman (not to mention her pregnancy!) should be sufficient to presume 
sexual contact between them:
But rather, what needs to be looked into is that he was secluded 
with her in a publicly known way, and she “stood under him” (lived 
as his wife) and became pregnant from him. . . . And according to 
their words (i.e., the views of those Geonim who ruled broadly), in a 
case such as this where they are familiar with each other, and also he 
took her to be his wife, it would seem at first glance that she needs 
a get because there are witnesses that he was secluded with her, even 
though there are no witnesses to a sex act [itself ]. And in a case of 
this sort, we say witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses 
to sexual intercourse, and since she engaged in sexual intercourse, 
we say that he had sex with the intent of kiddushin, because a 
man does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex.
Can it therefore be presumed (or at least possible) that the sexual act was done 
with the intent of legitimate (Jewish) marriage, that is, kiddushin?
The Rivash’s response, however, is to turn to the Rambam’s argument (and 
those of others as well) against a broad application of the ein adam . . . principle:
However, the Rambam, z”l, deflected this ruling with all his power 
(literally: with both hands). . . .
 For even according to the view of those Geonim z”l who held 
that in general we say that he had sexual relations for the purpose 
of kiddushin, here this man under consideration did not have sexual 
relations for the purpose of kiddushin. For since they married in 
marriage rites under the law of the idolators and at their gathering 
place by the word of the priest, it is as though they made clear that 
their intent was not for kiddushin according to the laws of Moses 
and Jewish women, but rather for the ways of idolaters, who are not 
under the law of kiddushin and gittin. And if this is so, she is not like 
a (Jewishly) married woman. . . .
 And in the case under consideration, certainly you do not have 
more brazen people than these, who go of their personal desires to 
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idolatry to bow down there, and their acts demonstrate their brazen-
ness and their irreverence.
The fact that the wedding took place as a Catholic ceremony does not mean 
only that the rites were substantially different from Jewish marriage. Rather, 
entirely other presumptions about the actions, motives, and intent of the par-
ties emerge. The choice of ceremony in the rites of another religion is to be 
understood as an active rejection of kiddushin as the basis of the marriage; 
the nature of the ceremony itself creates a presumption that the man had no 
intent at any time to create a Jewish marriage between himself and the woman. 
Indeed, if, as the Rambam ruled, only a person of good reputation and Jew-
ish practice can even perhaps be presumed to have engaged in a sex act with 
only legitimate intent, then participation in Catholic—in the words of the 
Rivash, “idolatrous”—rites itself removes one from possible consideration on 
this account and in fact creates the opposite presumption: that the intent was 
of brazenness and disregard for proper Jewish sexual morals.
CIVIL MARRIAGE
The concept of civil marriage—that is, marriage overseen through secular gov-
ernmental authority—first appeared in Holland in 1580 but did not imme-
diately attract rabbinic attention. The apparent first published responsum 
addressing the topic is dated to 1741.26 The challenge of civil marriage is that 
it takes place outside the framework of Jewish marriage by means of kiddushin 
but, seemingly, also does not take place within the framework of any other 
religion or set of theological assumptions immediately antithetical to Judaism. 
Frequently, the two coexist: a couple is legally required to be civilly licensed or 
married under the law of the state but is not prevented from having a religious 
ceremony of their choice as well; it may even be that the officiation of a clergy 
person also fulfills the civil requirement. When couples both follow the proce-
dures of the state and marry through kiddushin, there has been relatively little 
halachic concern; the couple is married Jewishly, and she will need to receive 
a get for the Jewish marriage to be severed, since marriage by kiddushin can be 
severed only by the get process.
Yet the existence of civil marriage allows a couple a new option for mar-
rying—and severing that marriage—outside of any Jewish framework. What 
is the status of a marriage enacted only through civil procedures, without a 
Jewish ceremony? If living together as husband and wife by virtue of a civil 
marriage in some way creates at least a doubtful kiddushin after the fact, then 
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from within the halachic system it should not be severed merely by a civil 
divorce degree, and any subsequent marriage of one of the parties—especially 
the wife—to another Jew is potentially adulterous. This set of questions has 
generated a vast body of literature and a multiplicity of views among those 
who have addressed it. Among the decisors who have taken it up, some 
have written responsa of great length and/or multiple responsa and have also 
responded to each others’ views in additional writings. Thus, following Gedsel 
Ellinson, author of the thorough study Non-Halachic Marriage, I will state 
now that “It is not our aim to put in order the responsa on the topic; we will 
consider only the halachic foundations, in the course of investigation of a 
selection of rulings.”27
A starting point for many of these responsa and analyses is the ruling of 
the Rivash discussed just above. Its applicability, however, can be understood 
in very different and even opposite ways. That is, if one wants to apply or 
extend the reasoning of the Rivash regarding the forced converts (and of other 
decisors considering other similar cases), one must come to a personal judg-
ment: is the critical factor in that case that the marriage rites were something 
other than kiddushin and did not meet the criteria for valid kiddushin, or is it 
the very “choice” of Catholic rites in particular—that is, the rites of a religion 
contrary to Judaism—that negates any validity under Jewish law? Put another 
way, is civil marriage religiously neutral, in which case it can be evaluated in 
terms of other factors such as its content, the legal rights and responsibilities it 
entails, and/or the social expectations regarding the commitments the couple 
are making to each other—and the correspondences or lack thereof with Jew-
ish understandings of marriage? Could such a couple subsequently lend a 
 Jewish character to their union ex post facto through their open life together as 
husband and wife and the reasonable assumption that they have consummated 
their relationship? Alternately, does the very choice to enter a civil marriage 
while foregoing kiddushin and Jewish rites carry religious significance? Does 
such a choice indicate something about the desire of the couple, and particu-
larly of the man, not to establish their relationship as kiddushin—or, going a 
step further, perhaps even indicate something about their lack of connection 
to Judaism and lack of commitment to “proper” Jewish practice?
In fact, it is intriguing to see the way in which both decisors and those 
who have analyzed their decisions yet again turn to the discourse of what 
presumptions may be made about the intent of those entering into civil mar-
riage without also participating in a Jewish ceremony of kiddushin (among 
other considerations). As Ellinson summarizes one strand of thinking found 
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in some of the more recent responsa of the twentieth century, “We are con-
cerned for [the possibility] of kiddushin through sexual intercourse, even if the 
parties did not intend Toraitic kiddushin. There are those who hold that for 
the requirements of kiddushin, it is possible to suffice with the intent of the 
parties to create between them fixed marital bonds.”28 Orthodox authorities 
often cited in association with this view include Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin 
and Rabbi Yosef Rosen (also known as the Rogatchover), both active in the 
early part of the twentieth century prior to World War II. While there are 
some important difference in their approaches and they come to somewhat 
different conclusions, both make one central point in their arguments: the pre-
sumption that parties to a civil marriage—and once again, most particularly 
the man—expect that a critical commitment of marriage is sexual exclusivity. 
The husband’s expectation that through marriage he has exclusive rights to 
sexual access to his wife is similar, both argue, to the legal condition created 
by kiddushin. Any relations between them are thus more like his ownership 
of (understood as exclusive sexual access to) her through kiddushin than licen-
tious relations, z’nut, and must be evaluated as such. Such a marriage should 
be severed by a get, at least out of doubt that it might fulfill the requirements 
of kiddushin.29 Nor is this approach limited to Orthodox thinkers. As Rabbi 
Isaac Klein, a leading halachic authority of the Conservative movement and 
author of the responsum that guides Conservative practice to this day, wrote in 
1938, “Our experience is that the moral standards of those who have become 
united through civil marriage, as far as marital fidelity and the purity of their 
family life is concerned, compares very favorably with the standards of those 
who have had the benefit of a religious marriage.”30
On the other side—that is, among those who hold that civil marriage has 
no Jewish standing—rulings often hinge on presumptions about the intents 
and desires of the parties vis-à-vis Judaism and Jewish marriage. The choice 
of a civil marriage, no less than the choice of a marriage in a religion other 
than Judaism, is understood as a conscious and willing rejection by the couple 
of Jewish marriage and kiddushin and indeed a rejection of a commitment to 
Judaism altogether. This view was expressed, for example, in several responses 
to Rabbi Henkin’s responsum, as in the following from Rabbi Shlomo Zal-
man Auerbach, who emphasizes the secular nature of civil marriage: “just as 
they don’t worry and think that she might not be betrothed to him according 
to the religions of the Christians and the Ishmaelites, thus to our great sor-
row he doesn’t care at all that she is not betrothed to him according to our 
holy Torah.”31 The very point of civil marriage alone, he suggests, is that it 
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represents a rejection of any religion. It should be noted that even according 
to this view some rabbis, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein being a notable example, 
have ruled that it is still preferable to have a get given where possible to resolve 
any doubt, but they would allow the woman’s remarriage without a Jewish 
divorce when circumstances make insisting on a get problematic. It is also 
possible to make the exact opposite presumption, as does Rabbi Klein of the 
Conservative movement: “Let us see what the mental attitude is of the parties 
that go through a civil marriage. Is it a matter of l’hakhit (‘spite’), or just a 
passive disregard of the requirements of the Jewish law? In most cases it is safe 
to assume that the parties do not object to a religious marriage. . . . In many 
cases it is sheer case of ignorance. . . . Under these circumstances, we surely 
cannot assume that the parties have definite objections to being married k’Dat 
Mosheh v’Yisroel.”32
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we return to the wedding of the Adlers, and the strange provi-
sion in their marital document, and to the question of how the traditional 
halachic system is likely to approach newly developing alternatives to kiddu-
shin such as, but not limited to, B’rit Ahuvim. What the Adlers, both of whom 
are rabbinically trained and versed in many of the complexities discussed in 
this essay, intuited is that when the arbiters of traditional halachah come to 
consider a ceremony such as theirs, those arbiters will come with a tradition 
full of presuppositions and presumptions that may be imposed on a marriage 
and the couple who entered it. In the sources surveyed here, we have seen that 
exclusive and binding relationships between heterosexual partners, initiated by 
marital processes other than kiddushin, may be brought under the rubric of 
kiddushin, such that they must be severed by the (unilateral) get process.
It is certainly possible, based on sources here, that to use a ceremony such 
as B’rit Ahuvim is to state clearly, in a way that civil marriage may not, that 
the couple is deliberately foregoing kiddushin and that their marriage should 
not be evaluated as such. Alternately, the choice of a ceremony that retains 
elements of Jewish language could as easily be taken as a desire not to reject 
Jewish forms and proper Jewish behavior, something that is more doubtful in 
the case of civil marriage. Knowing that their motives will be scrutinized and 
defined by others, the Adlers are attempting to the best of their abilities to 
make their own assumptions about their marriage, their relations, and their 
intents explicit, to forestall the possibility that other assumptions might be 
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imposed upon them. In this, I would suggest that the couple has identified 
an important challenge that anyone seeking alternatives to kiddushin must 
consider and attempt to address, as they have.
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Agunot, Immigration, and Modernization, 
from 1857 to 1896
Haim Sperber
INTRODUCTION
This essay investigates the phenomenon of agunot (explained below) in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, and especially during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, this has become one of the most 
discussed issues on the social and cultural Jewish agenda. Although referred to 
sporadically in nineteenth century Jewish social history research, this issue has 
not been extensively investigated. This essay offers an introduction to this topic.
The essay’s main objectives are to
1.  sum up the research to date,
2.  estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon,
3.  discuss the available databases,
4.  formulate certain conclusions based on research on all the known 
cases of agunot between 1857 and 1896, and
5.  provide insights on the effect of the phenomenon of agunot on
 A.  the status of nineteenth century Eastern European Jewish women,
 B.  the changing role of rabbis in Eastern European communities, and
 C.  the complex relationship between absconding husbands and im- 
migration.
DEFINITION OF AGUNOT
The term agunot (sing. agunah) refers to Jewish women who are unable to 
divorce because they have been abandoned by their husbands. The word 
literally means “anchored,” suggesting that such women are chained to their 
marriages, since according to Jewish law only the husband is able to grant 
the wife a get [writ of divorce]. Although in the past most agunot were aban-
doned wives, there are various other ways of attaining this status.
The traditional way of coping with the phenomenon of agunot was to ask 
the rabbis for advice. A rabbi usually alerted other rabbis about the absconding 
husband as part of the effort to find him and obtain a get for the abandoned 
wife. Rabbis were also very instrumental in offering legal aid to agunot.1 This 
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changed with the advent of Jewish journalism in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Women began to search for their absconding husbands by placing advertise-
ments in newspapers and other journals. With these new avenues open to 
them, women no longer depended solely on rabbinical help for finding a solu-
tion to their plight.
THE STATE OF RESEARCH TO DATE
Historical research of the phenomenon in the second half of the nineteenth 
century is virtually nonexistent.2 However, much more has been written about 
agunot in the early twentieth century, especially in North America.3
CheaRan Freeze devoted thirteen pages to agunot in her pathbreaking 
research on Jewish divorce and marriage in the Russian Empire in the late 
nineteenth century.4 She was the first to regard it as an important aspect of 
the nineteenth century Jewish family history. Arthur Hertzberg and, recently, 
Gur Alroey probed this phenomenon as part of their research of Jewish immi-
gration.5 Margalith Shilo investigated agunot in the small Jewish community 
in Jerusalem in the nineteenth century.6
Mark Baker is the only researcher who primarily focused on this topic, 
but his work covers only four years, from 1867 to 1870, and is limited to only 
one source, the Hebrew Newspaper HaMagid.7 In her Ph.D. dissertation, Noa 
Shashar relates only to the period before 1850.8
The research results in this essay are the first exclusively dedicated to 
agunot in the late nineteenth century.
THE EXTENT OF THE PHENOMENON
All the data for the scope of the phenomenon of agunot are estimates. Most 
agunot were not reported as such due to either shame or despair. Furthermore, 
although most agunot lived in Eastern Europe, much of the data refer to post-
migration reports, particularly to North America and the United Kingdom, in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Mark Baker suggests that the agunot reported in Jewish newspapers rep-
resented only 1 percent of all the cases, based on Ephraim Deinew’s statement 
in a footnote in HaMagid (April 21, 1869): “Readers of the Jewish journals 
need not think that the published cases of agunot in newspapers are all the 
cases. In fact if all agunot would wish to publish their troubles, all the journals 
would not suffice. In fact only one in a hundred is mentioned.”9
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Arthur Hertzberg claimed that during the period of the Great Immigra-
tion (1881–1924) one hundred thousand Russian Jews deserted their wives 
and families, but he did not cite his sources.10 ChaeRan Freeze doubts this 
estimate.11
However, figures given by Jewish organizations in Great Britain and 
the United States might give some further hints. The British Jewish Board of 
Guardians’ report for 1870 gives the number of agunot as 103.12 Their report 
for 1871 refers to 105 cases.13 These are huge numbers, if the size of the Jew-
ish population in Great Britain (fewer than 300,000 in 1870) is taken into 
account. In the 1880s, the figures were much higher. The report for 1881 cites 
151 cases,14 and the 1886 report cites 214 cases.15 The numbers for the 1890s 
was even higher. The report for 1892, for example, gives 353 agunot.16
As far as North America is concerned, Hertzberg’s figures are indirectly 
supported by a report by Morris D. Waldman to the Sixth Conference of the 
National Jewish Charities in the United States in 1909. Waldman reported 
on deserted women requesting aid from charities in various cities: 78 in St. 
Louis, 90 in Baltimore, 204 in Chicago, and 1,046 in New York.17 Waldman 
also quoted research from 1901, with the number of deserted Jewish women 
in Boston given as 105 for the same year.18
In 1908–1909, the records of the United Hebrew Charities of New York 
(UHCNY) showed that 652 out of 1,046 women were deserted for more than 
a year, including 130 for more than a decade. Waldman provided figures of 
deserted women assisted by the UHCNY from 1903 to 1909 (1,052, 970, 
1,124, 1,040, 106, 1,049, and 1,046, respectively).19 It seems that in New 
York alone, there were at least a few hundred new agunot per year. As early as 
1871, a report of the Hebrew Benevolent and Orphan Asylum Society of New 
York, published in the Jewish Messenger on May 5, 1871, refers to 78 deserted 
wives supported by the society in 1870 alone.
All these figures do not include Eastern Europe. However, most agunot 
found in the present research came from the Russian and Hapsburg Empires, 
and figures do not exist for them. Rather, research on East European agunot 
relies heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative sources
THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
This essay is based on research on over forty-seven hundred cases of identified 
agunot, most of them from Eastern Europe. Most information on agunot can be 
found either in newspapers (mostly Jewish newspapers in Hebrew or Yiddish) 
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or in rabbinical responsa books and other sources. As shown here, these two 
main databases portray different agunot narratives. The basic assumption is that 
at least one hundred thousand Jewish agunot lived in Eastern Europe during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Although there is some information 
relating to anonymous agunot, especially in the rabbinical sources, this research 
concentrates solely on those identifiable by either name or place.
CATEGORIES OF AGUNOT
Based on research of forty-seven hundred cases of agunot in the nineteenth 
century, seven basic types were identified.20
1. Women Deserted by Husbands Who Disappeared
Isaac Waldorf is probably the most notorious case of desertion. After deserting 
his wife in Vienna, he went to New York and remarried. When his second wife 
died, leaving three young children, he appointed an eighteen-year-old girl, 
who came from Vienna, to look after his children, and later he married her. 
The bride invited her mother from Vienna to come to New York. The mother 
recognized her son-in-law as the husband who deserted her. The daughter/
third wife was born a few months after Waldorf ’s desertion.21
In most of the known cases, the husbands were not found. There were 
also a few cases of wives deserting husbands.22 However, deserted husbands 
who were still married could apply for a heter meah rabanim [permission, 
signed by one hundred rabbis (from three countries)] to marry another wife. 
Men would look for rabbis willing to sign such permissions. In a peculiar case, 
in 1857, Itzik Walershtein from Hungary went on a mission to collect one 
hundred rabbis’ signatures for another man whose wife was insane. However, 
Walershtein disappeared, making his own wife an agunah.23
According to Jewish law, wives could not receive such permission. This 
created a problem in countries where bigamy was illegal.24 In some cases of 
couples married according to Jewish law but without having recorded the mar-
riages by the state, husbands would deny the marriages altogether.25 However, 
since they were married according to Jewish law, the wives would remain agu-
not, although the whereabouts of the husbands were known.
Since women could not receive heter meah rabanim, their only option 
was heter agunah [permission to the agunah], which is discussed later in this 
essay. Desertion was the most common reason for women becoming agunot 
(see Table 1).
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2. Women Who Refused to Receive or Were Not Granted a Get
Some husbands who refused to grant their wives permission for divorce were 
imprisoned or deported. The cases of imprisoned or deported women unwill-
ing to receive a get were much fewer,26 while some refused to receive it for 
other reasons, particularly economic considerations.27 Not many cases of the 
latter were found, although this later became more widespread.
3. Widowed Women Whose Brothers-in-Law Refused  
to Grant Them Permission to Marry Others
According to Jewish law, when a husband dies and has a surviving brother, the 
widow, if she does not have children, is obliged to marry the brother unless 
she is released from this duty. This is done through a ceremony called 
halitza [Levirate marriage] in which the widow takes off the brother-in-law’s 
shoe, whereby she receives the brother-in-law’s permission to marry another 
man. Thus, he is released from the obligation to marry her, and she becomes 
free to marry whomever she desires. In one peculiar case, a brother of a 
deceased man went to give his sister-in-law halitza but disappeared, and his 
own wife thus became an agunah as well.28 Sometimes the brother-in-law 
could not be found,29 refused to give permission,30 or demanded payment 
for it.31
4. Women Whose Husbands’ Bodies Have Disappeared
Such instances include husbands’ deaths by drowning32 or by natural disasters 
while traveling. The difficulties in such cases could be that a husband’s body 
was not found or was mutilated beyond recognition.33 In such instances, 
women could not remarry until the husbands were officially pronounced dead. 
There were many instances in which husbands had been taken into the armed 
forces and died during their service, but their bodies were missing or muti-
lated.34 In some cases enlisted husbands did not return home, sometimes by 
choice.35 In other cases they were missing in action, but the rabbis refused to 
accept the army death reports.36 In one case the husband had been murdered 
but the body was discovered only much later,37 and during all the intervening 
years the woman remained chained to the marriage.
5. Improperly or Incorrectly Written Get
The divorces of women with such a get38 could not be finalized.39 In some 
cases, the get was deliberately written in an improper way.40
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This issue was the subject of a number of literary works, mainly in nine-
teenth century Russia. Among the most famous of such pieces was Yehuda 
Leib Gordon’s poem “Kotzo shel Yod” [41.[קוצו של יוד
There were also some cases in which women refused to receive the 
get because the husband tried to serve it by using force or intimidating 
the woman.42 In other cases, rabbis refused to accept the get written by rab-
bis who were appointed by the state but whose ruling was deemed improper 
because they did not have rabbinical training and formal rabbinical education.43
6. Women Whose Husbands Became Mentally Ill  
and Were Not Competent to Grant a Get
In such cases, women had to apply for heter beth din (התר בית דין) [permission 
of the rabbinical court] to be released from the marriage.44 Similarly, women 
who had become mentally ill were not considered competent to receive a writ 
of divorce,45 and the husbands became chained to such marriages. Such matters 
could be adjudicated by rabbis using heter meah rabanim, as mentioned above.
7. Women Refused a Get by Jewish Converts to Christianity or Islam
Some of the converts to Christianity became anti-Jewish agitators, such as 
Israel Aaron Birman, also known as Dr. Yustus.46 In such cases, the divorces 
still had to be granted according to Jewish law. In the event that converts refused 
to grant a get, the women became agunot.47
The most famous instance involving conversion was of Sarah Leah, the 
widow of Mechel Alter Gener of Odessa in the Russian Empire, who became 
an agunah. Both of Mechel Alter Gener’s brothers converted to Christianity 
and were not willing to grant Sarah Leah halitza. She needed special rab-
binical permission to remarry. The case was much debated in newspapers, 
rabbinical responsa, and civil courts in Odessa. The rabbinical debate was 
conducted by Rabbi Avraham Yoel Abelson of Odessa. The correspondents 
included Avraham Yoel Abelson, Israel Issar Shapira, Aaron Zeev Wolf Wail, 
Itzhak Elhanan Spector, Mordechai Aarom Gimple, Leib Frankel, Yosef 
Zechaia Shtern, Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Shimon Arie Schwabacher, and 
Shmuel Mohaliver—many of the most important rabbis in Eastern Europe.48
HOW AGUNOT COULD OBTAIN PERMISSION TO REMARRY
In cases (categories 2–6) in which a husband was not found for a few years 
or was declared insane, in a coma, or unable to function, the rabbis could 
release the agunah from her chains by the heter aguna [עגונה  To gain .[התר 
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such permission was the principal goal of agunot. However, rabbis could grant 
such permission only within the framework of Jewish law.49 In many cases, the 
newspapers applied pressure on the rabbis to be more liberal and issue written 
permissions to remarry more frequently.
Table 1 divides the known cases of agunot into various categories. About 
30 percent of the women researched became agunot for reasons other than 
desertion by their husbands. Furthermore, the two major sources on agunot, 
which are discussed below—namely Jewish newspapers and responsa books—
offer two different narratives regarding agunot. While the newspapers dealt 
mainly with deserted women, the responsa dealt mainly with women whose 
husbands were deceased as well as with 6 halitza cases and get and mental 
health issues. Thus, out of 1,584 cases of agunot cited in responsa, 1,121 
(70.8 percent) were women not deserted by their husbands, while 2,260 out 
of 2,560 cases (88.3 percent) reported in the Jewish newspapers were women 
deserted by husbands (see Table 5 later in this chapter). The reason for this is 
explained in the next section.
THE SOURCES
The sources describing such phenomenon are vast, but most have not been 
researched until now. There are four main databases on agunot: newspapers, 
Table 1. Data on the Categories of the Known Cases of Agunot 
Agunot No. %
1 Deserted by husband or wife 3,012
1a Serial deserting husband (2 or more deserted wives) 150
Total deserted wives
Total deserted by wife
Total desertions
2,987
   175
3,162 68.09
2 Refusing to grant or receive a get 1281 2.54  
3 Halitza issues 202  4.28
4 Husband suspected dead (one case of a wife) 608 12.50
5 Improper get 235 4.59
6 Mental or severe illnesses 2742 5.79
7 Conversion 80 1.71
8 Undefined and other cases  23 0.50
Total 4,712 100.00
1. Among those cases, 24 women refused to receive the get.
2. Including 13 males [agunim] and 249 females [agunot].
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especially Jewish ones; rabbinical sources, especially responsa books; official 
Russian rabbinical documents; and letters and documents in private archives.
As mentioned earlier, the different sources offer alternative and some-
times conflicting narratives regarding agunot. This is demonstrated in the 
analysis of the various sources.
I. JEWISH NEWSPAPERS
While the Jewish newspapers are mostly in Hebrew, there are some in Yid-
dish50 and in various local Jewish newspapers.51
Much information regarding agunot is found in the Jewish newspapers. 
Indeed, the first Hebrew newspaper, HaMagid,52 published from 1856 to 
1903 initially in Lyck, Prussia, and later in other places, put the matter of 
agunot very high on the agenda. While Mark Baker’s research on agunot in 
HaMagid is restricted to the years between 1867 and 1870,53 the current 
research investigates all the issues of the newspaper.
Information on agunot is also available in other Jewish newspapers, par-
ticularly in those published after 1880.54 Information on agunot in the news-
papers appeared in two main forms: advertisements and news reports.
The advertisements, placed by women or their relatives, mostly fathers, 
sought information on the whereabouts of husbands. They were published 
only after the editors verified the validity of the information.
The editors were very much aware of possible manipulation by the 
parties concerned. On June 28, 1871, the editor of HaMagid reported on 
some instances of women approaching the newspaper a few weeks after hus-
bands went away on business, and by the time of publication the husbands 
had returned. To avoid such problems, the newspapers specified the infor-
mation that advertisements should include and stated that “We will not adver-
tise any advertisements concerning agunot if the matter is not presented to us 
by the rabbi or communal officials of the place where the agunah resides.”55 
The usual procedure was to ask the local rabbi to confirm the woman’s version, 
after the editor of HaMagid (June 23, 1869) wrote that he had been deceived 
by two people a few years earlier. He decided that advertisements would not 
be published without rabbinical consent.56
In many cases the rabbis would write the advertisements,57 which were 
then posted as letters from the rabbis to the editor. In other cases, advertise-
ments were written by newspaper correspondents or community officials.
Two typical examples of advertisements are the following:
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1.  This first advertisement was published in HaMagid (June 16, 1866, 
and September 9, 1866). It relates to a woman deserted by her hus-
band five years earlier. In most such advertisements there is much 
information regarding the deserters, while information on the aban-
doned wives is rare:
A woman Necha, the daughter of Haim David of Warsaw, was 
betrayed by her husband five years ago. Last year, he wrote to his 
family that he was in Suez, Egypt, and has not been heard from 
for nine months now. The man is tall and has a black beard and 
hair. He is about 34 years old and is a roofer by profession. Some 
years ago he was in the Caucasus. The address he sent is in Suez 
under the name of Moritz Greenwald. The person who would do 
the good deed of meeting him and receiving the get from him will 
be well rewarded, as our late Sages have proclaimed many times. 
Please, as soon as the editor should learn anything, let him inform 
the great genius, our teacher, Rabbi Doberosh Meizlish, may his 
light shine, the head of the Beth Din of Warsaw. I hope that all 
our fellow sons of Israel, wherever they are, will try to find out the 
whereabouts of this man.
Benjamin David, Secretary, Warsaw Sacred Community
2.  The second advertisement refers to two women left by the same 
man. Again, there is much information about the deserter and very 
little concerning the deserted wives. The advertisement appeared in 
HaMagid (August 20, 1873):
A WOMAN’S CRYING VOICE
A woman [named] Pesia, daughter of David Levy, is seeking Israel 
Baer, born in Berditsov, Russia. [Baer is] the son of Yehoshua 
Heschel Shapira, grandson of the famed Leah Menasche. Having 
married in the town of Hamla, Galicia, [the said Baer] lived in 
Yassi, Romania, for a number of years but ran off, not to be found. 
I have been traveling for three and a half years, looking for him 
without success. Therefore, I beg all those who have a connec- 
tion with HaMagid to try and make him send a get to his above-
named wife. This is how he looks: He is about forty-four years old, 
of medium height; his hair and beard are black [giving his face] 
a round [appearance]. On one foot, he has a [birth] mark, and, 
on his lower [back . . . a scar from] a healed blow. He took along 
Yaacov, his [now] 15-year-old son from this marriage. The son is 
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bleary-eyed and has a dark, dappled face due to blisters; he has 
thick lips. Now I know, as a matter of certainty, that this betrayer 
has abandoned another wife in the city of Tchernowitz, Romania. 
Her name is Yenta, and she is divorced from her first husband, 
Mihel Tandetnik. She resides at a baker’s place near the military 
hospital. It is a religious commandment to force him to release 
both his wives from their chains. A get for each of them should 
be addressed to me, care of my aid Yosef ben Itzhak or care of the 
rabbis in the above-mentioned cities.
Itzhak Aizik Shor, Chief Rabbi of Bucharest
In most cases the advertisements were published free of charge.58 In some cases 
the advertisement was published in more than one newspaper,59 but in most 
cases they appeared only in one. If a woman wanted to publish a series of pleas, 
she had to pay for the advertisements. The best-known case of paid advertise-
ment is of Bassia Freizetova, who published her requests in three newspapers in 
1883. Freizetova also tried other routes, such as appealing to rabbis and local 
Russian authorities.60 In some cases women would publish an advertisement 
and, after a decade or more, publish another one.61 Occasionally a woman or 
her relatives offered financial rewards.62 However, offers of rewards were rare.
Another way a woman’s plight would become known was through the 
publication of her story by a newspaper correspondent. A good example is 
the case of Shlomo Braham. The story was initiated and followed up by a 
HaMagid correspondent. Many correspondents helped to trace deserting hus-
bands across borders, notably Ber Dov Goldberg in Paris, David Fishman in 
Tiberias, and Shlomo Behor Hutzin in Bagdad.63
The editors encouraged their correspondents to pursue elusive husbands. 
Such was the case of Libbe Marcus. David Meyer Marcus left his wife Libbe 
twice. In the second abandonment, he emigrated from Russia to France. The 
Paris correspondent of HaMagid, Ber Dov Goldberg, was very helpful in find-
ing Marcus and preparing the get. The editor helped Libbe reach Paris and 
receive the get.64 In some cases readers added information that helped with the 
deserters’ apprehension,65 or the pursuit might have begun with an advertise-
ment but was then followed by a newspaper investigation.66
Sometimes the editors published incorrect information in attempts to 
locate the deserter. Such was the case with Ithzhak, the son of Moshe the 
Cohen. An advertisement was published in HaMagid (January 17, 1884). The 
publication detailed the route Itzhak took in 1881 from Breslau through Italy, 
England, and Egypt. In his final letter to the family, he stated that he intended 
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to go to Bombay, India. After late 1881, all contact with him was lost. The 
advertisement was published in early 1884, and meanwhile the family moved 
from Breslau to Serbia. On April 3, 1884, the HaMagid correspondent in San 
Francisco wrote that Itzhak came there from the East Indies and then moved 
to Los Angeles. However, the original advertisement was republished on Sep-
tember 24, 1884. A possible explanation is that despite the further informa-
tion, he did not return or send a get. Another explanation may be that since the 
name “Itzhak the son of Moshe the Cohen” is very common, the San Francisco 
correspondent was reporting on another Itzhak. In my view the second expla-
nation is more feasible, since some details were added that were different from 
those given in the original advertisement.
In some instances, the newspaper editors were quite eager to publish 
stories of agunot. This was the case regarding the alleged deserting husband 
Yehuda Kahalan, who was accused of abandoning Rachel Friedel. The news-
paper published both sides of the story: the wife accused Kahalan of desertion, 
and Kahalan himself denied the accusation. However, the newspaper kept on 
insisting that it was a desertion case even after it became clear that Kahalan 
had not deserted his wife.67
The editors were clearly looking for agunot even if there were none, and 
they were much criticized for this. As a result, from 1879 onward HaMagid 
published far fewer dispatches about agunot and only if the editors were certain 
that the wives were indeed deserted.68
In rare instances, the Hebrew newspapers cited cases published earlier in 
other Jewish newspapers.69 The editors also referred cases to rabbis, encouraging 
them publicly to help the agunot.70 They even published articles condemning 
rabbis who were reluctant to do so.
Special attention was drawn to cases of serial deserters. For example, 
Zeev Margaliot abandoned seven wives (see HaMagid, February 24, 1874, and 
HaLebanon, March 25, 1874, and August 26, 1874), and his namesake Alexan-
der Sender Margaliot deserted three wives (see HaMagid, July 6, 1859; August 
30, 1859; October 6, 1859; December 7, 1859; and March 21, 1860).71
Awareness of the issue of agunot in the public sphere had side effects. Some 
dishonest people would try to make a living from such a matter. Moshe Gold-
stein of Cairo, Egypt, claimed that he was carrying a get from Itzhak Finkel to his 
wife Ester Zissel. Goldstein claimed that Finkel asked him deliver a get to 
his wife. According to the Jewish law, a get has to be sent via a messenger if 
the husband and wife were living in places far away from each other. Finkel was 
supposed to be living somewhere near the Caspian Sea, while Ester lived in 
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Russia. In each city Goldstein passed through, he requested that Jews pay for 
his expenses, since he was performing a mitzvah [holy commandment].72
Similarly, the above-mentioned case of Bassia Freizetova became so 
famous that two criminals, presenting themselves as her father and husband, 
tried to profit from her plight. The older one, who posed as Bassia’s father, 
asked Jews for money to help him take the deserter back to his deserted wife.73 
For some professional criminals, such as Hirsch Denmark, wife desertion was 
just one of an assortment of criminal activities.74 Some deserters were actually 
engaged in trafficking women.75
Another indication that the phenomenon of agunot was becoming an 
important issue among the Jewish public was that some husbands threatened 
to leave their wives without granting a get, thus making them agunot.76
HEBREW NEWSPAPERS AND THE ISSUE OF AGUNOT
The newspapers dealt mainly with the first type of agunot—wives deserted by 
husbands. The issue of agunot was mainly addressed in Hebrew newspapers 
and rarely in the Yiddish ones. For example, between 1862 and 1872 while 
Hamelitz published sixty-five advertisements on agunot, its Yiddish edition 
Kol Mevaser published only five. American Yiddish newspapers, which began 
to appear only in late 1870, published more information, mostly referring to 
North American agunot.77
Eliezer Lipman Zilbermann (1819–1882), the publisher and first editor 
of HaMagid (founded in 1856), brought the issue of agunot to the forefront 
of the Jewish social debate. As Baker has shown, Zilbermann made this issue 
one of the most important topics in HaMagid.78
On September 13, 1865, in a very long editorial, Zilbermann proclaimed 
that agunot were one of the most important matters that should be discussed 
in the Jewish press. He also stated that HaMagid would put pressure on rabbis 
who hesitated in taking up the cause.79
Orthodox newspaper editors disagreed with, in their view, the overem-
phasis of the issue, especially Yehiel Brill, the editor of HaLebanon,80 who 
accused Zilbermann of reporting on agunot even in simple marriage disputes 
between husband and wife. In July 1879, Brill published another editorial in 
which he stated that the issue should be dealt with exclusively by the rabbis, 
and not in the media.81
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, David Gordon became the new editor 
and publisher of HaMagid, promoted from deputy editor, in which position 
he had served since the mid-1860s. Gordon was more concerned with the 
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Jewish national movement and the settlement of Jews in Palestine and less 
focused on social issues.82 After Gordon’s death in 1886, his son Dov, who 
was the editor until 1890, continued his father’s editorial policy. In 1890, 
Yaacov Shmuel Fux became publisher and editor; he continued along those 
lines until HaMagid closed down in 1903. Under Fux’s leadership, HaMagid 
concentrated solely on cultural and political issues, altogether neglecting the 
social problems in the Jewish community.83
From 1880, HaMelitz (which was founded in Odessa in 1860 and later 
moved to St. Petersburg)84 and Hatzfira (founded in Warsaw in 1862)85 
became the leading newspapers to spread the word about the issue of agunot. 
Both HaMelitz and Hatzfira became daily newspapers in the late 1880s, giving 
the matter widespread coverage.86
Table 2 analyzes all information found in the Jewish newspapers on agu-
not between 1857 and 1896.87
As the analysis clearly shows, in the four decades investigated, about 
75 percent of the mentions in media sources on agunot were advertisements. 
However, the advertisements dropped from 88.9 percent in the first decade to 
60.2 percent in the fourth decade. On the other hand, the number of news 
reports on agunot rose from 31 in the first decade to 330 in the fourth, pos-
sibly reflecting the professionalization of Jewish media.
II. RESPONSA
Agunot became an ardent issue in the Jewish community, mainly in Eastern 
Europe, as evidenced by the vast amount of information on the subject 
in nineteenth century published responsa and rabbinical questions and 
answers.88 Even more information is found in unpublished responsa, which 
can be located in rabbinical archives.89 While this issue became prominent 
in responsa in the nineteenth century, it was a major topic of discussion in 
rabbinical literature long before.90 In traditional Jewish society, family issues 
were usually handled privately and discreetly (although, of course, the dis-
appearance of husbands was known in the shtetl and the community).91 
A unique feature of nineteenth century responsa was their reaction to the 
public challenge, including the leaders of nineteenth century Jewish com-
munity, and the high profile of the issue of agunot in the Jewish press. The 
rise of journalism offered agunot a new way to try to solve their situation. 
Requesting the aid of rabbis was practically the only avenue open to the 
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spotlight on the issue of agunot, not only in newspapers93 but also in Hebrew 
and Yiddish literature,94 affected rabbinical literature in general and responsa 
in particular.95
Some examples of the effect of the new public scene on the major rabbis 
in Eastern Europe are presented below. Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, 
head of the famous Volozin Yeshiva, referred to HaMelitz of 1887 as a source 
of information on agunot.96 In another instance, Rabbi Berlin referred to 
Hatzfira.97 However, he stated that rabbinical decisions should not appear in 
the newspapers unless absolutely necessary.98 Rabbi Hayyim Berlin, the son of 
Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi, referred to HaLebanon (a less surprising reference, since 
it was an Orthodox journal that published an addendum of rabbinical litera-
ture).99 Rabbi Hayyim Berlin also mentioned his father’s habit of reading the 
debates about religion in the newspapers, which he claimed was a common 
thing to do on Shabbat.100 The well-known Rabbi David Friedman referred to 
several mentions of agunot in HaMagid of 1873.101
Rabbi Shalom Mordechai Shvedron, in a responsum on the agunah Hava 
Sateshny, even based his decision on information he found in a newspaper.102 
In the case of the agunah Reizel Laysten (1895), whose husband drowned in a 
ship on its way to America, Rabbi Shvedron also relied heavily on newspaper 
reports, even claiming that had the husband survived, he could have sent a 
note via the newspapers.103 Rabbi Yosef Shaul Nathanson as well as other rab-
bis published their requests regarding agunot in HaMagid.104
In fact, the most important rabbis in Eastern Europe, such as Shlomu 
Kluger (1785–1869),105 Itzhak Elhanan Spector (1817–1896),106 Yosef Shaul 
Nathanson (1810–1875), and many others, wrote responsa on agunot.
However, information in the responsa is partial in many cases and does 
not provide precise data regarding persons and places involved in some cases. 
In many of the cases, even the date is not specified. Another methodologi-
cal problem is that many responsa books were not published by the authors 
and appeared only long after they were written.107 Responsa literature mostly 
deals with the second, third, and fourth categories of agunot, that is, involving 
halitza, identifying the dead, and get completion issues. There are also many 
other responsa on agunot.
Many other cases than those found in the responsa have been analyzed in 
this research. All the cases of agunot mentioned without a date or clear timing 
in the responsa were ignored in this research. The following methodology was 
adopted: cases in which a year is not mentioned were ignored and left out of 
the database, whereas instances in which only a place or a name was missing 
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went into the database, while if both the place and name were missing, they 
were not included. There are two other databases, but they have much less 
information on agunot.
III. OFFICIAL RABBINATE PAPERS ESPECIALLY IN RUSSIA
From 1844 onward, officially recognized rabbis of the community became 
officers of the state in the Russian Empire. Many communities continued to 
employ unofficial rabbis alongside the official ones. However, many of those 
living in Jewish communities were prepared to assent to administration by 
the official state rabbis.108 This occasionally created a new category of agunot: 
women thought to have married and divorced not exactly according to Jewish 
law.109 However, research on these sources is just beginning.
IV. LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING IMMIGRANTS
This applies particularly to East European immigrants to the United States 
and England.110 Such important sources can be found in the records of wom-
en’s benevolent societies and of social workers. Most of these records relate to 
the early twentieth century and are thus outside the scope of this research.
This essay considers data mostly from Jewish newspapers and responsa. 
The information collected is analyzed in Tables 3–8.
Table 3 shows a constant rise in the number of cases reported in each 
decade. The reasons for this were the rising awareness to the issue of agunot 
as well as the increase in the number of newspapers, which also became more 
widespread. Agunot became a hot issue that helped to sell the newspapers.
Although 96 percent of the reported cases were deserted women, the 
numbers of deserted men might be higher than was known. In a patriarchal 
society, many men were reluctant to publicize the fact that they were deserted. 
Many of the cases of deserted men portrayed the deserting women as either 
out of their minds or unfaithful, which seems have been somewhat misleading.
Most information on the known cases of agunot comes from the 
media. The information published in the newspapers is also much fuller 
in details, and many cases can be followed for long periods of time. How- 
ever, all sources have much more information (usually descriptions) about 
the absconding men and much less about the women.
Many cases of agunot were related to immigration. Furthermore, although 
in many cases the deserted did not go to other countries, others left their 
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1. Some cases appeared in several sources, hence the difference between 
the number of cases and the number of incidents. 




1. A deserted man is one who could not be served a get because his wife 
left or became mentally ill. He might ask to rabbis to grant him permis-
sion to marry another wife, which was denied in most cases.





Responsa (Only 36 incidents appeared both in the responsa and in the newspa-
pers. Rabbis who published advertisements about agunot did not discuss those 




1. Others in Table 5 refer mainly to archival records; for example, the Jewish Board of Guardians, MS173, 
Hartley Library, the University of Southampton.
Table 6. Breakdown of Cases
Percentage Number
40.24% 1,896 Immigration-related cases
40.91% 1,928 Nonimmigration-related cases
18.85% 888 Not clear if related to immigration
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shtetls, villages, or cities for other places within the vast Russian and Hapsburg 
Empires. Another research finding is that toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, many couples or families migrated, and the desertions took place after 
immigration. The author is currently investigating this phenomenon.
Table 7 clearly shows that agunot were mostly an East European phe-
nomenon: 4,024 out of 4,712 known cases (85.3 percent) were in Eastern 
Table 7. Geographical Dispersion from 1857 to 1896
Number Place
2,198 Russian Empire1
1,164 Habsburg Empire (including Galicia, but excluding Hungary)





















4,712 Total cases identified
1. On the geographical complexity of Eastern Europe, see Shaul Stampfer, “The Geographical Background 
of East European Jewish Migration to the United States before World War I,” in Migration across Time and 
Nations: Population Mobility in Historical Contexts (ed. I. A. Glazier and L. De Rosa; London and New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1985), 227–28, and “Patterns of Internal Jewish Migration in the Russian Empire,” in Jews 
and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union (ed. Y. Ro’i; Ilford, Essex, and Portland: F. Cass, 1995), 37. 
Internal migration was the cause of many agunot cases. 
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Table 8. Destinations1 of Known Immigration-Related Cases of Agunot
Destination 1851–1866 1867–1876 1877–1886 1887–1896 Total
United States 57 101 195 401 763
England 17 55 61 124 257
German states 16 55 35 16 122
Russian Empire 02 37 25 27 109
Congress Poland 25 34 16 15 09
Habsburg Empire (including 
Galicia excluding Hungary) 61 22 81 26 28
Romania 22 28 16 12 78
Hungary 21 14 11 13 59
France 8 9 25 5 47
Eretz Israel 32 19 31 21 67
Turkey 71 10 9 6 42
Australia and New Zealand 12 10 4 6 28
India 6 7 5 3 21
Egypt 3 4 1 12 20
Sweden 4 7 3 1 15
Argentina 0 1 1 13 15
Caucasus 0 6 4 5 15
Holland 2 1 4 2 9
South Africa 0 1 4 3 8
Syria 2 1 1 4 8
Brazil 0 0 1 6 7
Iraq 4 1 1 1 7
Italy 4 1 1 1 7
Canada 0 0 1 4 5
Morocco 0 1 1 2 4
Algeria 0 0 1 1 2
China 1 0 1 0 2
Mexico 1 1 0 0 2
Persia 0 0 2 0 2
Denmark 0 1 0 0 1
Portugal 1 0 0 0 1
Total 228 473 459 719 1,896
1. See Lloyd P. Gartner, “Jewish Migrants en Route from Europe to America: Traditions and Realities,” Jewish 
History 1:2 (1986): 49–67.
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Europe. However, since the 1890s, the number of cases in immigration coun-
tries (especially the United States) rose.
Table 8 shows that 1,293 out of 1,896 cases (68.2 percent) of husbands 
left for distant foreign countries (especially on the American continent), while 
603 (31.9 percent) left for nearby countries (for example, from the Russian 
Empire to Romania or the Hapsburg Empire).
CONCLUSION: AGUNOT, IMMIGRATION, 
AND MODERNIZATION
Various conclusions can be drawn from this research:
1.  The role of rabbis as the sole decision makers in the Jewish commu-
nity, and in particular as far as women were concerned, was dimin-
ished by the Jewish media, which played a major role, as well as by 
other factors. Women, and agunot in particular, took advantage of 
this. Rabbis based their decisions on halachah [Jewish Law]. Rabbis 
could be more lenient toward women’s needs on certain occasions. 
However, since the status of women in halachah was inferior, rabbis 
could not provide them with much help. As the phenomenon of 
agunot became more extensive, the rabbis became more helpless in 
supporting the women’s cause.
2.  Deserted women could not rely on the rabbinical establishment 
or other communal institutions. They came to realize that women 
needed to help themselves. Publishing advertisements was only one of 
the avenues open to women in dealing with their plight. The fact that 
religious Jewish women were now turning to the newly formed public 
arena was probably the most significant change. This also reflected 
women’s deep understanding of the modern public sphere, especially 
with regard to the role of the media in modern society. The wide 
public airing given to the issue of agunot in the nineteenth century 
was an important indicator of East European Jewry’s modernization.
  This research does not manage to give a satisfactory answer as to 
why desertion of wives became more widespread. Possibly, demo-
graphical parameters, such as the age difference between husbands 
and wives, particularly at the time of marriage, should also be taken 
into account in attempts to explain the issue.111 Another explanation 
might be the effect of immigration, as discussed in the next point.
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3.  Immigration was among the major reasons behind the phenomenon 
of agunot in the nineteenth century. The sense of being in constant 
motion created a cultural environment that encouraged many men 
to desert their wives and families. But was the issue of agunot part of 
the immigration process,112 or did immigration just exacerbate the 
matter?113 Although in my view immigration certainly played a role, 
it was not causal. Rather, it was an added complication, together 
with other radical changes in Jewish family life and the role of 
women in Jewish society in nineteenth century Eastern Europe.114
With massive immigration, the desertion of women became a much greater 
predicament. In fact, immigration changed the nature of desertion. During 
the period of large-scale immigration, there were many more cases of husbands 
deserting their wives and families after arriving at their new destinations.
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Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies of DNA 
in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism
Sarah Imhoff and Hillary Kaell
Family Tree DNA, a commercial personal genetic testing company, advertises 
its services by appealing to a Jewish past: “Your ancestors left clues in your 
DNA which you can use to determine your deep ancestral origins and to link 
you with others in recent times. We can compare your results with our data-
base—the largest of its kind in the world—and tell you whether those clues 
indicate possible Jewish ancestry and whether you match others who are Jew-
ish.”1 The company subtly markets itself to both Jews and non-Jews, suggest-
ing that DNA testing can help a person understand something fundamental 
about oneself and one’s relationship to others.
In her work on Native Americans and DNA, Kim Tallbear uses the 
phrase “gene talk” to refer to “the idea that essential truths about identity 
inhere in sequences of DNA.”2 She shows how people use the interpretations 
of DNA sequences to make legal and political claims but also to understand 
themselves more deeply. In all of these processes, Tallbear notes, gene talk 
often takes interpretation for fact and can even mislead. In our respective 
research on Jews and Messianic Jews we have found similar kinds of gene talk, 
though the political stakes are quite different than for Native Americans. Like 
Tallbear, we focus less on the science itself than on how people make social 
meaning out of technological possibilities.
Gene talk permeates American culture at large. From the 1970s televi-
sion miniseries Roots to Henry Louis Gates’s recent PBS show Finding Your 
Roots, Americans have sought out and embraced their distinctive versions 
of ethnic heritage. In Roots Too, Matthew Frye Jacobson shows how white 
U.S.-born Americans embraced Irish, Italian, Polish, and other European 
ethnic pasts. This “ethnic revival,” a legacy of the 1960s, birthed a new way 
of talking about identity—a “new syntax of nationality and belonging,”3 as 
Jacobson writes. This syntax of belonging is very much still with us, and now 
gene talk participates in discourses of belonging right alongside talk of food, 
grandparents, art, and music.
The scholarly literature that analyzes gene talk and white ethnic revival, 
however, has a tendency to overlook religion or relegate it to being merely 
another marker of cultural difference. It positions gene talk as a discourse 
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about ethnicity and place in society without noticing that it can also be about 
place in a theological or cosmic narrative. The phenomena we analyze here 
participate in something that looks like “ethnic revival.” That is, we might 
have said that gene talk and DNA testing form a new wave—or a new tool in 
the toolkit—of contemporary ethnic revival. And while this is true, it is not 
the whole story. In these Jewish and Messianic cases, gene talk and its power 
construct much more than just an ethnos. They participate in constructing 
religious identities, and they make theological claims. Even in the case of 
secular Jews, as we will see, a secularized version of a theological narrative 
underwrites gene talk and its significance.
Based on research conducted on North American Judaism and Messianic 
Judaism, this essay explores how gene talk operates as parallel phenomenon for 
these two groups. That is, gene talk shares certain traits, yet the reasons behind 
it ultimately diverge. We begin by analyzing what we mean by “gene talk,” 
where it happens, and what it sounds like in each of these communities. We 
then consider the implications for ideas of family, specifically how this includes 
notions of “lost” relatives and “hidden” roots as well as the interaction between 
gene seekers and their family members. After noting how the two sets of vocab-
ularies and reasons for appeal seem quite similar, we conclude by clarifying how 
gene talk does quite different authorizing work for Jews and Messianics.
GENE TALK AND JEWISH COMMUNAL NARRATIVES
North American Jews talk a lot about DNA. “I haven’t done a DNA test 
yet,” explained a Jewish man, but I want “to test to help solve the mystery of 
my great-grandfather’s family.”4 “Jews whose great-grandparents were chased 
from their Russian shtetls,” announced a magazine article, “leave molecular 
scars adhering to our DNA.”5 And many Jews have their DNA tested even 
when they assume that they already know the results. As one woman posted 
in an online group, “I got my DNA results. . . . I’m 99% Ashkenazi. No 
surprise there!”6 A confirmation of Jewish heritage like this can make people 
feel connected to the past, imagine closeness with ancestors, and narrate 
rich stories about personal histories. When it provides a sense of rootedness 
and ethnic distinctiveness, this Jewish gene talk reflects the larger trends 
of white ethnic revival. But gene talk in the Jewish community also reflects 
a distinctively Jewish set of ideas and history.
DNA is on the radar of many Ashkenazi Jews because of their distinctive 
role in the history of science. Historically, Ashkenazim have been a relatively 
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endogamous population—that is, they largely married and had children with 
one another. This relative endogamy meant that they became an early interest 
of geneticists. And many geneticists were Ashkenazi themselves. The result was 
that Ashkenazim were overrepresented in the people studying and the people 
being studied. Moreover, the prevalence of Tay Sachs and other heritable dis-
eases, such as Gauchers, in Ashkenazi populations led to Jewish public health 
campaigns promoting DNA testing of partners before marriage or planning 
children. Recent testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations, also 
somewhat more prevalent in people with Ashkenazi ancestry, have likewise 
contributed to increased awareness of genetics for North American Jews.
Even so, the deepest appeal and meaning of gene talk in Jewish com-
munities is not the scientific facts that it offers Jews. It’s not even disease 
awareness. The deepest appeal of gene talk is the narrative it helps create: 
DNA functions as a trope in a narrative about the coherence of Jewish identity 
and peoplehood. Jews talk about “our ancestors,” “our people’s history,” and 
“our own families’ forebears” as imprinted “in our DNA.”7 A recent headline 
proclaimed “Genetic Study Proves Jews Are a People.”8 After his DNA test, 
a Canadian-born Jew explained that “One of the reasons I made aliyah is 
because I believe I am actually from this area [Israel/Palestine], and I do feel 
like I’m returning home.”9 All this gene talk suggests fundamental and scien-
tific interconnections among Jews across history and an ancestral homeland. 
These ideas of historical and religious memory living in genetic material, as 
we will see, are similar to the way that Messianics engage in gene talk. But 
the underlying reasons for this gene talk, which depends on theological and 
religious ideas, diverge for the two groups. We argue that for Jews, gene talk 
can serve as a confirmation—or, for nonreligious Jews, as a secular substitu-
tion—for the theological idea of peoplehood. Whether or not it is scientifically 
accurate—and in many cases it is not—gene talk provides support for the idea 
that Jews are a fundamentally connected, cohesive, and distinctive people.
When North American Jews are interested in genetics and DNA, they 
often go where most Americans get their information: the Internet. As with 
any topic, the Internet offers scientific rigor and clear lay interpretations of 
technical material, as well as poor, utterly wrong, or misguided information. It 
is not our interest here to police erroneous information about Jews and genet-
ics. Rather, we seek to clarify what information people are encountering and 
how they interact with it.
Many Jews get information about Jews and genetics from websites with 
specifically Jewish content or missions. Two large Jewish religious websites, 
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Chabad.com and Aish.com, both affiliated with observant forms of Judaism, 
are popular locations for curious Jews. Because these websites offer the most 
comprehensive online resources for many religious topics, many Jews, even the 
nonobservant, find themselves getting their information from these sites. 
The response to an Aish.com article titled “The Cohanim—DNA Connec-
tion” included more than twenty accounts with personal interest stories or 
stories about the links between DNA and Jewish identity. One man wrote that 
“I never understood what it meant to be a cohain before this article.” Several 
shared the results of their own tests, such as the man who had just been DNA 
tested by Family Tree DNA and had the Cohen Modal Haplotype.
Another, likely a non-Orthodox Jew, wrote that “In my temple [a word 
for synagogue used by Reform Jews but not others], before the evening 
prayers, there are discussions about origins,” which he connected to DNA. 
Another commenter, who may or may not be Jewish, framed her response in 
religious terms: “I am so thrilled to see yet again of God’s handiwork that he 
has kept the priesthood line of Aaron!” Non-Jews too get information from 
these sites. The same Aish article, for instance, included a comment from a 
Finnish person about “Jewish roots among Finnish people”; he wondered if 
DNA testing could help uncover the true history.10
MyJewishLearning.com, a religiously unaffiliated website, also features 
several articles about DNA.11 They contain more scientific information and 
less traditional exegesis than those on Chabad.com and Aish.com, but they 
still aim to make the genetics comprehensible to nonexperts. The comment 
sections for many articles—“Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Mizrahim,” “Native 
Americans and Jews,” and others—overflow with commenters announcing or 
puzzling through their own DNA. Here too, commenters include non-Jews 
(“I am non Jewish but very interested,”12 “I’m America Indian on my father’s 
side, my daughter and I have a love for Israel and want to live there one 
day. Deep down we feel we are Jewish”13) and Jews (“I am from the Tribe of 
Levi. . . . We Jews go back a few thousand years”14). There are far fewer partici-
pants who frame their questions or comments in terms of Torah observance, 
but the relationship of genetic information to biblical history is still a major 
source of conversation on nonreligious sites. On all of these Jewish content 
websites, then, gene talk abounds.
Jews also go to the websites of DNA testing companies themselves to 
understand “Jewish genetics” and DNA. Many of these companies have spe-
cifically designed their websites, explanations, and even tests to appeal to Jews. 
23andme, Family Tree DNA, DNA Consultants, and Roots for Real all have 
Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies of DNA in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism 115
specific tests marketed toward Jews. Family Tree DNA has hosted webinars, or 
online seminars, specifically for Jews doing genealogical research. As these for-
profit companies suggest, there is a growing and profitable industry focused 
on DNA, genetics, and Jewishness. And it is in these companies’ interest to 
market DNA as though it tells essential stories about personal history and 
identity. If they framed DNA as merely a sequence of chemical compounds, 
then far fewer people would be interested in their own DNA results.
There are also a growing number of discussion groups for Jews inter-
ested in DNA, genealogical research, and family histories. The “Tracing the 
Tribe—Jewish Genealogy on Facebook” group had nearly 7,000 members 
as of December 2014. The discussion groups on the website JewishGen, 
which explains that it is designed to “ensure Jewish continuity” by present-
ing resources for genealogy, support thousands of posters. JewishGen, one 
of the largest Jewish genealogy websites, is affiliated with both the Museum of 
Jewish Heritage and Ancestry.com, and its “Family Tree of the Jewish People” 
currently includes information on over five million individuals submitted by 
more than forty-five hundred Jewish genealogists.15
As the commenter who said that the members of his temple talked about 
“origins” and DNA before evening prayers suggests, gene talk takes place 
offline too. While many of these conversations happen spontaneously, some 
occur in settings more formal than synagogues. Since its 1981 inception, the 
International Conference on Jewish Genealogy has grown significantly, and 
it includes popular sessions focused on DNA. At the 2013 conference, for 
instance, Family Tree DNA sponsored sessions, led by its founder Bennett 
Greenspan, called “Understanding, Interpretation, and Use of DNA Results” 
and “Haplogroups: What They Are and What They Mean for Jews.” Seven 
other sessions also focused on DNA.
Jews from all religious affiliations as well as nonaffiliated Jews participate 
in gene talk. Orthodox Jews tend to be particularly aware of DNA because of 
public health campaigns promoting the awareness of and testing for genetic 
diseases. A genetic testing company called Dor Yeshorim (Hebrew for “the 
generation of the upright”), for instance, has become very popular among 
young adult Jews considering marriage. The company screens each partner 
and then tells them whether they are compatible or not; that is, whether both 
partners are carriers of the same recessive gene that could lead to children with 
these diseases.
But observant Jews also use gene talk in realms well beyond that of the 
medical concerns for potential children. Chabad connects DNA evidence 
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to religious practice, using the former as an argument for pursuing the lat-
ter. “Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Yemenite and Italian kohanim can actually trace 
their backgrounds back to the Jews of the Exodus. And if modern science 
has given us the tools to prove common ancestry, isn’t the next obvious step 
to dedicate ourselves to our common purpose—G-d’s Torah and mitzvot?”16 
They even use it as evidence for the historical moral uprightness of Jews: 
“But almost 100% of all men with family tradition of priesthood do descend 
from kohanim. Generation after generation of Jewish women were faithful to 
their husbands and their tradition. What a proud record of fidelity. . . . This 
devotion to our spouses and our G-d has always been the way of the Jew.”17 
For religiously observant Jews, then, gene talk can be about continuity, as Dor 
Yeshorim and its mission demonstrate. It can also be about affirming religious 
practices and theological concepts, as Chabad shows.
Nonreligious Jews also participate in gene talk. Unlike the Chabad 
article, they do not frame genetic connections as a reason to do mitzvot, but 
these connections are nevertheless meaningful for them. One commenter on 
MyJewishLearning.com identified as secular and celebrated how “DNA test-
ing has been able to show how many genes we have are Jewish,” which he 
equated with “direct blood,” though he was careful to say that he welcomed 
converts too.18 Others ask explicitly how to understand their identity, given 
their genetic and historical knowledge. A commenter to the historical article 
“Who Are the Semites?” reprinted on MyJewishLearning.com wrote that “My 
Jewish ancestors are from Lithuania, Russia and Poland. My sister sent in my 
Dad’s DNA. Came back showing Sephardic connections. . . . [H]ow do I find 
out my race?”19 Nonreligious Jews, then, also assume that DNA can tell them 
something essential and meaningful about themselves. They imagine that 
DNA holds clues to their identity and social place.
GENE TALK IN MESSIANIC JUDAISM
Messianic Judaism is a movement of congregations that incorporate aspects 
of Jewish ritual into evangelical or charismatic Christian worship. Its current 
form dates to the late 1960s, when young Jewish converts to Christianity, 
often associated with California’s Jesus movement, joined the “Hebrew Chris-
tian” descendants of earlier converts to form congregations and then denomi-
national associations that retained aspects of their Jewish heritage.20 Today, 
estimates of the number of Messianic Jews vary widely—anywhere from 
30,000 to 2.5 million—but it is clear that the movement is growing rapidly.21
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Messianic Jewish leaders view the movement as by and for people 
like them, “ethnic” Jews who believe in Jesus. Jewish men are favored for 
congregational and denominational leadership; “ethnic” Jews comprise the 
movement’s public face as authors, musicians, Davidic dance teachers, and tel-
evangelist talk show guests or hosts. Yet upwards of 70 percent of congregants 
are in fact “gentile believers” (GBs), as they are known in the movement, a fact 
almost completely ignored by scholars.22 With growing numbers of GBs, con-
gregations are also becoming increasingly diverse and include Americans of Afri-
can, European, and Hispano origin as well as immigrants from across the globe.
Most congregants, gentile or Jewish, arrive from Pentecostal or charis-
matic churches that follow some form of premillennialist theology.23 They 
believe that contemporary Jews are the genetic descendants of biblical Israelites 
and are thus crucial because, first, they are of the same lineage as Jesus, and 
thus their rituals and prayers most closely approximate what Jesus knew during 
his incarnation on Earth. And second, Jews are understood to have a key role 
to in the End Times that will presage the Messiah’s return. To be a Jew is 
thus to be situated at the very center of biblical and apocalyptic narratives.
Gene talk, though largely stifled by the ethnic Jewish leadership, remains 
so prevalent that GBs often encounter it shortly after their arrival. Unlike 
North American Jews, however, few GBs actually test their DNA. Gene talk 
is thus a space of imagined possibilities, filled with discursive weaving and 
dodging: “I don’t know that I have any Jewish heritage. But maybe there is. . . . 
I don’t say that I’m not but I don’t say that I am.”24 This kind of talk hints at a 
complicated question: is Judaism inherited or not? Most GBs associate certain 
essentialized traits with Jewishness, ranging from the physiognomic (big noses) 
to the societal (community oriented, book smart).25 Yet they are circumspect 
about labeling Jews a race, which they define as “scientifically” inalienable—
that is, rooted in one’s DNA. The supposed fixity of racial categorizations 
belies how GBs understand their own spiritual biographies, where they dis-
covered a “heart” for Jewishness—their own and Jesus’s—as they grew with 
God following the radical self-transformation that is central in evangelicalism 
(being “born again”). Yet fundamentally, GBs still believe that you cannot 
convert to being a Jew as you can to a religion, such as Christianity.26
This paradox between (racial) fixity and (spiritual) discovery is a central 
feature of the gentile experience in Messianic Judaism, reinforced by the move-
ment’s leaders, who strongly discourage gentile conversions and have generally 
denied the validity even of those considered halachic by Orthodox Jews.27 As 
a result, most GBs attempt to distinguish bloodlines from beliefs by drawing 
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a tripartite schema. Although the terminology varies, effectively it runs as 
follows: the “Hebrews” (or Israelites) are a race physically descended from 
Abraham and the twelve tribes, a bloodline flowing through all contemporary 
Jews. Being “Jewish,” on the other hand, is to be part of a religion that has 
failed to understand the Word of God. And last, “Israel” is the people of God, 
which includes all believers in Jesus grafted together into a single lineage or, 
in Messianic terms, one “new man” (Eph 2:15). GBs follow Messianic leaders in 
rejecting the idea that anyone can or should convert to Judaism the religion, 
since it would require renouncing Jesus as the Messiah, which they rightly 
understand to be alien to it. Yet many of them also want to be more than 
spiritually “grafted”—they want to be part of the bloodline.
One way to claim this lineage is to draw on a tradition of biblical exege-
sis that traces the roots of contemporary people-groups to an ancestor in the 
book of Genesis. Scholars of U.S. religion have examined how, for example, 
Native Americans were viewed as descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes and 
African Americans were viewed as descendants of Noah’s son Ham.28 Though 
GBs reiterate a number of these theories, most commonly they trace their 
roots back to Abraham, thereby broadening the Jewish “line” to encompass 
nearly everyone. “God said to Abraham that he’d have many descendants,” 
notes Donald, a fifty-year-old white man who attends Melech Israel, a con-
gregation in the southern United States. “I was not brought up Jewish. I don’t 
know that I have any Jewish heritage at all. But I may have Jewish ancestry but 
that far back, I won’t know it. And so I don’t say that I’m not but I don’t say 
that I am.”29
To speak in such generalities rarely generates controversy in Messianic 
congregations. The second way to trace lineage is more specific and thus is 
potentially open to refutation: clues within one’s own makeup or actions 
become visible proof of a particular DNA. In Messianic gene talk, someone 
else, generally a stranger or distant relative, is the first to call attention to the 
fact that a GB may have Jewish roots. GBs describe being told that they “look” 
Jewish or that their aptitude for learning Hebrew must be genetic. Then GBs 
begin to piece together other clues, such as an elderly relative who mysteri-
ously whispered certain prayers under her breath or had an inexplicable famil-
iarity with Jewish rituals or ideas.30 For example, Sharyla, a forty-nine-year-old 
African American in the same congregation as Donald, notes that her mother’s 
father, a Baptist pastor, had Hebrew books. She says, “I know a lot of Baptist 
preachers who don’t study Hebrew. So I don’t know. Because they were old 
books so I don’t know how long [our family] had them.”31 Gene talk always 
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hints—never declaims—a key distinction between Jewish and Messianic Jew-
ish contexts.
The most important clue, however, comes from within the believer 
herself: a deep calling to the Jewish people. Donald concludes his discussion 
about descent from Abraham by emphasizing that while anyone may have 
this lineage, he and other GBs almost certainly do: why else would God 
have called them to Messianic Judaism? Here, notions of scientific objectivity 
dovetail with the pietistic heritage of evangelical Christianity, wherein believers 
are expected to create and sustain intimate, emotionally immersive relation-
ships with Jesus, God, and—in the case of premillennialists—God’s people, 
the Jews. The intensity of these connections leads GBs to deduce that perhaps 
they have a calling in their blood. Karyn, an African American woman in 
her late fifties, is typical: “I’ve always questioned [if I might be Jewish],” she 
says, “because of the love and the commitment being so deep, and even my 
family, when I was going [to Messianic services], they used to tell me I was 
strange. So I know that I’m not ‘the typical person’ culturally speaking.” Later, 
she notes that Jewish-style worship “felt like coming home. This is the other 
half that has been missing. I’m just coming in touch with my Jewish roots.”32 
While “roots” could be taken metaphorically, Karyn, like many GBs, implies 
an intuition perhaps borne of “genetic memory,” the DNA of their ancestors 
within them.33
HIDDEN LINEAGES AND LOST RELATIVES
Both Jews and Messianic Jews use the language of discovery in gene talk. 
But the two groups differ when it comes to what is unknown and might be 
uncovered. When Family Tree DNA and other DNA testing companies talk 
about “lost” relatives, they are not lost in the sense that they have disappeared 
from the Jewish people. “If you are looking for that long-lost relative or 
ancestor,” the Family Tree DNA website explains, “or if you feel that some day, 
someone may use a DNA repository to look for long-lost relatives, you should 
consider doing this simple DNA test. Your ancestors left clues in your DNA 
which you can use to determine your deep ancestral origins and to link you with 
others in recent time.”34 In some sense, these lost relatives are not properly lost 
at all; rather, it is the familial connections that have been lost. Persecution and 
forced migration obscure or sever connections in this language of lostness.
But they do not obscure a person’s own Jewishness from herself. She 
knows she is Jewish, and so do her relatives, even when she does not know 
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all the connections in her lineage. “Finding” these lost relatives and ances-
tors appeals because it creates connections, which add to the branches and 
roots of the family tree. It adds to the tester’s knowledge of her identity 
and to her story. It may create a greater sense of connection to other Jews and 
to the Jewish people. But except for people outside the Jewish community 
who use DNA to discover their own Jewish ancestry, it does not transform the 
tester’s self-understanding.
Rather than “lost,” Messianics often talk about what is “hidden.” 
This idea fundamentally redounds to the self: the true nature of one’s blood is 
unknown even to oneself often because an ancestor hid the truth, which was 
then forgotten over time.35 This idea derives in part from the mainstream Jew-
ish community, where there has been a surge of popular and more scholarly 
media about “hidden” or “secret” Jews, most often the “anusim” descendants 
of Spanish or Portuguese Jews.36 Typical is Jewish writer Gloria Golden’s 
Remnants of Crypto-Jews among Hispanic Americans, marketed with the tagline 
“Hidden deep in the heart of the American Southwest among the larger His-
panic population are descendants of the Sephardim, Jews from Spain and Por-
tugal.”37 These books began to appear frequently in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
just as more gentiles were joining the Messianic movement. While these two 
events are not causal, their confluence has popularized an authoritative narra-
tive upon which GBs now draw.
Talk of anusim circulates widely among Messianics online and also pro-
vides one of the few contexts when “gene talk” is promoted by congregational 
leadership. Lana, a forty-year-old woman of mixed-race ancestry, describes 
how “A lot of times people hid their Jewish identity. And as time went by, as 
generations went on, they didn’t tell anyone. . . . We’ve had guest speakers here 
[at Melech Israel] that have said that they discovered Jewish sects in Africa and 
in Asia—and all over the world—India. I mean, these people were hidden off 
but they came from Spain after the Inquisition.”38
Stories of “hiddenness,” as opposed to “lostness,” mean that some GBs 
can make stronger claims to Jewish lineage than others. Lana self-identifies as 
a person of black, white, and Asian blood, but in her southern milieu she is 
commonly seen as African American. In Messianic terms, African Americans 
have the most difficulty making claims to Jewish descent that are accepted by 
other congregants, although they are sometimes successful if they follow rec-
ognized typologies of the “hidden” Jew, such as when Lana hints that she may 
share blood with these newly discovered sects. African immigrants are usually 
more successful, assuming that they claim descent from well-known groups 
Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies of DNA in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism 121
such as the Beta Israel or Lemba. GBs of East European descent also make 
strong claims based on the perception that with so many Jews in these regions, 
there was certainly intermarriage and hidden identities.39
The most accepted of these “racial shifters” are Hispanics and others with 
a plausible anusim identity.40 Congregations in the southwestern United States 
include a growing number of people in this category. Rabbi Silvio estimates 
that when he arrived at Beth Yeshua, in a mid-sized southwestern city, only 10 
percent of the congregants were Jews. About five years later, that number has 
risen to 25 percent mainly due to the inclusion of newly discovered anusim—
including Silvio himself. He discovered his roots during his pastoral training 
at a Pentecostal seminary. Embracing this definition of himself, he married the 
daughter of a well-known gentile leader in Jewish evangelism and began a Mes-
sianic ministry.41 People such as Silvio are accepted into congregational leader-
ship as Jews and are even celebrated by the largely Ashkenazi opinion makers 
at the denominational level. In short, it is vitally important to leaders (and 
most congregants) that Messianics, but especially public figures, claim Jewish 
blood in ways that converge with acceptable discourses in mainstream Juda-
ism, such as the anusim.42 Thus, Messianics reiterate their self- understanding 
as Jews and retain a claim to legitimacy in the eyes of American Jews and the 
evangelical Christians who support them as Jewish-run ministries.
The gene talk one hears in congregations is the result of a rather solitary 
process of searching, most of which takes place online. Like Christian proph-
ecy seekers, GBs carefully compile disparate pieces of information (indeed, 
many GBs are already familiar with such methods of piecing together dates 
and places regarding the apocalypse).43 The most popular lineage search is 
built around a kind of “Hebraized name lore”: onomastics or, more precisely, 
anthroponomastics, the study of personal names.44 GBs scan lists of Jewish-
associated names, picking out those in their own family trees and looking for 
phonological concurrences.
Take, for example, Nora, a fifty-six-year-old white woman raised in a 
Methodist church. Like many GBs, she recalls always feeling “called” to Juda-
ism. “Every Jewish person has like a spark in them,” she says, “And even if 
somebody is descended from Jews and they don’t know it, they can still have 
the spark.”45 She encountered gene talk at a now-defunct Messianic congrega-
tion in a large northeastern city. Shortly after, she recounts, “because I had an 
ancestor whose middle name was Sevilla, the light bulb went off. That’s Seville! 
That’s a city where a lot of Jewish people lived.” She began to hunt online for 
clues about this mid-eighteenth century ancestor, Enis Sevilla Sloy:
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And I found that the name Sloy is sometimes a Jewish name. . . . 
One of the Arabic ways of saying Solomon is Sloymon. That’s one 
theory. Or Sloyal. It was a Belarusian word that means jar. And 
Jewish merchants used jars like that. That’s another possibility. This 
name is [also] in one of these books with Jewish surnames. And in 
Krakow, Poland, there’s a name Slojman. And Krakow is a city where 
Sephardic Jews settled after the expulsion.46
Nora notes that Sloy might also be Gaelic, however. As is typical, she evaluates 
etymological clues according to how they match her “genetic memory”—that 
“spark” she feels. Thus, she gathers multiple potential correlates that all seem 
to point in one direction: the presence of Sephardi blood.
Although the process by which GBs decide what evidence to accept is 
largely idiosyncratic, there are nevertheless limits as to what can be hidden 
and discovered. Judy, a seventy-year-old woman from Texas who attends a 
Messianic congregation in the Southwest, described it as “a quandary.” She 
would dearly like to be Jewish, as one of her uncles claims. However, his evi-
dence, culled from a website ancestry search, traces the family’s lineage back to 
King Hezekiah in the eighth century BCE, one of the most prominent kings 
of Judah who is also mentioned in Jesus’s genealogical line recounted in the 
Gospel of Matthew. Given that the first Temple was destroyed, she reasons, it 
is unlikely that he uncovered substantive genealogical records. Without ruling 
it out, Judy hesitates to make such an ancient and extravagant claim.
For American Jews, gene talk and family tree building is meant to bring 
families together—sometimes only conceptually, sometimes virtually, and 
occasionally even physically. The motto of the International Jewish Genea-
logical Society is “Without the past, there is no future. Reach out.”47 When 
Jews send in their DNA to Family Tree DNA for genetic testing, for example, 
one of the most popular options they choose is called “Family Finder.” This 
option lets the user “Discover unknown family connections” and “Connect 
with living relatives.” 23andme advertises “Contact your DNA relatives across 
continents or across the street” and has a popular “Relative Finder” option.48 
And when they get these matches, many Jews try reaching out to their “DNA 
matches.”
Genealogist Elise Friedman’s webinar, hosted by Family Tree DNA, gives 
advice for contacting potential “matches” via e-mail.49 Sometimes the con-
nections happen on social media. In the “Tracing the Tribe” Facebook group, 
members often “meet” distant cousins they have seen on their “Family Finder” 
result in the comments. In one comment thread, a man wrote “Hi, Sam, just 
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checked my Family Finder on ftdna.com and it appears that we are possible 
4th cousins.” Sam replied. In the same thread, a woman wrote to contact 
another commenter after seeing her name in the thread: “Hi Sarah! Any idea 
how we are related? You’re a pretty close match to me on GEDMATCH (100 
cM, 5 gens).”50 Some Jews—though not all—use their DNA results to con-
tact potential family members. And the vast majority of Jews who see “Rela-
tive Finder” and “Family Finder” results get evidence for genetic connection 
beyond the family members they know. Author A. J. Jacobs decided to hold the 
“biggest family reunion ever” when a fan from Israel wrote him to say that 
the two were related. Using genetics and genealogy paired with family tree 
websites, Jacobs identified seventy-seven million relatives and extended an 
open invitation to the June 2015 family reunion.51
GBs’ gene talk, on the other hand, may create or aggravate tensions with 
their family members and rarely, if ever, leads to new connections. Nearly 
all GBs come to the movement as single adults or couples without children 
(including grown children).52 Most see themselves as spiritual mavericks who 
follow God’s calling and describe feeling different from their families, as Karyn 
does above. In part, this perspective reflects the evangelical Protestant empha-
sis on each adult’s responsibility for his or her own faith. It also adheres to 
a biblical typology: when potential followers of Jesus asked for leave to bury a 
father or say goodbye to kin, they were rebuked. No one who looks back, Jesus 
told them, is fit for the Kingdom of God (Luke 9:59–62).
GBs are aware that family members, especially their grown children, may 
feel ambivalent about their new Messianic Judaism. By practicing Jewish-like 
rituals, GBs reorient their social calendars away from Sunday church and fam-
ily meals. They generally refuse to celebrate Christmas. They give up beloved 
family dishes, such as Easter ham. More existentially perhaps, GBs also often 
have difficulty reconciling themselves to their parents, who brought them up 
in Christian churches. Some dismiss their parents’ faith altogether. Others 
imply that their parents knew about their Jewish roots. Inspired by the anusim 
speakers at Melech Israel, Lana decided to trace her genealogy until her mother 
made her promise not to. Like most GBs, Lana construed this rather inexpli-
cable request as hinting at a secret lineage her parents are trying to protect. 
Last, some GBs gloss over difference altogether. Eva, a co-congregant of Lana’s, 
denies any true theological disjuncture with her Baptist family: “But our par-
ents, I believe they wanted the same thing [as us]. Even though—bless them 
and their hearts—they knew Jesus was a Jew but they [failed to recognize it]. 
Their heart was still ‘People are people. We love the Lord.’”53
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RECOGNIZING GENE TALK’S RELIGIOUS ROOTS
Previous studies of Messianic Judaism have posited that gene talk arises from 
two sources: GBs seek to become Jews in order to advance within the move-
ment’s leadership, and they are caught up in the broader “white ethnic revival” 
that speaks to a sense of postmodern rootlessness. Jewishness gives them an 
identity.54 Yet these conclusions fail to explain why GBs spend so much time 
“gene talking” without ever insisting on being accepted as Jews and thus never 
benefiting directly in institutional terms. Further, it leaves unclear why GBs 
from all races, not just “white ethnics,” speculate about their lineage.
Similarly, scholarship on Jews has suggested that gene talk is about either 
disease, especially Tay Sachs, BRCA1, and BRCA2, or ethnic identity. But 
companies such as 23andme and Family Tree DNA are legally limited in their 
ability to make medical claims or offer medical interpretations of DNA results. 
They comply with these legal mandates and sometimes even announce them 
on their websites, so the Jews who test through them are not primarily seeking 
medical advice. Furthermore, many Jews who test are already secure in their 
personal Jewish history. Finding an ethnic identity to claim was not at stake for 
the woman who wrote that “I got my DNA results. . . . I’m 99% Ashkenazi. 
No surprise there!”55 Something else motivates these Jewish DNA testers to 
engage in gene talk.
To understand its appeal to both Jews and GBs, we need to take the 
religious dimension of this activity seriously. Gene talk appeals to North 
American Jews for several related reasons. In addition to providing roots, his-
tory, and distinctiveness for a group of mostly white Americans, as Jacobson 
and other expositors of white ethnic revival would have it, Jewish gene talk also 
does crucial religious and communal authorizing work. These three reasons 
for the appeal of Jewish gene talk—providing scientific support for tradition, 
seeming certainty in questions of who is a Jew, and redemption of Jewish his-
tory—all point to the idea of Jewish peoplehood. This idea of peoplehood, or 
even chosenness, has foundations that are religious, theological, and biblical. 
And for religious Jews, it remains important in these contexts. But gene talk 
can also offer a secularized version of peoplehood that emphasizes connection, 
family, history, and distinctiveness while avoiding charges of chauvinism that 
can plague the concept of chosenness.
This gene talk emphasizes that like the “begat” verses in Genesis 10, lineage 
matters. Who your ancestors are matters a little. But what matters a lot are the 
fact that you have ancestors, that family trees connect Jews together, the idea that 
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Jews share DNA, and the idea that Jewishness is somehow biological. Gene talk 
at once assumes and reinforces the idea that Jews are a people and that people-
hood is fundamental to Jewishness. Whether this functions as a justification for 
religious tradition and practice or functions as a secularized version of a theologi-
cal connection, gene talk cements the idea of Jewish community.
First, gene talk and interpretations of DNA can provide “scientific 
proof” of religious traditions. The most popular instance of this occurs around 
what people call the Cohen gene, a sequence of alleles on the Y chromosome 
of some men who identify themselves as cohanim. In its explanation of the 
Cohen gene, the official Chabad website asks “Are these tribal affiliations 
[Cohanim] just a matter of folklore and tradition? Can such claims actually 
be proven?” and then answers that “Today they can, and the key is DNA test-
ing.”56 According to Chabad’s interpretation of this DNA evidence, men can 
scientifically “prove” their status as Cohanim. In this article, Chabad values 
DNA tests above “just” tradition. This is quite remarkable because of Chabad’s 
intense commitment to Jewish tradition.
Aish.com offers a similar question-and-answer structure for discussing 
genetic findings. The article begins by introducing Karl Skorecki, the Cana-
dian Jewish geneticist who participated in the earliest research of the Cohen 
Modal Haplotype. “Dr. Skorecki considered, ‘According to tradition, this 
Sephardi Cohen and I have a common ancestor. Could this line have been 
maintained since Sinai, and throughout the long exile of the Jewish people?’ 
As a scientist, he wondered, could such a claim be tested?” Later the Aish.com 
article proclaims that “The research findings support the Torah statements 
that the line of Aaron will last throughout history.”57
But it is not only the Jewishly devout who tell this story of the scientific 
proof of an ancient priestly line. One DNA testing company markets the pos-
sibility of identifying a person’s “ancient tribe.”58 Immediately after hearing 
explicitly that presence of the “Cohen gene” in men is halachically irrelevant 
and utterly inconclusive—about half of men who self-identify as cohanim 
have it, and some men who do not also have it—one man said, “But I want 
to have a DNA test anyway. Just to be sure.” In a 2010 lecture, secular jour-
nalist Jon Entine calls the Cohen gene “a remarkable story of genetic witness 
to the traditions of Judaism and the Israelites. Absolutely amazing.”59 Entine 
uses the religiously coded language of “witness,” more commonly a Christian 
idiom (from Isa 43:12), for the way that genetics vindicates theological and 
textual Jewish traditions. Gene talk here supports textual and ritual religious 
traditions.
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Second, in addition to playing a strong supporting role in religious nar-
ratives about priestly tribes, gene talk seems to provide scientific data about 
who is and who isn’t a Jew. Scientists all agree that there is no genetic sequence 
common to all Jews and absent from all non-Jews. And yet, Jews still talk of 
“Jewish genes.” Jewishness is “embedded in my genes, my DNA,” explained a 
man who identifies as Jewish after receiving the results of his DNA test.60 An 
Aish article titled “Jewish Genes” says that “There is now new and exciting 
DNA evidence for common Jewish origin—not just among Cohanim, the 
Priestly Class, but among Jews scattered all over the globe.”61 In the summer of 
2013 the Israeli Ministry of the Interior even requested a DNA test of a poten-
tial birthright traveler in order to prove she was Jewish.62 Positioning DNA as 
an arbiter of Jewishness appeals to Jews because Jewish identity is, we might 
say, really messy. The Reform movement’s acceptance of patrilineal descent, 
halachic standards that differ even from one another, Israeli criteria about 
who qualifies for aliyah, differing conversion processes, and intermarriages 
all contribute to an increasingly confusing landscape of Jewish identification. 
Science, in contrast, seems to provide clear criteria. This kind of gene talk pur-
ports to provide a factual answer to the complicated question of who is a Jew.
Third, gene talk appeals to a sense of connection and continuity in 
the face of recent Jewish history. Some of these projects explicitly refer to the 
Holocaust. JewishGen officially calls itself “A Living Memorial to the Holo-
caust” and offers both a Yizkor Book of “lists of Holocaust martyrs”63 and a 
Holocaust Registry. The registry relies on information supplied by professional 
and amateur genealogists, including that which they have discovered through 
genetic testing. “As more people add records and search the database,” the web-
site explains, “it is our hope that this registry will help bring about reunions 
with loved ones.”64 The DNA Shoah Project, whose mission is “building a 
database of genetic material from Holocaust survivors and their immediate 
descendants in hopes of reuniting families disrupted by the Shoah . . . and, 
eventually, assist in the forensic identification of Holocaust-era remains.”65 
JewishGen and the DNA Shoah Project assert that genetics can help people 
rediscover ancestors, and they also suggest that DNA might help bring justice 
to Jewish history.
Beyond these explicit links to the Holocaust, popular gene talk and DNA 
testing marketing also allude to the ways genetics can heal past injustices of 
Jewish history. Family Tree DNA, one of the largest personal DNA testing 
company, has a Jewish founder and markets itself specifically to Jews. A mar-
keting video proclaims that “Many Jewish families have been separated due to 
Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies of DNA in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism 127
forced migration and persecution over the last several centuries. Now thanks 
to Family Tree DNA, you may rediscover lost roots and cousins.”66 Drawing 
on inquisition and Holocaust narratives of lost Jewish relatives, this suggests a 
redemptive capacity of family history. Gene talk can recover and redeem Jew-
ish connections after historical persecution worked to destroy them.
While much of the gene talk in Jewish communities may sound similar 
to the gene talk in Messianic Jewish communities, it is incorrect to assume 
that their reasons for doing so are identical. In order to understand GB gene 
talk, one must first take theological changes into account. Since the nineteenth 
century, Western Christians have begun to view Jesus’s earthly life as a major 
tool for creating an intimate relationship with him. Jesus as Jew mattered. 
Among evangelicals, this notion dovetailed with an equally important shift: 
the premillennialist view of contemporary Jews as the “genetic” descendants 
of Israel and thus as “genetically” linked to Jesus as well.
Gene talk also corresponds to how evangelicals read the bible “literally,” 
meaning that for them it is an accurate rendering of historical events and of 
typologies with present-day application. The Hebrew Bible, in particular, con-
tinually authenticates through lineage. In the book of Numbers, for example, 
the Lord commands the Israelites to take a census, tracing each person back 
to their “original” tribe. Read in light of the Gospels, this becomes even more 
significant: Jesus’s own lineage is traced back to David in order to authenticate 
his Messiahship. This kind of interpretive logic parallels gene talk, where the 
full implication of GBs’ interior “selves”—the deep love they feel for the Jews 
and their sense of belonging to the Jewish people—may be explained fully by 
tracing descent.
Yet we still fall short of explaining why gene talk rather than genetic test-
ing is appealing. The answer, we believe, relates to how gene talk is a practice, 
in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms. It takes place over years, cementing congregational 
members in a shared discursive tradition that reflects and contributes to the 
hermeneutics that matter to them. Engaging in gene talk strengthens their 
conviction not that they are Jewish (necessarily) but that lineage matters: it 
matters that Jesus was a “genetic” Jew, that North American Jews are “genetic” 
descendants of Israelites, that one’s spiritual growth may reflect what lies 
hidden within one’s DNA. Further, gene talk that follows recognized pat-
terns among mainstream Jews—related to the anusim, for example—is more 
accepted and valued. Thus, ironically, by engaging in gene talk without doing 
DNA testing, Messianics find a way to participate in the Jewish community 
by contributing to its authenticating discourse.67
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In fact, actually undertaking genetic testing entails significant risk. We 
don’t mean that it may reveal that GBs are not “actually” Jewish (for there are 
many ways to construe genetic data). Rather, the risk is an ontological one. 
Judaism-as-religion, according to Messianics, is incorrect in two fundamental 
ways: because it denies the Messiah, it also ignores the radical nature of Jesus’s 
claim that, first, there is no longer a difference between “Jew and Greek” and, 
relatedly, Greeks (i.e., gentiles) are now grafted into the Jewish people. To dig 
too hard for Jewish roots—to move talk into action—risks negating the cen-
tral Gospel promise of new life and togetherness in Jesus. In short, evangelical 
theology propels GBs toward claiming a Jewish identity and also problematizes 
it. To focus on race as an inalienable attribute has the potential to directly 
undermine the theology that undergirds Messianic Judaism and evangelical 
Christianity as a whole.
Clearly, DNA means something much more than just the science behind it. 
Gene talk holds great appeal for both Jews and Messianic Jews because it has the 
ability to extend narratives of self and authorize certain ways of belonging. In 
these contexts, gene talk is not simply another kind of discourse about ethnic-
ity and place in society. It is also about place in a cosmological sense, operating 
alongside and within religious practices and ontologies. Jews and Messianic 
Jews share a fascination with DNA testing and yet differ in how and why 
they engage in gene talk, differences rooted in their divergent theologies.
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Contemporary Modern Orthodox  
Guidance Books on Marital Sexuality
Evyatar Marienberg
Young women and men who are about to be married in haredi [Ultra-Orthodox] 
communities are encouraged to have a few meetings with a person of the same 
sex, designated as a groom/bride teacher, whose role is to instruct them about 
married life, the laws of menstrual impurity, and the marital act itself. This is also 
the case in some parts of the Modern Orthodox/National Religious world. Some 
young couples, especially those who are on the right side of this world, really 
need such instruction, as indicated by this rather honest, but not unique, state-
ment: “I am a rabbi-teacher in a Yeshiva and alumnus of a serious Yeshiva myself. 
My wife is a teacher, and alumna of a prestigious yeshiva for women. I describe 
our background in order to explain why we have no knowledge in this domain.”1
In addition to this oral and hopefully individualized guidance, a wide 
range of specialized books and booklets are available for newlyweds (or 
engaged) couples from these groups. In recent years, manuals were also writ-
ten for parents to help them explain sexuality to their young children. Schools 
are also slowly starting to realize that they need to deal with these issues, and 
a growing number of curricula target this market. More advanced works, 
aiming to help already-married Orthodox adults solve problems in their own 
sexual life, are also available now. These various works present a broad view of 
the ways marital sex is explained and prescribed in the contemporary Jewish 
Orthodox world. My plan in this essay is to examine several Modern Ortho-
dox works of these various kinds, published in Israel and in the United States 
in the last few decades. I will not discuss publications that aim explicitly, by 
their nature, style, or content, at haredi Jews and that are less likely to be of 
interest for Modern Orthodox couples.
MODERN ORTHODOXY
The term “Modern Orthodoxy” is a very problematic one especially in recent 
decades, when this supposedly clearly defined branch of Orthodox Judaism 
grew significantly in numbers and, not incidentally, also in diversity.
Orthodox Judaism itself is hard to define. One can probably say that 
generally, officially, Orthodox Jews are those Jews who believe that the Torah 
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is divine, that it was handed from God to Moses as is, that the Talmud and 
later authoritative sources are the only legitimate interpretation of the laws in 
it, that modern notions should have a minimal impact on these laws, and that 
one must make a great effort to follow these laws as explained by the rabbis. 
These laws should shape one’s daily life.2
Some people might object to the definitions suggested above, saying 
that some Orthodox Jews do not think of the Torah as literally divine or that 
some Orthodox Jews believe that modern concepts can and should impact 
Jewish practices. Others might say that some Conservative Jews hold that the 
rabbinic laws should shape their own daily life as well. All of this is true, but 
such people are on the fringes of their own respective groups (even if often 
they think, or pretend, they are not). In most cases, I believe that the defini-
tions above cover the vast majority of Orthodox Jews and eliminate the vast 
majority of non-Orthodox Jews.
It has become commonplace for at least the past several decades to divide 
the Orthodox world into haredi, previously referred to as Ultra Orthodoxy, 
and Modern Orthodoxy. It is obvious, though, that just as the very definition 
of Orthodoxy is problematic, any definition of its subgroups is also com-
plicated. In both cases, it is probably better to speak of a certain spectrum, 
situating Modern Orthodox Jews between haredi Jews and Conservative (or 
in Israel, traditionalist or secular) Jews. Modern Orthodox Jews will be those 
Orthodox Jews who believe in the importance of Jewish practices in daily life 
but also give positive value to secular culture.
A major question today is if those on the right side of so-called Modern 
Orthodoxy, known as National haredi, Hardal, Radical Religious Zionism, or 
Toraniyim [Torah Oriented], should be considered Modern Orthodox at all, 
considered as a type of haredi Judaism, or dealt with as a category of itself. 
There is no consensus on the answer.
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SEXUALITY
There are many ways to transmit knowledge about sexuality. It can be done 
visually, orally, or in written form. It can be done formally, in class, or infor-
mally, from peers, partners, family members, and newspapers as well as on the 
Internet and in numerous other ways. In this essay I will focus only on formal, 
written, published material in book form of two types, written by and aimed 
at people located within the wide spectrum of Modern Orthodoxy: books 
written for parents, trying to help them find the right way to transmit such 
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information to their children, and books written for people who are about to 
get married. I will not deal with haredi books, and I will not deal with oral 
guidance.
BOOKS FOR PARENTS
In 2009, a little booklet of 68 pages titled Talking to Your Children about 
Intimacy: A Guide for Orthodox Jewish Parents was published by Sara Dia-
ment. Diament is a Modern Orthodox woman herself. According to her 
self- description, she lives in New Jersey and holds master’s degrees in Jewish 
studies and health and behavior studies. The book is very clearly written “from 
within,” using the language, codes, and assumptions of American Modern 
Orthodox Jews. The book discusses the importance of parents talking with 
their children about sexuality while of course adapting it to the child’s age, 
maturity, and interest in the matter. The text is peppered with Hebrew and 
Yiddish words that are commonly used in American Modern Orthodox circles 
and provides some examples of how adults in this community might explain 
these issues to children. The following is an example of instructions and ideas 
given by Diament:
While you should never say anything that is not truthful, you need 
not give complete information at all times. When my children were 
very young, and they asked my husband and me how parents have 
a baby, our first line of response was always, “The first thing you 
do is daven [pray] to Hashem [God] to help you have a baby.” This 
response was both truthful and imparted our hashkafah [religious 
point of view] and was usually quite satisfactory, at least initially. I 
remember that when my son was about nine, he asked me, “If non-
Jewish people don’t daven to Hashem how can they have a baby?” 
I answered him truthfully (but not completely) that a man and a 
woman could have a baby without davening to Hashem, but that 
was something that Jewish people did. My son didn’t probe any fur-
ther. But if he had, I would have explained that beyond davening to 
Hashem, there was something that Immas and Abbas [mothers and 
fathers] do together to help make the baby, and answered any further 
questions that arose.3
Toward the end of her book, Diament provides an imaginary report by a 
brother and sister, aged ten and eleven, of the information they learned from 
their parents (father to son, mother to daughter). Diament says that letting 
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children read it alone or together with their parents can help the discussion. 
The text is an interesting mix of explicit content together with theology:
When Hashem [God] created Adam and Chava [Eve] the first 
thing that He instructed them was, “Peru u’revu—Be fruitful and 
multiply,” which in regular English means “Have children!” [Mom] 
also told me that while it is true that Abba [Dad] and she davened 
[prayed] to Hashem [God] to have us, that there is a special part 
that parents play alongside Hashem in creating a baby. . . . Abba 
explained to me that because an Abba and Imma [father and 
mother] love each other, when they are alone together at night in 
bed they like to be close. Sometimes, they might just hug and kiss 
each other. Other times, they take their clothes off to feel very close 
in a way that only Immas and Abbas do. They may also decide to 
have sexual relations. Abba said that he needed to explain what that 
was—because beside being a nice way of being close, it is also what 
an Imma and Abba have to do to play their part in creating a baby. 
He told me that when a man and a woman have relations the man 
comes very close to the woman. By then, from thinking about all 
the cuddling they are doing, his penis has become firmer than usual. 
This makes it easier for the man to put his penis inside a special 
opening in the woman’s vagina. My Abba told me not to worry— 
it doesn’t hurt the lady—in fact it feels very nice. Hashem wanted 
to make sure that it was something pleasurable to do so that mar-
ried people would want to do it. He said that it’s one of the ways 
that a husband and wife can show their love for one another, even 
when they aren’t going to create a baby from it. After a man puts his 
penis inside a woman’s vagina, he rubs it back and forth so he can 
release from it a little bit of liquid called semen. In the semen, there 
are something called sperm, though they are too small to see—you’d 
need a microscope. The sperm have something like a tail so they can 
travel, in a swimming kind of way, deeper into the vagina.4
In this text, children learn that God is in charge but also learn about penises, 
vaginas, erections, and sperm. In fact, the actual act is explained clearly and 
accurately, without any obvious censorship, though, of course, adapted to the 
age of the children and described as something religiously kosher.
A few years later in 2012, another book of the same type, Talking about 
Intimacy and Sexuality: A Guide for Orthodox Jewish Parents, was published by 
Yocheved Debow. Debow describes herself as a Modern Orthodox American-
born Israeli woman who wrote her doctoral dissertation on the matter.5 The 
Contemporary Modern Orthodox Guidance Books on Marital Sexuality  139
book, 342 pages long, does not contain as much Orthodox jargon as Dia-
ment’s book and is by far more comprehensive. Whether this is a good or 
bad thing depends on the reader’s expectations. Diament’s book can be read 
quickly by busy parents and provides ready-made recipes on how to deal with 
the issue. Reading Debow’s book demands more time, although it is written 
in a very accessible way. Like Diament, Debow uses both scientific and Jew-
ish literature and concepts, but obviously Debow’s more voluminous work 
includes by far more of both. At the same time, Debow’s book at times feels 
more apologetic. Very often it compares “Judaism” to a “Western Approach.” 
“Judaism,” according to Debow, is spiritual, while “Non-Judaism” is materi-
alistic and commercial and supports immediate gratification.6 In its essence, 
the attitude that the book expresses is not different from Diament’s. Parents 
should speak with their children, adapting, of course, to age and personality; 
actual scientific terms should be used to refer to the sexual organs; lack of 
explanation is not a good idea (or as Debow puts it, even a bad explanation is 
better than no explanation); and when the time is appropriate and the child 
is, or seems to be, interested in the matter, the basic details of the sexual act 
should be explained honestly and accurately.
Debow’s work is a by-product of her involvement in creating a cur-
riculum on the matter under the auspices of Yeshiva University, the flagship 
academic institution of American Modern Orthodoxy. It was published 
jointly by two respected organizations in the Modern Orthodox world: the 
publishing house Ktav and Orthodox Union Press. It is hard to imagine 
better credentials from a Modern Orthodox perspective. On the other hand, 
this strong identification with Modern Orthodoxy, which is also very central 
in the content, might push away Orthodox parents who are located more 
on the right side of the Orthodox spectrum, closer to the National haredi or 
haredi worlds. Diament’s booklet, although Modern Orthodox in many ways, 
is less explicitly so and thus might be possibly consulted by such parents.
The two books of Diament and Debow represent a watershed in deal-
ing with the matter in American Modern Orthodoxy. One slim, the other 
comprehensive; one practical, the other more theoretical; one published inde-
pendently, the other under the auspices of major institutions. Both provide 
English-reading Modern Orthodox parents with specific guidance of how to 
speak about the matter with their children in a manner that is in line with 
the current recommendations of professional organizations while, at the same 
time, being adapted to Modern Orthodox sensitivities, wishes, beliefs, and 
practices. Guidance to children should be given, according to them, with 
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implicit or explicit understanding that they should not engage in sexual rela-
tions or any sensual contact before marriage. In addition, the entire sexual 
act is described as an act with religious meanings. No drawings of body parts 
are provided.
Would an average Modern Orthodox person follow the instructions of 
these two books? I do not know. The books by Diament and Debow show that 
it is possible to find a way to explain the fundamentals of the sexual acts to 
children while respecting core concepts of Modern Orthodoxy. On the ques-
tion of whether this actually happens in the real world, I have no answer. At 
the time I wrote these lines, neither of these two books had been translated to 
Hebrew. As far as I know, there is no comparable work written originally 
in Hebrew. Non-English-speaking Modern Orthodox parents in Israel do not 
yet have a guide of this kind to help them.7
BOOKS FOR BRIDES AND GROOMS
Several dozen Modern Orthodox marital guides for young couples have been 
published in Hebrew and in English, in Israel and in United States, in recent 
decades. Though one can find a few works of this type from the 1970s, maybe 
even from the 1960s, these works were isolated cases and did not yet constitute 
a distinct genre. The real wave of Modern Orthodox publications on marital 
life started around 1985 and continues today in full force.8
Most of these books are of little relevance to this study due to the fact 
that they contain theoretical, theological, or ideological discussions of mar-
ried life but not a significant explicit section on sexual relations. From those 
books that can be categorized on the more or less Modern Orthodox spectrum 
and that contain a significant section on marital sex, I consider about half a 
dozen to be particularly interesting. Here, I will explore three of them.
SHLOMO AVINER’S ETZEM ME-ATZAMAI  
[BONE OF MY BONES]
Shlomo Aviner is an Israeli rabbi who was born in France in 1943 and moved 
to Israel in 1966. For many years he has been a leading figure in the national 
religious community, especially among the settlers. He is one of the found-
ers and leaders of the national-religious branch known, among other titles, 
as “National haredi.”9 This is a group that grew out of the national-religious 
movement; some might consider it to be outside of the so-called Modern 
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Orthodox spectrum. Among other things, this group is characterized by what 
its adherents see as stricter observance in some domains, particularly women’s 
dress. It also accords a more central place to men’s study of rabbinic texts and 
promotes separation from the secular world.10
Aviner is not an uncontroversial person even in his own branch of 
National haredi, something which is perhaps not surprising: in radical groups, 
people are considered kosher or nonkosher because of nuances that might look 
insignificant to an outsider. Still, he remains a prominent figure, well known 
outside of his immediate circles. He has published dozens of books and has 
had weekly broadcasts and columns in various media venues affiliated with the 
religious Right. He or his disciples also operate multiple websites with hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of videos featuring his lectures and answers to ques-
tions in both Hebrew and French.
Aviner is extremely interested in issues related to sexuality and tzinut, 
which literally means “modesty” but in reality is connected almost entirely to 
the regulation of women’s dress and to relations between the sexes.11 It is thus 
not surprising that he is the author of several books on these matters.
The most relevant book to our discussion is Etzem me-Atzamai [Bone 
of my Bones], published in 1984 with a new edition in 2001.12 It is partially 
structured as questions and answers: “What should be done when there is 
incompatibility between the spouses regarding copulation?”;13 “Sometimes the 
woman desires the union more than the man. Must he abide, or should 
she give up?”;14 or “What should a man do if he gets aroused very fast, while 
his wife gets aroused more slowly?”15 Whether the questions are ones that 
Aviner was actually asked or are his own creation I do not know, though I tend 
to believe that many are crafted by him as a literary tool.
On the cover of Etzem me-Atzamai one finds that it is “For Married 
Couples Only,” though in the “warnings” opening of the book it is said that 
brides and grooms can consult it a few days before the event. Aviner declares 
that Etzem me-Atzamai is only for those who have difficulties with their sexual 
life. Those who do not should not consult it. It is also only for simple people 
who have to fight their evil inclination. Holy people do not need the advices 
of the book.16
Aviner considers himself a champion of women’s rights and honor.17 
Women are gentle and sensitive, and their husbands must continually take this 
into consideration. On the other hand, because women are superior beings to 
men in many aspects, they also have some serious obligations toward men. For 
example, women should be “givers”: they should devote their lives to “giving” 
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to their husband. If, for example, the woman is not enjoying marital relations, 
this is still okay. Many women never enjoy sexual relations, says Aviner. “Many 
couples are made in such a way that the women cannot reach physical enjoy-
ment, and one must not insist on it. This is vain. It is more important for the 
wife that her husband loves her and hugs her, and that his enjoyment is impor-
tant for her. This is enough.”18 “The fact that you do not enjoy,” says Aviner 
in response to a real or crafted question from a woman, “is not critical. There 
are women who did not enjoy [sex] in their entire life, and this did not bother 
them, but it was all with great love [to their husband].”19 The woman has “an 
inner enjoyment from the closeness, from the love, friendship, and peace. She 
does not need the physical enjoyment.” What is important, he declares, is that 
she at least does not suffer.
When engaging in marital relations, lights must be off, even though it is 
permissible to leave a small light on during foreplay. Talking is very important, 
especially for the woman. The husband must show her warmth by talking to 
her and making her happy. One is not allowed, though, to speak about unre-
lated issues, and Aviner even warns women that this is not the time to raise 
concerns of various kinds.20 Gentle touch is also important. There is no place 
the husband is forbidden to touch, although those who are particularly pious 
might decide to create some limits. Aviner does not seem to be thrilled with 
the possibility of the husband touching his wife’s genitalia. He rarely men-
tions this possibility, nor does he tell his readers about its importance if the 
woman’s satisfaction is a goal. In the same vein, the idea that a woman expe-
riences pain in her first instances of intercourse seems to him to be a given. 
Considering the fact that he does not instruct his readers about foreplay, he 
might indeed be right with regard to what happens in the bedrooms of those 
following his guidance. To put it bluntly, for couples who follow his guidance, 
the chances that the woman will reach sexual satisfaction are indeed quite low.
Aviner is aware that problems can occur. He mentions in particular male 
impotence and premature ejaculation. These happen “especially for the most 
modest grooms.” The couple should not feel too much guilt and should try 
again later. Holy thoughts, relaxation, and reducing the excitement can solve 
most problems. The bride must not expect enjoyment from the first union. In 
fact, for Aviner, as we saw earlier, even if the woman never enjoys marital rela-
tions, nothing is wrong.21 With such a view, it is no surprise that Aviner does 
not spend much time, if at all, on female physiological problems. The woman, 
anyway, should not expect pleasure from the act. Aviner does not mention the 
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option of reaching for professional help, and one can imagine that for him, as 
long as the couple succeeds somehow to conceive and the husband is happy, 
the situation is satisfactory.22
ELYASHIV KNOHL’S ISH VE-ISHAH AND ET DODIM
Some years after revised versions of Aviner’s book appeared, another book, Ish 
ve-Ishah [Man and Woman], by Elyashiv Knohl, entered the same market.
Elyashiv Knohl, born in 1948, is a rabbi of a religious kibbutz and 
was educated in some of the same rabbinic circles as Aviner. Unlike Aviner, 
though, who remained on the conservative side of the national religious world 
throughout his career, Knohl was for many years a senior faculty member in 
charge of training students for the rabbinate in a yeshiva that was known to 
be—although unquestionably Orthodox—on its progressive side.23
Knohl’s book initially appeared in 2003, with a subsequent thoroughly 
revised second edition in 2005 and a third edition in 2014.24 An English edi-
tion was released in 2008.25
Many of the Modern Orthodox contemporary works on the matter speak 
to both husband and wife and try to guide readers in ways that the authors 
believe take into consideration women’s concerns as well. In reality, many of 
these texts, and not only those by Aviner, might still seem to be, for an out-
sider, very problematic from a feminist or egalitarian perspective. Knohl does 
it dramatically better than most others. In fact, one of the most outstanding 
characteristics of his book is its commitment to an as-egalitarian-as-possible 
treatment of both partners, expressed in its very language. In Hebrew, a 
language with clear distinctions between feminine and masculine verbs and 
nouns, writing or talking in inclusive language is extremely hard. Knohl makes 
a real effort to do so in every sentence and in every term used.
Knohl’s book deals mostly with issues that are not related to our specific 
interest. In its scope it is similar to countless other guides to marital life pub-
lished in the Orthodox world. What makes it so essential for us is a separate 
thin brochure titled Et Dodim: A Guide to Marital Relations from a Torah Per-
spective, which is attached to the sealed book.26
One of the central threads in Knohl’s booklet is the idea that the man 
and the woman have the same obligations and rights with regard to sexual 
relations. Everything should be done with mutual consent, and no side has 
more rights or obligations than the other. If the Talmud and halachic [Jewish 
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legal] literature say, for example, that a man “can do with his wife whatever 
he desires,” it means of course with mutual consent. If the Talmud suggests 
ways to enhance the chance that the newborn will be male, the Talmud did 
not mean it scientifically but just as a way to encourage the enjoyment of both 
partners in time past, when male children were more appreciated by some. 
Needless to say, this is not the way the regulations have been presented and 
prescribed for centuries. And yet, being an Orthodox rabbi writing to ortho-
dox readers, Knohl does not present his interpretations as a break from a long 
tradition but instead presents them as the “true” meaning of Jewish texts on 
the matter throughout history.
Knohl devotes significant time to discussing problems that might occur, 
such as premature ejaculation, male impotence, and vaginismus. He explains 
that these phenomena are common, and the couple should not develop 
anxiety over them or feel embarrassed. He offers some possible solutions and 
explains that if after a while the couple still feels that things are not right, 
they should seek professional advice. In particular at the beginning of their 
relations, couples should be aware that the difficulties are normal. Unlike 
most traditional guides, Knohl admits that the couple might not succeed in 
having full relations in their first night together. In fact, he even says that if 
this seems to them inappropriate, they do not have to try. Postponing it for a 
while is acceptable.27 One should remember that at least some of the couples 
whom Knohl addresses are indeed young men and women who never had 
any physical contact with a member of the other sex, and some of them 
did not even touch their spouse until the wedding ceremony, which hap-
pened only a few hours earlier. For them, having to go immediately “from 
nothing to everything,” as some put it, can indeed be traumatic. Knohl tells 
them they do not have to. His unapologetic permission is remarkable in the 
Orthodox context and shows again that Knohl puts the couple’s well-being 
very high.
It is hard to summarize Knohl’s work in a few words, but it is correct to 
say, I believe, that the technical content in it is outstanding and would have 
been appropriate and useful for probably any young person of any culture 
and background who is about to begin experiencing heterosexual relations. Of 
course, Knohl weaves this practical guidance with halachic considerations, but 
it is clear that he puts the mutual enjoyment of the couple as the utmost prior-
ity: almost all regulations are presented as tools to achieve this goal. Obviously, 
being Orthodox, if the law is clear and Knohl does not know of loopholes to 
get around it, the law is the last word.
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JENNIE ROSENFELD’S AND DAVID S. RIBNER’S ET LE’EHOV
In 2011, an English booklet (ninety-two pages long) titled Et Le’Ehov: 
The Newlywed’s Guide to Physical Intimacy, written by Jennie Rosenfeld and 
David S. Ribner, appeared.28 A parallel Hebrew edition was published in 
2013. With these two versions, the book became available in the first two 
languages of the vast majority of the world’s Jews. I discuss here the original 
English version, which was the one actually written by these two American-
born immigrant-to-Israel authors.
Rosenfeld holds a Ph.D. in English, and her dissertation dealt with sex-
ual ethics in the Modern Orthodox world. She was active for several years in 
projects regarding sexual education in such communities. Ribner is a professor 
of social work at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, a certified sex therapist, and an 
ordained Modern Orthodox rabbi.
The book does not include a rabbinic approbation of any kind, nor does 
it include any mention of consultation with a known rabbinic authority (even 
though some of those mentioned in the acknowledgments are rabbis). Obvi-
ously, the fact that Ribner himself is ordained can be seen by some as giving it 
some rabbinic authority. It mentions some connections with Yeshiva Univer-
sity, the same institution that contributed to the works of Debow described 
above, and uses the vague term “Torah-Observant” to describe its intended 
audience. It is hard to believe that the authors never consulted major rabbis on 
issues discussed in the book, but one can understand the possible reasons why 
they decided not to mention explicitly such consultations. It is probable that 
some of these rabbis did not want to be openly associated with their project, 
even if they agreed with its content and even supported its cause. Moreover, 
the authors probably wanted to make it clear this is a book written from a 
professional perspective, not a religious one, even if the intended readers and 
the authors themselves are Orthodox. Last but not least, giving an approbation 
from one rabbi can always mean that the book might be dismissed by those 
who do not highly regard that particular rabbi. Instead, Rosenfeld and Ribner 
chose to open the book with an extremely pious preface, one that should speak 
to readers of all shades of Orthodoxy: “At every step in the creation of this 
manual, we keenly felt the presence of the Borei Olam [Creator]. We have ven-
tured into sensitive waters and we pray that what we have produced here does 
not deviate in any way from our obligation to sanctify the Name of Heaven.”29
The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and appendices of 
various kinds. In the introduction, the authors say that they wrote it for brides, 
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grooms, and those teaching them. The authors justify the book’s existence by 
stating that “This kind of information was once passed from parent to child; 
our impression is that this is no longer the norm.”30
The level of detail in the book might be surprising to outsiders. And yet 
it should be remembered that some of their readers might actually have little 
to no knowledge about the physiology of members of the other sex and even 
little understanding of their own: “For the new Kallah [bride], seeing her hus-
band’s erect penis can be confusing. . . . When erect, the penis can become a 
deep red and almost purple. . . . These changes are normal and should not be 
a cause of concern.”31
Trying to serve as well as possible even such readers, the book explains 
the appearance and functions of male and female genitalia, preparation for the 
couple’s first sexual experience, kissing, foreplay, orgasm, and, understand-
ably, intercourse.32 It mentions the possibility for newlyweds to postpone the 
first intercourse. Rosenfeld and Ribner present it not only as acceptable but also 
as common.33 Several times in the book they inform and remind readers that 
other Jewish Orthodox couples have similar problems and that the advice they 
may have received from pious instructors may not be something everybody else 
agrees with. The question of the first night is one example. Another is with 
regard to the observance of the laws of niddah [menstrual impurity]. Rosenfeld 
and Ribner admit that it can have serious negative implications for the couple’s 
intimacy, even though the common party line with regard to this topic is that 
it enhances intimacy by giving the couple a “time-out” to do other things.34 In 
the same way, Rosenfeld and Ribner acknowledge that the idea that couples 
will always have desire for intimacy when the wife returns from the ritual bath, 
following the niddah period, is also often detached from mundane reality.35
The core of heterosexual sexual relations, vaginal intercourse, is described 
at considerable length.36 The authors explain that intercourse should not come 
without any foreplay, emphasize the importance of natural or artificial lubrica-
tion, and warn that it takes some time for couples to do the “fine-tuning” that 
will make it enjoyable. They explain very meticulously how penetration happens, 
how each of the spouses should position himself or herself, and how one should 
move. They give special attention to the missionary position, though they do not 
say that it is particularly recommended. They only mention the probable fact it 
is “the manner that is used most often around the world.” They also tell couples 
that a wet spot on the sheets following intercourse is to be expected.
In a subsequent chapter, the authors discuss briefly what they call 
“Alternate Intimacies.” Because some of these acts—for example, oral 
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sex—might not be deemed perfectly kosher by all rabbis, the authors add 
a warning: “Though this guide has been prefaced with the caveat that it is 
not meant to serve as a halachic resource, this point deserves to be reiter-
ated here. We have chosen to include below a wide range of sexual activities. 
However, some of the actions below may not be sanctified by your individual 
halachic authority (posek).”37
The book’s final sections discuss, like other books we saw, physiological 
and psychological problems that may affect sexual relations. As in some other 
works, the authors recommend consulting a professional if the problems per-
sist. Two other elements that also appear at the end of the book are relatively 
unusual. One of them is a rather extensive list of resources on sexuality, includ-
ing books, websites, and companies that sell sex toys. The other appendix is 
a sealed envelope with the following warning: “Note: This envelope contains 
illustrations that are meant to accompany the text and to clarify certain points 
with regard to male and female sexual anatomy and sexual positions. These 
illustrations are therefore explicit, and each person should take this into 
account before viewing the drawings.”
Inside the envelope, five illustrations are again preceded by the same 
warning, with a further note that the illustrations have been commissioned 
specifically for the book and that “they attempt to balance the necessary sensi-
tivity with the need for clarity and accuracy.” Two of the illustrations show the 
female and male genitalia, and three of them show sexual positions: mission-
ary, woman on top, and rear entry. Indeed, they are very minimalistic. Ribner, 
in an online audio interview,38 explains that some of his clients, and eventually 
readers, might need such detailed depictions. After all, many of them have no 
television at home, do not go to movies, and have never seen a sexual act in a 
film, be it even a nonpornographic one. As a result, some of them might not 
know how, for example, to position their legs.
CONCLUSION
I have explored five complex books, written by people who could be described 
as part of the large spectrum of Modern Orthodoxy, with Aviner on its right 
margin. Based on my study of these books and many others, I think it is fair to 
say that there is currently a revolution in the way marital sexuality is presented 
in some Modern Orthodox works. The changes are mostly due to the increas-
ing impact of feminist ideas and the way academic scholarship in general, and 
social sciences in particular, penetrate the internal discussion. The first two 
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books we examined were written by women immersed in current scholarship 
on the matter. I do not think that this is a coincidence: Modern Orthodox 
women often have higher academic education than men. Obviously, not 
all women are so enlightened and open. Some of the most disturbing texts on 
the matter, not explored here, were written by women, such as Rachel Neriyah. 
Aviner also includes in one of his books a section that he claims was written by 
a woman, and its content is essentially identical to texts that are officially his. 
At the same time, not all men write books that ignore modern knowledge. The 
most we can say is that in some places some women bring outside scholarship 
into the system. This is not different from what we know happened during 
the period of Jewish Enlightenment [Haskalah], for example. Women are not 
expected to devote their time to Jewish sources, their education is less con-
trolled and restricted, and they are expected to be a bridge, mostly for financial 
reasons, between the closed Jewish world and the outside.
The fourth book, by Knohl, was written by a male rabbi who does not 
have formal training in the field but admits repeatedly and clearly that he has 
consulted extensively others who do, including women. The fifth book was 
written by a man and a women, both having academic training in the field. 
On the other hand, Aviner’s book, the third on my list, lacks any of this knowl-
edge and reflects not much more than a repetition of old rabbinic ideas cast in 
modernized language. Aviner should be credited with starting the revolution 
by speaking frankly on the matter and writing about it. Knohl took a further 
step by taking serious consideration of the social sciences when writing his 
rabbinic manual. Diament, Debow, Rosenfeld, and Ribner took yet another 
step by gaining full academic training in the field and by trying to adjust the 
traditional religious ideas of Modern Orthodoxy to what they know from aca-
demia, not the other way around.
NOTES
1. Puah Institute, http://puah.org.il/ViewShut.aspx?ArticleId=7552. Question asked 
December 28, 2010. The context, content, and style make it clear that the couple is not 
haredi.
2. A non-Jewish female undergraduate student who took a course on Judaism with me 
defined Orthodoxy in this way in a paper: “While many religions allow individuals to 
fit the religion into their lives, the strict followers of Jewish law show that their lives 
have to be fit around Judaism. The Jewish law impacts every part of their life.” I would 
like to thank B. Williard for permission to mention this definition, which I find very 
pertinent.
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Challah from Abba:  
The Modern Jewish Father
Joshua Brown
God, slow to anger and abounding in kindness; forgiving iniquity 
and transgression; yet not remitting all punishment, but visiting 
the iniquity of fathers upon children, upon the third and fourth 
generations.
—Numbers 14:18
Since its birth, Judaism has been concerned with the effects of one generation’s 
actions upon another. In this particular verse the rabbis understand not only 
that every generation is different but also that each generation is dependent 
upon the ones that came before it and those that come after it:
Consider the implications of this verse by analogy with a four-level 
storehouse, one level above the other; on one there is wine; on 
another oil; on still another, honey; and on still another, water. If a 
fire starts on any one of the levels, what is above it will extinguish 
the fire. But if all four levels should have oil on them, all four will 
burn down. Likewise, if children persist, generation after genera-
tion, in the wicked ways of their forefathers, punishment will be 
visited upon them. But if the generations alternate, one generation 
righteous and the next wicked, and so on, then “the fathers shall not 
be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to 
death for the fathers” (Deut 24:16). Hearing this, Moses rejoiced, 
saying, “In Israel, no one is a malicious destroyer of grapevines just 
because his father was a malicious destroyer of grapevines.”1
There are two assumptions made by this passage that are important to the 
study of the modern Jewish father. First, the rabbis are clear that fathers are 
influential in their children’s lives. The second assumption is that children 
should strive to be different from their fathers in order to be righteous. 
Both assumptions are telling of the issues that fathers have faced throughout 
time. In this essay I look at the modern father and the many challenges he 
faces as he enters his home and works to become an active parent. In particular 
this essay focuses on four challenges facing fathers in the twenty-first century 
as they are informed by modern psychology:
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1.  The challenge of being Other in the child’s life.
2.  The challenge for the father to provide basic needs for the child.
3.  The challenge for the father to introduce the outside world to the 
child.
4.  The challenge to spend time that is of high quality but also time 
parenting the child.
Some of these challenges are ancient and have continued from generation to 
generation, while others are arising as unique to the modern era.
While less notable than the challenges, there are benefits that fathers 
bring to their children’s lives. The latter portion of this essay will focus on 
these strengths that fathers have brought to parenting throughout the genera-
tions and finally the unique role fathers could play for the future generations 
of children.
CHALLENGES: THE OIL THAT BURNS  
FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION
If Abraham was the father of our biblical world, then Sigmond Freud has been 
the father of the psychoanalysis of the relationship between parents and their 
children. Like Abraham, whether the oedipal relationship speaks to us or not, 
it is the standard that all other theories are measured against and therefore will 
be the primary model I address in this essay.
CHALLENGE #1: FATHER AS AN OTHER TO THE CHILD
The Oedipus complex in Freudian psychoanalysis refers to a stage of psycho-
sexual development in childhood whereby children of both sexes regard their 
father as an adversary and a competitor for the exclusive love of their mother.2 
Fathers, like oil, are an entity that is infinitely separated from the family in 
which they reside. This has been a major challenge for fathers to overcome 
throughout all of time, and according to current psychologists it has not 
receded. Moreover, as dual-earner families become the norm in our society, 
men are faced with a struggle to help fill the void of what was once a full-time 
stay-at-home job while being considered an other or outsider.
The father as Other impacts the family in a variety of ways. We will 
explore the complex nature of this outsider status through the relationship 
between the father as one excluded from the mother-child relationship:
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The pediatrician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott argued that 
“the infant and the maternal care together form a unit.” Good 
enough mothering “includes fathers, but fathers must allow me to 
use the term maternal to describe the total attitude to babies and 
their care. The term paternal must necessarily come a little later than 
maternal.” Winnicott held that the father’s role in early infancy was 
to support the mother in her state of primary maternal preoccupa-
tion, to enable her to provide a holding environment and to avoid 
unnecessary impingements on the baby . . . when the infant is in the 
state of absolute dependency on the maternal holding.3
As Winnicott explains, the mother and child form a unit. The father falls 
outside of this unit and is not privy to the connection formed between the 
child and the mother. Notice that this is a relationship focused not on time 
but rather on dependency. The child is dependent upon the mother and not 
the father. While it is possible for the father to hold, care for, and even feed the 
baby, both society and biological factors often place the mother into the role 
of primary caregiver. The father becomes the alternative to mom, or Other.
Not only is this dependency fulfilling the child’s needs, but it is also 
providing the child with pleasure. “Good experience is usually associated 
with need fulfillment—when it is in the presence of the mother in tune with 
its needs, which usually means a mother in the act of attending to them.”4 
Fathers, perhaps without even knowing that it is happening, may find them-
selves outside the child’s source of need fulfillment and even happiness in the 
early stages of life.
But need fulfillment can come from fathers as well. Technology has 
blessed us with bottles and other tools that help the father fill the biological 
roles of mother. For instance, in the cases of single-parent families in which the 
mother is absent, we can imagine that a child’s needs are met by a man. But 
we should not be fooled into thinking that our modern postfeminist society is 
as egalitarian in the home as it is in the workplace. While women have moved 
into the professional world, they often do not relinquish their domestic role. 
Wendy Mogel, a noted family therapist and author of The Blessing of a Skinned 
Knee, spoke with me about this reality. She believes that “women today are 
trying to be perfect men as well as perfect women.”5
The intent is not to point fingers at mothers but rather to illuminate the 
complexities of the love triangle that exists between parents and their child. 
Mothers, whether full-time parents or CEOs for corporations, continue to feel 
the pressure of being primary caregivers or “perfect women,” as Mogel stated. 
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The father’s challenge is to overcome the lack of space and find a balance 
between his partner’s emotional need to be a “perfect” parent and his need to 
be a professional father.
But this otherness raises a wide range of emotions in the child. It is not 
only that the father is not the mother. We must also concern ourselves with 
how the child views the father in relation to the mother. The father is a neces-
sary Other. This other often serves as a response or alternative to the mother. 
According to the French psychologist Jacques Marie Emile Lacan, “The 
child’s sense of identity develops from seeing himself reflected in the other— 
the mother. . . . The father is seen as another brother wishing to take the 
child’s place with the mother.”6
In this case the father takes on the role of what we would term a brother. 
The child relates to father as one would relate in a sibling rivalry competing 
for the other parent’s attention. This is heightened even further as we consider 
the sexual relationship often present among parents.
The oedipal relationship is a love triangle. Traditionally it occurs when 
two people in relationship create a third object, the child, to love. For the 
newcomer with needs from one and possibly both of the parents, their love for 
each other can be viewed as another challenge. This challenge is particularly 
problematic for fathers, as their children believe that their primary caregiver, 
the mother, often abandons them to seek the father.
“In fantasy, separation is always experienced as the mother retreating to 
the other room—the parental bedroom—with the second object, the father.”7 
In this aspect of the oedipal theory the child becomes envious and even angry 
with the father. “The father is the hated depriving object, and this requires the 
father to have a capacity to be hated. The father has to accept that the central 
nurturing relationship involves the mother, and that he is excluded from the 
mother-infant couple.”8 And while the child is of primary concern, each mem-
ber of this love triangle may feel similarly. “Essentially, the task for the mother, 
father and infant involves tolerating the link between two people they desire 
and which excludes them.”9
CHALLENGE #2: PROVIDING BASIC NEEDS
Fathers are not mothers, and they face a challenge in breaking into the rela-
tionship between mother and child. The second challenge that fathers face 
focuses on whether it is even possible for fathers to provide basic needs for 
their child. Perhaps it is only the mother who can fill the needs of her child.
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As we explore this second major challenge, we find that fathers may face 
a tremendous disadvantage, as their biological necessity seems to be diminish-
ing with the progression of modern science in the field of fertility. “Winnicott 
reminded us that there is no baby without a mother.”10 One of the advances 
that modern science teaches us quite clearly is that men do not need to be 
present for childbearing or child rearing: “The acceptance of a whole new 
mode of procreation, ranging from ‘do it yourself turkey-baster’ inventions to 
sophisticated in vitro conception techniques, has contributed to the appear-
ance that fathers are redundant beyond donating sperm.”11
Women have a freedom that is biologically absent for men. Whereas a 
woman can birth to her child without a surrogate, a man must find a woman 
should he want to have a child alone. But it is not the biological limitations 
that provide the real challenge for fathers. Most fathers find themselves in a 
relationship. The biological needs are covered by their spouse. Rather, the social 
and psychological implications of not being a necessary part of the biological 
creation of a child are significant as we consider challenges facing fathers. This 
challenge stems from biology but is certainly made more difficult by the pro-
gressive nature of our society that often avoids gender differentiation:
From the 1960s onwards, the women’s liberation movement steered 
a difficult path between, on the one hand, stressing the equality of 
and importance of women, and at the same time on the other hand 
seeing motherhood as a potentially disadvantageous role in the battle 
for equality. There is little doubt that the new ideas on the impor-
tance of women . . . had the result that, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, there was an increasing loss of confidence in 
the value of the received sense of manhood and fatherhood.12
Feminism raised a question that we continue to ask and often fail to answer 
today: Are men necessary for child rearing? But asking for, needing, and receiv-
ing assistance in childbirth is not a new phenomenon. Abraham and Sarah laugh 
at God when they are told they will have a child. When Isaac marries Rebekah, 
he seeks help in becoming a father to help Rebekah get pregnant. “Isaac 
pleaded with God on behalf of his wife, because she was barren; and the LORD 
responded to his plea, and his wife Rebekah conceived.”13 Seeking help in fertil-
ity is an old challenge. What is unique about this challenge for our generation is 
that a woman can turn to God or to a fertility doctor without need for a man.
The question then becomes, what necessary role does the father play in 
his child’s development? Within the oedipal context, the father is an Other 
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often viewed as secondary. But there is more to raising a child than carrying 
it to term.
Viewed in a broader context, any attempt to understand the respective 
roles of mother and father has to take into account three immutable facts:
1.  That the woman has the essential procreative role,
2.  That the physical and psychological survival of the human infant 
requires the care of one other person, and
3.  That the transformation of a biological baby into a fully functioning 
member of human society (i.e., socialization) involves more than 
mere physical and psychological survival.14
To push the father aside because he cannot fulfill the first fact above is to 
ignore a holistic perspective of child rearing. Children need another person 
to help socialize them and integrate them into society. As is discussed at the 
end of this chapter, fathers are ideal candidates for these needs.
CHALLENGE #3: THE CHALLENGE OF OPENING DOORS  
TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD
The previous challenges may be viewed as disadvantages that men face in our 
society due to their gender. Perhaps the third challenge can be considered an 
opportunity available primarily to the person taking on the role of the Other. 
This is the challenge of the father representing the outside world. One psy-
chologist understands this in multiple stages: “There are three possible stages 
for the father. In the first stage, known as the mirror stage, the father is not 
distinct. In the second stage, the father intervenes and cuts the link between 
mother and child. And in the third stage, the child wishes to be like the father 
rather than to be the lover of mother.”15 Cutting the link between the mother 
and the child is an important stage for the child, but it can be a difficult tran-
sition for the father. This cutting of the link is one of the key actions a father 
can take as the representative of the outside world.
For Freud, “the concept of reality is bound up with the father.” But 
this also allows “the father [to] appear mainly as a powerful figure to be 
fought or to whom we must submit.”16 This stage of fatherhood is therefore 
closest to the traditional role of the father as the patriarch of the family. 
In his book Becoming the Kind Father, Calvin Sandborn, a lawyer by trade, 
chronicles the struggle that this challenge presents. In telling his personal 
story, Sandborn relates the long tradition in masculinity of the man as an 
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outsider to the intimate nature of domestic life. In this sense, fathers are 
beings of doing what is outside, such as work, politics, and fighting, and 
not feeling what is inside the home, such as love, peace, and comfort. For 
him, man has remained a knight in armor. “In fairy tales, the hero wears 
emotional armor as well as real armor. While he slays the dragon and saves 
the princess, he must always be brave. She shows emotions, but he doesn’t. 
Instead, he is cool, powerful and ‘in charge.’ He’s like Davey Crockett, ‘The 
King of the Wild Frontier’ . . . the man who knew no fear. . . . Many, like 
Batman, Green Hornet, the Lone Ranger and Zorro, actually wear masks to 
hide their faces and feelings.”17
Sandborn believes that fathers leave masks and armor for their sons to 
adopt. This is his version of the burning oil present in every generation of men. 
He explains in his story that it is not only through fairy tales and comic books 
that this armor is transferred. It is also in very real life-changing moments that 
patriarchy has denied men the opportunity to express their emotions.18
One of these moments took place when Sandborn lost his father at the 
age of thirteen. He recounts the interaction among his brothers immediately 
after hearing of his father’s death:
I choked like I had a bone in my throat; and for a brief moment I 
cried. . . . Gasping, almost retching, I stumbled down the sidewalk 
with Tom. When we got to the corner, David suddenly stopped, 
took a deep breath, and looked back at me. He braced his shoulders 
and spoke authoritatively, in his Marine voice, “We’re men in this 
family now, boys. We have to take this like men.” He snapped the 
twig in his hands in two, and threw it to the ground. . . . “We’ve got 
the girls to take care of. We all have a job to do. . . . Think about 
it—Dad would want you to be strong champ,” he said to me. “Don’t 
worry, Tom’s the oldest now, so he’s in charge. He’ll take care of you.” 
He slapped the dust off of his hands, and strode quickly back into 
the house. By the time David slammed the door, I had stopped cry-
ing. I didn’t cry again—or mention my father—for 15 years.19
Sandborn refers to this moment as a Boy Code Lesson and later explains how 
it turned his view of a knight in shining armor into a tin man with buried 
emotions. This is the challenge of representing the outside world. It is a system 
in which the father is the authority of the outward-focused image. He does not 
have the freedom or even the capability to be a master of his inside, emotional 
world. In Sandborn’s words, “Patriarchy has denied men the opportunity to 
speak their feelings.”20
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While overcoming the biological barrier of giving birth to a child is 
impossible, taking off the emotional mask of patriarchy is open to men. 
Moreover, as the Other, the man has the ability to become another source of 
emotional support for his child:
When the baby arrives what it needs is a carer, who for a while, 
can devote themselves to the child. . . . Whoever takes on this role 
should, if possible, have a state of mind encompassing several aspects 
described by Winnicott as “primary parental preoccupation,” by 
Bion as “reverie.” An adult in this state has unconsciously opened 
themselves up to the baby in a way that enables them to be deeply 
responsive to the baby’s communications.21
Men cannot choose their sex, but some psychologists believe that men can 
choose to overcome the long burning oil of being emotionless. Sandborn 
explains that in order to build this relationship we must overcome a patriarchal 
competitive nature of win/lose mentality and replace it with a sense of love for 
ourselves. In his book, which reads much like a memoir, he explains:
Too often men attack ourselves. I’m often shocked at how mean 
men can be when they talk about themselves. It’s commonplace to 
hear men describe themselves harshly: “I’m such a no good bastard; 
Really, I’m just a stupid sonofabitch.” As a young man told me, 
“I say things to myself that, if somebody else said it, I would punch 
them in the face.”22
Sandborn believes that this is some of the oil that we inherit from our fathers. 
Personally, I did not relate to Sandborn’s perspective until I recently observed 
it in action. At a retreat for fathers and sons at a camp outside of Los Angeles 
I supervised a friendly game of soccer: sons versus fathers. The game was 
mildly competitive, with high fives after every goal and a sense of comraderie 
among the two groups. Fathers would cheer for sons and vice versa. At one point 
in the game a twelve-year-old boy was passed the ball and had the opportunity 
to score. He pulled his leg back far and struck the ball with what looked like 
all his might. When the ball missed the goal, the boy, standing not so far from 
his father, fell down, hitting the ground with his hand. “I’m so stupid . . . such 
a screw up,” he said.
Missing the goal was not a big deal, and it happened many times over the 
course of the game, but for this son it was a letdown, a sign of being a loser and 
not a winner. His father only a few feet away, along with the rest of the men, 
did not really notice the boy’s disappointment. It is a normal reaction among 
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men in a competitive setting. I was struck at both the intensity of the boy’s 
reaction over a simple missed opportunity and the almost ambivalent response 
of more than twenty men. It was a sign to me that men, even at a very young 
age, may in fact be too harsh on thenselves.
Was this child’s disappointment really his father’s voice inside his head 
saying “How could you miss that shot?” I don’t know. What is evident is that 
none of the men felt the need to react to this emotional outrage of hitting the 
ground with self-deprecating words. None of the fathers comforted the child 
or were even shocked by his outward disappointment. Rather, we all acted 
as knights in an armor that protects our vulnerabilities. It is a norm in male 
behavior, as Sandborn points out. “We’re only a couple of generations removed 
from King George V’s declaration that the father’s proper role is to frighten 
his children. Even today, half of all Americans agree that ‘the father must be 
master of his own house.’ And in this traditional patriarchy, the father-son 
relationship has been one of dominance and submission, not of emotional 
connection.”23
CHALLENGE #4: TRAVELING TOGETHER BUT GETTING NOWHERE
The fire in the storehouse of fatherhood reaches back through generations of 
men to biblical patriarchy. It is a reality that has been studied by psychologists 
and experienced by fathers and children such as Calvin Sandborn. But as the 
rabbis teach in their commentary, every generation is not only like the previ-
ous one; it is also unique to its own time. We are not only burning the same 
oil of biblical patriarchy. There are also new challenges that modern fathers 
must face.
As I mentioned in our discussion of Abraham, one of the primary traits 
of biblical fathers was their mission to be on a journey, constantly traveling. 
In my discussion with Mogel, she reminded me that modern fathers are also 
known to be travelers with their children. Recounting her own experience with 
her father, she remembers the importance of this traveling and reflects on the 
new challenges men face in the twenty-first century:
I walked to school every day with my father. We lived in Manhat-
tan and we walked together every day and we talked about his 
business. But also my father always wanted to know everything 
about my life. Even today, he wants to know the ages of the chil-
dren that my daughter baby-sits for while she is in college. This is 
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the beauty of the Jewish man—that he wants to know about his 
granddaughter’s job.
 So one place fathering happens is in the car. . . . But I just went 
to the car show and I was shocked. There are big screen TVs in cars 
today. We saw these cars with large plasma screen televisions in them 
and then everyone is plugged in so you can’t connect because you are 
connected. It is an erosion of the places where parenting takes place.
 The car used to be great. Driving to soccer practice or a b-day 
party you would process. I don’t know what percentage now, but 
these tools to shut kids up—these machines are the plug and every-
one is all stopped up and isolated. And the daddy, completely the 
odd man out. He is losing out the most because he doesn’t have a 
unique role. He doesn’t provide something essential for the system.24
As I teach twenty-first century teenagers, I realize that the television in the car 
is only the beginning of the new lover in our family triangle. Ipods, cell phones 
and GPS units are distractions in our lives that often prevent conversations. 
Mogel believes that these challenges affect the father in particular because 
occurrences such as riding in the car are not viewed as quality time. Sandborn 
adds a different perspective that is directed specifically at men trying to over-
come the masked emotions of patriarchy:
When something impacted me emotionally—when the boss dumped 
on me, when I had an argument with my wife, when one of the kids 
disappointed me . . . I would feel upset for a moment. But then I 
would immediately divert myself from the feelings. Like my brother 
David, I threw myself into the job at hand. I’d work long hours. Or I 
escaped into reading. Or, I’d turn off the feeling and turn on the TV.25
I empathize with Sandborn. On September 11, 2001, I arrived home just as 
the World Trade Center was struck by the terrorist planes. Like the rest of the 
country, I and the eleven other men in my house were in shock. For twenty-
four hours our lives were at a standstill. Our world had been shaken in a way 
that my generation had never felt. Other generations recalled Pearl Harbor or 
President John Kennedy’s assassination. We knew immediately that 9/11 would 
be our moment to remember where we were. But on day two and day three as 
emotions continued to flare, I noticed the men in my life becoming agitated: 
“When is sportscenter going to stop playing the news? When can I turn on 
sports again and get past 9/11?” We were not insensitive; in fact, a close friend 
barely survived the attack. But we did not want to experience the emotions; we 
wanted to turn those emotions off by turning on meaningless entertainment.
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Technology is a new love in our lives, and men are known to be more 
interested in it than women. It can be a mask that we wear to hide our emo-
tions and further disconnect us from relationships. But men face other chal-
lenges in expressing themselves. Sandborn claims that “intimacy with oneself 
prepares us for intimacy with others.”26
Moreover, he explains that men are at a linguistic disadvantage in 
expressing these emotions:
Men, unlike women, lack a broad range of words to describe vari-
ous emotions. This lack of emotional vocabulary is a real deficit— 
it’s part of the reason that almost 80% of men have difficulty iden-
tifying what they are feeling. I knew when I was angry or feeling 
something quite powerful, but I didn’t have the words for subtler 
feelings such as disappointment, discouragement, insecurity, irrita-
tion or the like. . . . I would use words that either exaggerated the 
feeling (“I feel like crap”) or minimized it (“It’s nothing—I’m just 
tired”). As a result, I failed to experience the “disappointment”—
because I was telling myself it was something else.27
Complicating this situation for fathers in particular is that the new role of the 
father expects him to be involved in the emotional side of the child’s life to a 
greater degree than previous generations:
In the modern, Western, nuclear family, mothers and fathers spend 
more time together than they did in the past and their roles are 
much less differentiated. Women no longer need to rely entirely 
on their husbands for material support or for obtaining power and 
status. Likewise, men now have social permission to be actively 
involved in parenting, and increasingly want to be given greater 
access to their children. . . . In the Western nuclear family we expect 
that fathers should be involved.28
With the changing role of women in our society, a space has been opened for 
the father to be more than just the one who communicates while driving the 
kid to school. Ironically, as the opportunities present themselves, the space is 
filled by new competition such as television and increasingly portable media. 
Adding to this concern is a long-held tradition of men’s limited emotional 
vocabulary. Today, as my experience proved on 9/11, men often rely on dis-
tractions such as television to distance themselves from emotional opportuni-
ties. These opportunities may be our best tools in creating the relationships we 
wish to harvest with our children.
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Mogel raises some other concerns about what prevents men from getting 
to journey with their children:
What kind of parent does a Jewish father get to be. . . . I told you 
about how the men withdraw. It all seems as though the fathers are 
even wimpier now. I am thinking about the people I see in psycho-
therapy—the women are contemptuous about the men. Some of 
it is projection. What legs do men have to stand on now when the 
women can earn money and the emotional currency of women is 
overvalued. That women can relate to the children. He gets squeezed 
out and so what can he provide. And earning more money than the 
mom . . . big deal. We have this ambivalence toward money as it’s 
dirty and we love it, so dad becomes that to us.29
The twenty-first century parent faces many competing interests. We have 
more dual-earner families, more distractions for our children, and more tech-
nology from our pockets, cars, and couches that can grab our attention. The 
expectations for fathers to be involved in their children’s lives are possibly 
higher than ever before. Adding to the expectations are the “old” pressures to 
make money and the “old” ways of avoiding emotions by escaping to the tele-
vision and sports. But it is not only society that wants dad to improve his role 
with children; it is the kids themselves. A Mori poll reported in The Guardian 
(April 10, 1997) showed that 20 percent of children eight to fifteen years old 
could not recall sharing an activity with their father in the previous week and 
that 80 percent want their father to spend more time with them.30 At a North 
American Federation of Temple Youth workshop for male teens, camp director 
Bobby Harris asked young men to talk about love in their relationship with 
their fathers. Author Doug Barden recorded their responses:
My father doesn’t have a clue as to what is going on in my life.
My father spends more time on his computer than he does with me.
My father is a rabbi, and sometimes I feel he cares more about the con-
gregation than he does about me.
I wish my father would sit down more and talk with me about what’s 
going on.
WRAPPING UP THE CHALLENGES
The role of the father is in transition. But we are sending mixed messages. On 
the one hand, our children are wondering where the father is in their lives, and 
on the other, the traditional role of the mother does not fit or may not even be 
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available to the father. Add this to the struggle that men face sharing emotions, 
and we find that the father has an uphill battle in the family.
The picture painted by children is more complex as well. Mogel believes 
that our children have become entitled, and she worries for their future. 
This concern is intertwined with the challenges a father faces, as previously 
discussed:
I was at a beautiful private school, and it is very progressive and 
casual and there were no seats left for the kids. And the teacher 
asked me if I minded sitting on the floor. So the teacher turned to 
a kid named Josh and said, “Josh do you mind sitting on the floor 
so Mogel can have a seat.” And Josh responded to the teacher in a 
whiney voice, “No, but Lucy, you know I feel so much more relaxed 
when I sit on the couch.”
 And I thought every issue is in there, and I immediately flashed 
to his first job interview and wondered if he will survive. His mother 
has taught him that his world revolves around his comfort. So the 
doting mother handicaps our kids.
 We have these young men—what is it going to be like when 
his wife is diagnosed with breast cancer? What is strength, maturity, 
leadership? What is the unique role of the father or the shared role? 
It’s so much less clear.
 ME: What would you tell those parents?
 DM: Oh, I beat them up [jokingly]. Don’t ask what’s wrong. He 
comes home and complains about teachers and friends and being 
bored. Not getting the Nintendo Wii when other kids have it. Of 
course he wants the Wii; he has been brainwashed to want it. That’s 
why we have Hannukah and birthdays and their own money. But 
when parents are worn down by life and then worn down by the 
kids’ genius by lobbying, . . . this is also a challenge of how manipu-
lative the children are. The kids, they’re so powerful. And then the 
dads—what does he feel about the situation? Let’s say he can’t afford 
the Wii. He can’t provide the Wii, and that is HIS role as father. 
Does he feel ashamed because the only thing he can contribute is the 
Wii because no one else pays attention to me?31
In this anecdotal story, Mogel highlights all of the challenges that I have raised 
for the modern father. He is a man struggling with his identity as it is associ-
ated with money. He is challenged to create a relationship with his children 
that values emotions, but he may not have the language and may feel more 
comfortable “buying” their love. The father also faces a complex competition 
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with the mother, the primary lover of the children. Egalitarian parenting is 
possible, in my opinion, but only so long as we understand that this is one 
case in which fair may not be equal. A father cannot be artificially inseminated 
and carry the child to term, and the father cannot feed the child from his own 
body. Moreover, the mother can do these things, and even if she chooses not 
to, she remains a woman attached to a long tradition of gendered roles that 
pushes her to be the “perfect mother” and in today’s world the “perfect man” 
as well. The position of the father seems somewhat lost, only able to react to 
the many changes and powerful forces that surround his desire to find a place 
in his family in which he can succeed and be a part of the team.
It is not my intent to paint a grim picture of the father. Family life is 
increasingly difficult for father, mother, and child. But it is significant that 
the father is such a missing person in the observed family, as it reflects one of the 
main problems and difficulties in becoming a father; that is, finding a role for 
him in the new family constellation.32
GOOD FATHERING IS NEEDED
Each generation of fathers faces challenges new and old. But this fatherly 
fire that the rabbis mentioned may also be a light for future generations. As 
discussed earlier, the role of the father, while complex and often difficult, is 
important and even necessary. In this last section of this essay I will address 
what fathers do to provide for their children’s needs.
Fathers are an Other to their children. They are not the mother. But this 
Other plays an important role in the child’s development. In the case of most 
families in which the father has not taken the place of the mother, the father 
becomes an important partner for the mother:
If the mother is in this state of reverie, she needs another, usually the 
father, to manage the practical external demands and to act as a protec-
tor so that, for example, the mother is not too exhausted by relatives 
and friends or by her own anxieties about the baby. Father can settle 
the baby to sleep, change the baby, give a bottle so that the mother 
can rest and recover, encourage visitors to stay for a short while only, 
and contain and help think about the mother’s and baby’s emotional 
responses. The concepts of “holding in mind” and “containment” are 
both vital aspects of the relationship between child and father.33
It is not only important to note that the father is a protector and guardian of 
the mother and child but also that the father may have the ability to make 
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the relationship between mother and child succeed. In this sense the father 
becomes a manager of mother and child. He is the person able to best under-
stand their emotions and limitations. Standing just outside the immediate 
relationship between mother and child, the father may in fact have the best 
perspective on what steps to take next. But there is another important factor to 
keep in mind in this relationship. It is not competitive. Rather, it is symbiotic. 
The mother and father are a team working to keep each other in balance and 
to provide for the child.
Certainly this is good practice for relationships, but perhaps it is the role 
of the father to model this behavior for the child:
The baby needs total care early on, but then steadily moves towards 
separateness, a wish to be alone and then to leave. This process 
means parents have, to some extent, to be left behind, discarded. For 
those adults who were uncertain of themselves, or who found in the 
baby an intense relationship they have had with no one else, there is 
a dread of losing the child and a painful wish to hold on. . . . Fathers 
have to both accept this themselves and help the mother separate 
and relinquish the child.34
Whereas we discussed the challenge that emotions place before fathers, there 
is a light that burns from this oil that is important for the child:
The father, by virtue of being less involved emotionally, can relieve 
the situation through his access to a fresh perspective. Probably the 
commonest example of this is when an infant gets into an inconsol-
able state and, despite her best efforts, it is just impossible for the 
mother to soothe “her baby.” . . . At such times a fresh parent with 
a fresh mind who, in the infant’s perception, is not part of the per-
secuting situation, can step into the breach to rescue the situation. 
This can restore a calmer state. . . . When there is an actual father 
who can act in this way, we can think of him as performing a sym-
bolic paternal function.35
The child needs the father in order to understand that his or her relationships 
are not limited to the mother but also that the mother’s needs are not met 
solely by the child. This partnership of mother and father is one of the values 
that Mogel believes we need to emphasize the most and one that many couples 
are leaving behind:
I would like for them to start with examining their actions in the 
light of the message that they send their kids of how much they 
respect each other. That’s the core. We are worshiping idols, and the 
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idols are our kids and their achievement. That has taken the place 
of God. It is so bad for the kids because it makes them so anxious 
and entitled. . . .
 I want the kids to see the parents cherishing each other—to see 
the mother really appreciating the father’s strengths, his physical size, 
his experience in the outside world and bringing it into the inside 
world. I want the girls to see the fathers finding their mothers beau-
tiful—potent antidote to the airbrushed world we live in.
 I want them to hear parents laughing together. My daughter 
once said to me when she heard my husband and I laughing in our 
room: “There is nothing that makes me feel more secure than to 
hear that sound.” Parents don’t realize this—they think it is all about 
the focus on the kid.
 Mothers need to think about what is unique about their hus-
bands. I say to couples all the time, “Why did you marry him . . . 
has it really changed all that much?”
 Then they are totally poetic—but when they have kids the kids 
take such center stage, and I always say “the kids will be gone and if 
you haven’t taken care of this relationship what is it going to be like.”36
This is a challenge, but it is also an opportunity. And I believe that it is less 
complicated than overcoming years of patriarchal models or finding a way 
to break into the mother-child relationship. Sometimes it can even happen 
without any effort at all:
A 13-month-old baby whose mother had recently returned to work 
was observed at the end of the day after he had been collected from 
his grandmothers. . . . He appeared to like nothing better than lying 
on a settee, apparently taking pleasure in his parents’ conversation 
with each other as they went about their evening chores. This was 
his preferred activity at that time of night and it had an unmistak-
ably settling effect on him. This baby seemed able to tolerate the 
awareness of his two parents having a relationship with each other 
and it is this that will form the basis of an internal space.37
Internal space is an important element in children forming their identities. 
What strikes me about this case in particular is that the child is passive and in 
the margins of the action. This marginal role is important for the kid, and it 
allows him to form an identity.
I believe that this is a light challenge, because in many situations the flame 
of a relationship is what brought the child into the world. The challenge is keep-
ing the flame lit and making sure that the child does not replace the spouse.
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The father represents a sense of power. Freud even described this as one 
of the strongest needs of a child. But the father also represents a sense of inde-
pendence and the outside world:
A key role for the father, which most men find they do intuitively, 
is to introduce the baby to the world. It is interesting to note that 
in general mothers appear to carry or sit holding their babies in 
the earliest weeks face to face, whilst fathers tend to hold the baby 
facing out into the world. . . . Many of the games fathers tend to 
enjoy playing with their children in a mutually pleasurable way 
tend to have elements of separation and return in them—a kind 
of losing/finding theme, perhaps enacting the necessary separation 
process.38
Fathers represent the world beyond the comforts of home to their child. They 
are the platform by which many children reach out into the world and discover 
themselves. This is a stark contrast to the mother, who holds her child close to 
her womb. Fathers not only bring the child to the world. They also bring the 
outside world into the home:
The effect of “Daddy coming home from work” can bring relief 
to what can often be a stressful situation at the end of the day. . . . 
The father is also seen as instrumental in turning the baby’s view 
towards the outside world away from the intense intimacy of the 
mother-child relationship, or as introducing the “third position” 
which is essential for healthy cognitive and emotional growth and 
development.39
The child needs to see that an outside world exists, and it is often the father 
who brings this reality into the house. As discussed earlier, our world is level-
ing the roles of mother and father, and it may seem as likely that the mother is 
the one “coming home from work.” I accept this with one exception. Mothers 
continue to take maternity leave for a period of months. This trend is only 
beginning for fathers. The first paid family leave bill was passed in California 
only in 2004.40 The Family Medical Leave Act does allow for any family mem-
ber to take up to twelve weeks, but this is unpaid. This often leaves mothers, 
even those who work full-time, as the initial caretaker in the home and the 
father as the “coming home from work” model.
Fathers are often a bridge for their children to the outside world. They 
are also a bridge to the inner world of the child, giving the child a sense of 
independence:
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That is, the father is a child’s primary experience of someone other 
than the mother. . . . The knowledge that someone else is thinking 
of and involved with the child frees the mother from her infant. It 
also frees the infant from the mother. It means that the child will 
have space to experience himself, can risk hating the mother, can 
even risk killing her in his mind, because there is someone else there 
to keep him alive.41
The child does not always need to hate the mother in order to gain from the 
father. But an overly obsessive relationship with the mother is unhealthy, and 
the father is the healthiest option to help children realize that they can depend 
on themselves as well as others. “Mother and infant need someone else to 
intervene to prevent them from remaining stuck in a merged, claustrophobic, 
potentially murderous relationship.”42
Research shows that children benefit most when the mother and the 
father together help the child gain a sense of independence. “We found that 
while secure attachment in infancy to the mother predicted early development 
of emotional understanding, if attachment to the father was also secure, the 
child’s development was even further enhanced.”43
Again, the message is that of the parents as a team, working together to 
help the children adjust to their new environment. In fact, a number of large-
scale studies have demonstrated that the greater the involvement of the father 
in an infant’s early care, the more rapidly the infant develops and the more 
likely the infant is to withstand stress and to be socially responsive.44
Some studies have also shown that a father can be quite successful at rais-
ing his children as the primary caregiver, the role usually taken by the mother:
Evidence for the overlap between the role of the mother and father 
comes from the work of Kyle Pruett. This is a longitudinal, in-depth 
study of 17 families where the primary caretaker was the father. 
The findings over eight years support the view that the “nurturing 
instinct” is not confined to females. Children develop extremely well 
in these families, and the child, far from demonstrating deficits in 
ego functions or object relatedness, seems more active, curious and 
less prone to pathological separation or stranger anxiety than infants 
whose primary dyadic relationship was with their mother.45
Unfortunately, we also know that not all people are good at nurturing their 
children. Calvin Sandborn’s book is predicated on the anger of his father and 
his father’s (and later his own) inability to be nurturing or what he terms “kind.” 
In his process of self-change, Sandborn explains the steps that he took in order 
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to become the “kind father” to himself. By looking at these steps, I believe that 
we can understand what a kind and nurturing father might look like:
1.  Hold myself in friendly regard.
2.  Pay attention to what I’m feeling.
3.  Identify that feeling with accurate words.
4.  Articulate the feeling to myself.
5.  Give myself permission and support to actually feel it, grieve it if 
necessary.46
This emotional experience is what Sandborn lacked in a father. He writes the 
book under the premise that this is what fathers should be to their children 
and that when this is absent for men, they need to become this father for 
themselves. I am not sure that Mogel would agree:
I just saw a family where they sing two songs and read two stories, 
then they have four kisses, then the dad comes in and reads a story 
and a song—it takes forty minutes every night. The parents hate it. 
But they are trying to be with their kids and love them. It has got-
ten way out of control because the ritual has gone sour. Its much 
too manicured and organized. It has become a huge power struggle. 
What is the definition of a book between the parents and kids?47
Her point, I believe, is that the emotions must be authentic and not rehearsed or 
scheduled. Sandborn wishes for men to go through a conversion that may not be 
possible. Certainly, men have the ability to love rather than hate, and I hope we 
can extend the vocabulary for men’s emotions, but some people, men or women, 
are, I believe, less inclined to be extroverted in their emotional expression. Some 
people will never be warm and fuzzy. If they were to try, it would be putting on 
a mask of emotion, and I have to agree with Mogel: it would not work.
The final aspect of fatherhood worth mentioning for this thesis came as 
quite a surprise to me. For many years I have heard spouses talk about their 
husbands or fathers as though they were the “extra child” in the family. “I really 
have three kids,” a mother of two children might say. To my surprise, this trait 
is not only common among men, but it is a welcome trait for them to hold 
within the family. Mogel explained that “A lot of the fathers I see are much 
more playful than the mothers.”48 This playful nature is not a coincidence. 
I already discussed the psychological significance of separation and return 
games that fathers often play with their children. Now, focusing specifically on 
some differences between fathers and mothers, many psychologists understand 
that a reaction to the “perfect woman” mother is the “playful father.”
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According to Mogel, there are two primary types of fathers in the tradi-
tional family structure:
1.  The one who comes home and makes order, trying to make rules. 
Part of this is a reaction to feeling left out. One of those rules is to 
pay attention to me.
2.  The second type takes time to play and be sillier than the mothers. 
Freud too writes about wit and humor. Sometimes the dads are more 
fun and funnier. The moms say that the dad is another kid.
These playful moments should not be minimized in their importance. The 
father, representing the outside world and an alternative to the mother, can 
provide his child with important memories that can help forge their identity. 
Mogel explained how this same theme arose as she asked women about their 
most vivid memories as a child:
One woman recalled that her father was a diver, and when they spent 
time at the beach he would always dive and pick up starfish for her 
to keep. Another father took the kids on a hike one day, and when 
they got to a stream he said, “Boy I am thirsty.” Turns out he had 
hidden some soda bottles under the bank of the river. He shocked 
his children when he reached down and pulled up these drinks out 
of the ground for his kids. Being the playful parent is important.49
Mogel was not interviewing these women about their relationships with their 
fathers. Unprompted, many of them referred to some of their strongest memo-
ries as memories with dad. Moreover, many of these memories were of dad 
doing playful things with them. Dad was having fun.
This is an exciting role for fathers to play as they look for models of 
fatherhood that are accessible to them, beneficial for their children, and not 
stepping on the toes of the mother.
CONCLUSION
Like oil in water, fathers are an important commodity that remains separated 
from its environment. As the rabbis explain, fathers can also be dangerous. 
Sandborn helps us understand the angry father and the man who wears the 
mask. Mogel points out that fathers are not separated always by their choice. 
They have a long, uphill battle to fight. And when they choose to fight it, they 
should do it with a great deal of love and respect for the child’s mother. Finally, 
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fathers bring some unique qualities to a family. They are guardians. They are 
Other and representative of the outside world. And they are playful, bringing 
a sense of fun into the family, creating memories that often last a lifetime for 
the children they help create.
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“Jewish Education Begins at Home”:  
Training Parents to Raise American Jewish 
Children after World War II
Joshua J. Furman
In 1954, the United Synagogue’s Commission on Jewish Education published 
the first installments of Your Child and You, a pamphlet series on child-rearing 
issues facing the American Jewish parent. Azriel Eisenberg, the executive vice 
president of the Jewish Education Committee of New York, contributed 
a volume to the series titled Talks with Parents in which he advised mothers 
and fathers on the importance of Jewish education and the critical role that 
parents play in their children’s development. He explained to his readers that 
“your children become what they are largely because of you, their parents. You 
are the most essential part of their world, for you are the first to create their 
world for them. As parents you give them not only your physical characteris-
tics but also your outlook on life, your manners, your temperament.” Even as 
he encouraged parents to enroll their children in religious schools and summer 
camps, Eisenberg stressed the central role that parents must play as “active 
partners” in their children’s moral and spiritual growth.1
Echoing Eisenberg’s call, numerous child-rearing authorities exhorted 
Jewish parents to take responsibility for their children’s Jewish upbringing 
and to seek appropriate counsel toward this end, since, they argued, the act of 
raising children to identify as Jewish in a predominantly non-Jewish environ-
ment was no easy task. This view, held by many in the post–World War II 
American Jewish community, reflected a widespread sense of anxiety about 
the quality and authenticity of Jewish life in suburban environments. As the 
primary setting of Jewish family life transitioned in the 1940s and 1950s from 
urban immigrant neighborhoods of first and second settlement, rich with 
Jewish institutions and cultural life, to suburban neighborhoods that lacked 
an established Jewish infrastructure, communal leaders worried openly about 
the ability of Jewish parents to transmit Jewishness to their children in these 
new settings. For their part, many parents counted on rabbis and teachers to 
provide their children with Jewish role models.2
Nevertheless, Anna Bear Brevis, another author in the Your Child and 
You series, concurred with Eisenberg’s view that parents could not rely on 
communal institutions alone to mold their children into knowledgeable, 
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committed Jews. In her 1954 pamphlet Jewish Education Begins at Home, Bre-
vis, a public school principal, noted that the vast majority of American Jewish 
children spent only a few hours a week engaged in formal Jewish schooling, 
as compared to thirty hours a week in public school, and they lived in com-
munities largely devoid of Jewish cultural and religious activity. Therefore, she 
claimed, to ensure the successful transmission of Jewish heritage, mothers and 
fathers must give their children a home environment that inculcates a love 
and appreciation for Judaism. To train women toward this goal, Brevis called 
for and later helped create the Institute for Jewish Mothers in her native town 
of Buffalo, New York.3
Six years earlier, writing in the Conservative movement’s publication 
Women’s League Outlook in 1948, parent education specialist Rose Cahan 
argued that parents seeking to transmit a Jewish heritage to their children in 
America must contend with additional challenges beyond those faced by all 
mothers and fathers. “In a dual culture it is not easy to live a Jewish life,” she 
wrote. “The Jewish way of life must be learned; it is not acquired at birth and 
parents have the primary responsibility of helping their children develop posi-
tive Jewish attitudes.”4
Believers in the supreme power of nurture over nature, educators, rabbis, 
and psychologists looked to American Jewish parents to play a leading role 
in shaping the ethnic identity, religious practice, and moral compass of their 
children. Throughout the postwar period, they dispensed child-rearing advice 
to Jewish parents on a number of topics. In journals, magazines, pamphlets, 
sermons, and speeches, these child-rearing mentors urged Jewish parents to 
create the kind of home environment and instill the values that they believed 
would ensure a child’s future happiness, loyalty to the Jewish people, and fit-
ness for citizenship in a democratic, faith-centered United States.
This essay will examine Jewish parenting advice from the post–World 
War II era on topics specific to the needs and interests of Jewish parents, 
including information on how to celebrate Jewish birth rituals and festivals as 
a family and suggestions on how Jewish parents and their children should nav-
igate the December holiday season. This generation of Jewish parents’ interest 
in and need for such child-rearing advice is the result of several factors unique 
to this era. To a significant extent, this child-centered communal agenda 
reflected wider trends in American society at large. The postwar baby boom 
accelerated the pace of suburbanization as growing families sought greener 
pastures on the outskirts of cities in which to raise their children. Following 
fifteen years of economic deprivation and war, many Jews took advantage of 
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new opportunities afforded them by the GI Bill and federal housing loans to 
purchase suburban homes.5 As they took up residence in new neighborhoods 
away from the urban core, Jews and other middle-class Americans created 
greater physical and emotional distance between themselves and their parents. 
In many cases, grandparents no longer lived in the same neighborhood or city 
as their children and grandchildren. In their absence, new parents turned to 
another source of comfort and counsel: the child-rearing expert, whose recom-
mendations stemmed not from Old World traditions or customs but instead 
from scientific research and psychological principles.6
Furthermore, at a time when American public culture embraced the 
notion of a Judeo-Christian heritage as a moral and political weapon in 
the nation’s struggle against communism and the Soviet Union, Jews could 
prove their patriotic bona fides by embracing their religious traditions. Follow-
ing World War II, in which Judaism earned newfound recognition and respect 
as one of America’s three “fighting faiths,” public performances of religiosity 
became a politically useful manner of simultaneously demonstrating faith in 
both God and the United States. In this newly ascendant “tri-faith America,” 
as historian Kevin Schultz has described it, Jews joined synagogues and sent 
their children to Jewish schools in record numbers. They increasingly came to 
understand and define Jewish identity in terms of religion, although this shift 
in conception of Jewishness was not generally accompanied by an increase in 
ritual observance or synagogue attendance. Sociologist Marshall Sklare, ana-
lyzing the rise of the Conservative movement in the suburbs, argued that their 
synagogues functioned primarily as ethnic churches, facilitating opportunities 
around the premise of religion for Jews to meet and be around other Jews.7 
While contemporary observers and later scholars have critiqued the authentic-
ity of this religious turn in American life, this historical context helps explain 
the motivation behind the plethora of books and articles aimed at introducing 
Jewish birth and holiday rituals to parents.8
As much as the recommendations from this cadre of experts drew upon 
insights and practices from the realm of Jewish tradition, external influences 
and historical circumstances also shaped the worldviews of Jewish parenting 
pundits in numerous ways. Their prescriptions for raising the perfect Ameri-
can Jewish child borrowed heavily from the fields of psychology and pediatric 
medicine and responded to the concerns and insecurities of an ethnic com-
munity adjusting to affluence and suburbanization.
While parenting advice books may appear to offer objective, timeless 
recommendations grounded in scientific evidence and empirical observation, 
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the genre in fact reflects contemporary social and political tensions. Child-
rearing advice, as a social and cultural construct, does not remain static over 
time; rather, the literature evolves and adapts in response to the needs and con-
cerns of parents and society at a particular moment in history. Given that the 
task of parenting is intricately linked to the survival of a community and its 
cultural traditions, a critical reading of child-rearing literature reveals the ten-
sions and insecurities at work within that particular social group.9 Analyzing 
American Jewish parenting advice in the post–World War II decades helps us 
understand how American Jews have navigated between adherence to religious 
and cultural traditions and interest in new medical and psychological insights, 
articulated and encouraged particular notions of gender roles in the American 
Jewish family, and responded to changing socioeconomic realities since 1945, 
including suburbanization and embourgeoisement.
Even as American Jews enjoyed a period of unprecedented economic 
and social mobility, long-standing communal fears about antisemitism, accep-
tance, and Jewish continuity intensified and developed in new directions in 
the suburbs. To assuage these anxieties, authors of child-rearing literature 
sought to train parents in the art of raising sons and daughters who would 
embrace a Jewish identity in an American setting. They filled books for moth-
ers and fathers with information about Jewish birth rituals and holidays so 
that parents could observe and preserve these traditions and pass them on to 
their children. They adapted the form and content of mass-market American 
baby books to produce similar volumes for Jewish audiences. They armed 
parents with guidance rooted in both traditional Jewish sources and modern 
psychology, arguing often that these two reservoirs of wisdom flowed together 
harmoniously. They argued that Jewish living was happy living, and that noth-
ing could be so American as to live Jewishly.
USHERING THE CHILD INTO THE WORLD OF JUDAISM: 
RITUAL EDUCATION FOR PARENTS
In 1950, the Women’s League of the United Synagogue of America, a group 
aligned with the centrist Conservative movement, published Sadie Rose Wei-
lerstein’s Our Baby, a scrapbook for parents to commemorate the milestones in 
a newborn’s first years of life. Part record book and part explanatory volume, 
Our Baby included pages on Jewish rituals such as brit milah [circumcision] 
and pidyon ha-ben [redemption of the firstborn] as well as pages on which 
parents could document the place and time of the child’s birth, the dates of 
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various physical development milestones, the baby’s feeding regimen and first 
words, and his or her medical and dental history.
Presented in soft pastel colors, Weilerstein’s book closely resembled other 
keepsake volumes of the era produced for new American parents. Some sug-
gestions to parents on what to record, however, pertained specifically to the 
baby’s earliest encounters with Judaism, such as “First Visit to the Synagogue” 
and “Days for Gladness, Seasons for Joy” pages, which prompted the parent 
to describe the child’s first experiences with each of the Jewish holidays in 
addition to Thanksgiving. On the page titled “A Tree for Baby,” parents could 
attach a certificate in recognition of the planting of a tree in Israel by the Jew-
ish National Fund in the baby’s honor.10
The inclusion of these explicitly Jewish sections, alongside the generic 
sections about the baby’s health and maturation found in similar publications 
for a general audience, signifies an effort on the part of the Conservative move-
ment to encourage American Jewish parents to value their child’s spiritual as 
well as physical growth. With the inclusion of a page for a Jewish National 
Fund certificate, Weilerstein and the United Synagogue also sought to per-
suade parents to instill an attachment to the land of Israel in their children. 
Through this and other forms of Jewish parenting literature, authors and 
speakers endeavored to teach mothers and fathers the knowledge and skills 
they would need to create a vibrant Jewish home environment for themselves 
and their children.
At the same time, the aesthetic and substantive resemblance of Our 
Baby to other books of its kind authored for a broad American audience 
suggests a desire, on the part of both publisher and purchaser, to render 
and receive information about Jewish child rearing in a thoroughly con-
temporary format.11 This choice reflected a broader yearning on the part 
of most American Jews to blend seamlessly into American life and culture 
while simultaneously making some effort to retain Jewish distinctiveness. 
This effort to reconcile modernity and tradition, to strike a balance between 
acculturation and ethnic continuity, lies at the heart of American Jewish 
parenting advice literature.
Alongside Our Baby, a plethora of books and articles on Jewish birth 
rituals appeared beginning in the late 1940s, offering information and advice 
to parents on how to navigate a baby’s induction into Judaism and Jewish 
peoplehood. Authors and producers of this literature operated on two assump-
tions: first, that American Jewish parents in fact desired to welcome their new 
son or daughter according to the principles and practices of Jewish tradition, 
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and second, that they were at least partly, if not entirely, unfamiliar with what 
these traditions entailed. As such, consulting a concise and comforting refer-
ence guide could relieve parents of the guilt or embarrassment of having to ask 
a rabbi or relative for assistance.
Rabbi Reuben M. Katz, in the foreword to Conservative rabbi Hyman 
Chanover’s 1956 book Blessed Event, noted that the arrival of a newborn baby 
is a time of intense mixed emotions, simultaneous excitement and apprehen-
sion. “American-Jewish parents are no different from other parents in shar-
ing these rather universal emotions, the qualms, confusions and moments 
of ecstasy,” he wrote. “And yet American-Jewish couples do have a tradition 
which provides for them a unique and socially desirable way of expressing their 
sense of awe, splendor, and dependence upon God during these sacred and 
memorable moments.”12
Chanover’s slim volume and others like it introduced Jewish parents to 
this array of birth rituals and advised them on the process of choosing a mean-
ingful Hebrew and English name for their newborn child.13 Parents could con-
sult a number of books, including Chanover’s Blessed Event, Nathan Gottlieb’s 
A Jewish Child Is Born (1960), and Shonie Levi and Sylvia Kaplan’s Across the 
Threshold (1959), for a carefully choreographed description of the brit milah 
ceremony for boys and the baby-naming synagogue ceremony for girls, along 
with other rituals such as the pidyon ha-ben. These works commonly included 
an English transliteration of the traditional Hebrew prayers, sometimes writ-
ten entirely in capital letters with hyphens to signal syllable breaks, so that 
nervous fathers could practice their pronunciation of the lines they would be 
called upon to recite in public.14
Chanover also included newly composed English prayers for mother and 
father to recite in anticipation of the birth of their child, entreating God that 
the child should be born “sound in mind and body and with a happy nature,” 
that the mother should be blessed with safety and strength during the delivery, 
and that both parents should “be privileged to raise this child to be a blessing to 
its loved ones, to Israel and all mankind.”15 These inclusions reflect a perception 
on the part of authors and publishers that many American Jewish parents of this 
era lacked fluency in Hebrew and would therefore appreciate, and likely require, 
alternatives and additions to the traditional Hebrew prayers recited at child- 
birth rituals. Furthermore, with the addition of English prayers, producers of 
child-rearing literature once again made an effort to contextualize Jewish birth 
rituals in a comfortable modern format for their target audience of acculturated 
Jewish parents.
“Jewish Education Begins at Home”: Training Parents to Raise American Jewish Children after World War II  181
BRIT MILAH AND THE THOROUGHLY MODERN MOHEL
The circumcision ritual, or brit milah, signifies the entrance of the Jewish 
male into the covenant between God and Abraham described in the book of 
Genesis. Circumcision functions in Judaism as an important marker of both 
ethnic and religious identity.16 Discussions of the circumcision ceremony in 
these guidebooks and related sources, in addition to the step-by-step explana-
tions of the ritual itself, frequently engaged in polemical discourse about the 
crucial religious importance of the act itself and the centrality of the mohel, 
or circumciser, to an authentic and valid execution of the ceremony. Com-
mentators sought to alleviate the concerns of modern parents by presenting 
circumcision as a normal and medically safe procedure that would inaugurate 
the baby boy into Jewish peoplehood without risking his health or his status 
in middle-class American society. At the same time, authors differed accord-
ing to their ideological roots as to how modern Jewish parents should navigate 
potential conflicts between Jewish customs and contemporary concerns.
Nathan Gottlieb, an Orthodox rabbi and mohel himself, devoted two 
separate chapters in his A Jewish Child Is Born to discussions of the ritual’s 
religious meaning and the qualities of the modern mohel. “With circumci-
sion,” he wrote, “the child is made a Jew forever. . . . Through circumcision 
the newly born are dedicated to God, to His Torah, and to the highest moral 
and ethical code.”17
Gottlieb proceeded to explain why circumcision is a practice completely 
in harmony with modern scientific principles but one that only a trained, 
pious mohel could perform. On the one hand, he claimed, “the technique of 
the modern mohel combines spiritual and surgical skill. The expert mohel is a 
specialist who has advanced this procedure to the most modern medical stan-
dards.” Those who perform ritual circumcisions are capable of rendering the 
brit milah a painless procedure, thanks to a familiarity with and use of mod-
ern instruments and techniques. The circumcision ceremony itself reflects an 
intimate divine knowledge of pediatrics, Gottlieb argued, since by the eighth 
day—the day on which the commandment should be performed, according 
to Jewish law—the baby’s blood-clotting factors are more developed and the 
potential health risks are greatly reduced.18
While brit milah thus accords with the latest and best medical practices, 
however, Gottlieb warned his readers that a physician—even a Jewish one—
could not perform a halachic [valid according to Jewish law] circumcision 
unless he was also a religiously observant Jew trained in the laws and practices 
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of this ritual, capable of performing the act accordingly. “Only the physical act 
of an expert mohel inspired by zeal for the Jewish religion renders a brit milah 
proper,” Gottlieb cautioned. “If an ordinary physician not trained as a mohel 
performs circumcision, even if a rabbi is present and reads the prayers, what 
results is not milah, but only an act of surgery.” He reassured parents that even 
Jewish doctors themselves prefer the services of a trained and devoted mohel 
to those of a surgeon.19
Other authorities, seeking to alleviate parental fears that circumcision 
might mark their sons as strange or harm them in some way, sought to remind 
parents that circumcision was a common practice around the world. Rabbi 
Morris Shoulson of Philadelphia, also a mohel, wrote in an essay for a volume 
on the Jewish family that between two hundred million and three hundred 
million people around the world lived in cultures that currently practice 
circumcision and that 92 percent of American males are circumcised. Even 
Prince Charles was circumcised at birth, Shoulson noted, when “the leading 
mohel of London” paid a visit to Buckingham Palace.20
Like Gottlieb, Shoulson also marveled at the harmony between the 
timing of the circumcision ceremony and the human body’s development. 
Emphasizing the health benefits of Jewish ritual as an additional justification 
for its performance, he cited studies claiming that circumcised men carried a 
far lesser risk of developing penile cancer and that their wives would be less 
prone to cervical cancer as a result of never coming into contact with the 
foreskin.21
Several other authors from Conservative and Orthodox backgrounds 
echoed Gottlieb’s insistence upon the indispensability of the mohel to an 
authentic and valid ceremony.22 Authorities aligned with the more liberal 
Reform movement, however, such as Rabbis Levi Olan and Floyd Fierman, 
regularly assured their audiences that if a mohel could not be found or is not 
preferred by the parents, a doctor could perform a ritual circumcision so long 
as a rabbi or the father recited the appropriate Hebrew blessings and the baby’s 
Hebrew name.23 This scenario played out in dramatic form in Covenants with 
the Lord, a booklet of theatrical scripts written by members of the Temple 
Beth-El Sisterhood in Great Neck, New York, and published by the Reform-
affiliated National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods in 1951 for broader use.
A collection of plays about Jewish life-cycle ceremonies from a Reform 
perspective, Covenants with the Lord followed three generations of the fictional 
Cohen and Gold families, marking the passage of time through various ritu-
als. In the first play, a newborn boy is circumcised in the hospital by a doctor 
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despite the objections of one of the boy’s grandfathers, who insists that a 
mohel perform the procedure in the sukkah, as the boy is born during the 
holiday of Sukkot, when traditional Jews eat and sleep outside in temporary 
huts. The grandmothers politely but firmly explain to their husbands that the 
ceremony will be conducted indoors by a doctor, according to the new parents’ 
wishes, so that the baby not catch cold outdoors or risk infection. “Our Jewish 
religion, thank God, is not a rigid one,” the first grandmother explains, while 
the second adds, “True, a mohel today is just as sanitary as a doctor, but if the 
children insist—what could we do? That does not mean that we can’t have a 
mohel or a rabbi to recite the [ritual blessings]. That our grandson starts his life 
as a Jew I took care of.”24 In the play, the grandmothers thus mediate between 
their husbands’ desires to maintain tradition and their children’s desire to con-
form to modern standards of health care and propriety, suggesting a model of 
ritual compromise for Reform Jews.
Whereas discussions of the circumcision ceremony revealed a deep cur-
rent of anxiety about authenticity and ethnic status among the commentators, 
their overviews of the welcoming ceremony for girls, which centered on the 
announcement of the girl’s Hebrew name during synagogue services, were 
much shorter and significantly less fraught. Naming ceremonies for girls in the 
synagogue, like the brit milah ceremony, reinforced traditional gender roles in 
the Jewish family, privileging the father’s public presence as representative of 
the family and relegating the mother to the background.
“In the event your baby is a girl,” Hyman Chanover wrote, “the welcom-
ing rites will be quite simple. They will center about naming her.” His chapter 
titled “If It’s a Girl” described the mechanics of naming ceremonies for girls 
in Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox services. Regardless of the denomi-
national setting, fathers played the public role of relating the baby’s name to 
the rabbi and offering blessings in these ceremonies, while mothers remained 
largely invisible. Only in the Reform ceremony, according to Chanover, were 
mothers granted the opportunity to participate in offering prayers of thanks. 
Even in this case, however, the father retained the honor of announcing the 
child’s Hebrew and English names and, through this and other declarations, 
“publicly accept[ed] the responsibilities of Jewish fatherhood.”25
Across the denominational spectrum, these texts on circumcision empha-
sized the importance of the ritual as a symbol of the covenant between God 
and the Jewish people. Authors also highlighted the consonance between 
Jewish practice and scientific principles as a means of convincing wary Jew-
ish parents of circumcision’s many benefits and of framing brit milah as both 
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an ancient religious tradition and a prudent medical intervention.26 Whereas 
authorities from Conservative and Orthodox backgrounds emphasized the 
wisdom inherent in Jewish tradition insofar as it echoed and reinforced sci-
entific findings, those writing from a Reform perspective praised Judaism’s 
pragmatic flexibility and adaptability in response to situational considerations.
CHOOSING A NAME
The act of choosing English and Hebrew names for an American Jewish baby 
provided another opportunity for parents, and those offering advice to them, 
to weigh contemporary American tastes alongside Jewish practices. At the 
conclusion of the brit milah ceremony for boys, or in a separate synagogue 
ceremony for girls, most American Jewish parents bestow upon the baby a 
Hebrew name, important for use in Jewish ritual, in addition to an English 
name. According to Ashkenazi Jewish practice [roughly speaking, Jews origi-
nally from Central and Eastern Europe], the custom is to give a newborn the 
name of a deceased relative, thereby carrying on that relative’s memory and 
expressing a desire that the baby inherit the qualities and character traits of 
his or her namesake. Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews, who trace their ancestry to 
the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, North Africa, and the Middle East, name children 
after living relatives, usually grandparents, for similar reasons.27
Accordingly, the practice of naming a Jewish child is tightly connected 
to the transmission of ethnic and cultural identity as well as expressions of 
acculturation. In a 1955 article in Commentary magazine, Rabbi Benzion 
Kaganoff declared that “[f ]or Jews, first names are inevitably something more 
than convenient labels for identification. . . . Among us they take on a highly 
charged symbolic value.”28 Kaganoff and others writing on the subject of Jew-
ish names suggested that a given name served multiple potential functions: a 
marker of either assimilation or fealty to Jewish tradition, an indication of the 
personal qualities that parents hoped their children would develop, and an 
opportunity to link past and future generations of Jews by virtue of carrying 
on the memory of a beloved family member.29
Rabbi Alfred Kolatch’s 1948 These Are the Names, one of only a few books 
published on the subject of Jewish names before the 1970s, explored the his-
tory of Jewish naming practices from biblical times, weighed the merits and 
demerits of various approaches to selecting a Hebrew name for a newborn, 
and provided statistics on the most popular English and Hebrew names for chil-
dren in addition to listing masculine and feminine names.30 Kolatch and other 
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authors encouraged Jewish parents to select English biblical names for their 
children, as opposed to those derived from French, German, and other sources. 
Simon Chasen, a Hebrew-language instructor at Weequahic High School and 
Rutgers University in New Jersey, noted in 1954 in the Conservative publica-
tion Women’s League Outlook that many a great American political and literary 
figure dating back to colonial times carried a biblical name.31 Therefore, Chasen 
argued, “if the American Jew really believes in his rightful place on the American 
scene, in his inalienable rights as an American, he will not fear to bear proudly 
names like Amiel, Boaz, Caleb . . . and others.”32
Shonie Levi and Sylvia Kaplan echoed this view in their 1959 book for 
Jewish homemakers. Discouraging parents from selecting “so-called modern 
‘equivalents,’ such as Stanley for Samuel, or Rhoda for Rebecca,” the authors 
cheered the “revival today of the strong, colorful biblical names that are part 
of America’s Puritan tradition.”33 That same year, in his landmark study Jews in 
Suburbia, Rabbi Albert Gordon noted with pleasure that the current genera-
tion of American Jewish parents was selecting such Old Testament names for 
their children with increasing frequency.34
While Gordon interpreted this development as a sign of growing eth-
nic pride among American Jews, Levi and Kaplan promoted the adoption 
of biblical names by arguing that traditional Jewish names were intrinsically 
American in both form and spirit. Returning to a theme prevalent in American 
Jewish thought since at least the nineteenth century, the notion that Jewish 
values from the Bible served as the inspiration for the American democratic 
system, these authors extended the argument to encompass the choice of a 
name. If names of Hebrew origin suited quintessential American figures such 
as Abraham Lincoln and Abigail Adams, they and others suggested, then par-
ents should not fear that the choice of such a name will subject their child to 
discrimination.35 This argument, linking adherence to Judaism with Ameri-
can patriotism, carried additional weight in a Cold War era characterized 
by increasing national acceptance of Judaism as an authentic American faith 
alongside Protestantism and Catholicism.36
HOLIDAYS FOR THE HOME
In addition to informing Jewish parents about birth rituals, rabbis and other 
authors of child-rearing advice also engaged in a concerted effort to educate 
their audience about how to celebrate Jewish holidays at home as a family. 
In May 1950, the Synagogue Council of America, which united all the main 
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denominations of American Judaism, joined with Catholic and Protestant 
organizations to sponsor National Family Week, an initiative to promote 
family cohesiveness through religious education and worship. In a pamphlet 
announcing the program, the council endeavored to convince American Jews 
that religion was the best antidote for the fear and isolation brought on by 
social and economic dislocation and the ever-present threat of nuclear war.
Returning to a familiar postwar theme, the Synagogue Council of Amer-
ica and other communal leaders advocated the adoption of Jewish rituals in 
the home, as much for their own sake as for the psychological and emotional 
benefits that the family would reap as a result. If the Jewish family could 
be convinced to weave ritual observances into the fabric of their lives, the 
authors believed, children and parents would develop happiness, camaraderie, 
and emotional security; the family would rescue itself from disintegration and 
despair; and Jewish continuity would be ensured.37
Dr. Evelyn Garfiel, a psychologist and the national education chairman 
for the Conservative National Women’s League of the United Synagogue of 
America, seconded these arguments in a 1953 article titled “The Sabbath and 
Jewish Family Living” published in the organization’s magazine. As Garfiel 
explained to her readers, human beings need to acquire a sense of belonging to 
a group larger than themselves, and no group is more important in this respect 
than the family. Accordingly, Garfiel urged her readers to take advantage of 
the opportunities afforded by the Friday night Sabbath table rituals to culti-
vate familial fellowship. The act of joining together on a weekly basis to eat 
together, worship God, and bless one’s children, she suggested, can instill “an 
intense feeling of being part of a self-sufficient group” upon the entire family.38
To help parents achieve this goal, rabbis and educators produced a wealth 
of how-to literature on Jewish holiday celebrations for parents in response to 
what they perceived as widespread unfamiliarity with these traditions among 
this particular generation of adults.39 As with those rituals surrounding birth, 
authors of these holiday handbooks acknowledged that parents today “often 
find themselves unable to introduce the various home ceremonials and cus-
toms that are associated with our Festivals and Holy Days because they have 
long since forgotten the historic reasons for the observances, or because they 
never knew them.”40
In light of this knowledge gap, many such guides aimed at multigenera-
tional education, teaching parents so they could in turn teach and celebrate 
with their children. Rabbi Albert Gordon’s 1947 How to Celebrate Hanukah at 
Home, along with companion volumes on the festivals of Passover and Purim, 
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included an explanation of each holiday’s origins, a program of Hebrew prayers 
and English readings, recipes for special dishes associated with each holiday, and 
a list of supplementary books and recordings. For children, Gordon included 
activities to entice their participation in the family ritual, such as a “Passover 
scavenger hunt,” Passover-themed charades, songs, and poems.41 Similarly, 
Rabbi Simon Glustrom’s 1956 volume When Your Child Asks devoted a chap-
ter to explaining how and why each Jewish holiday is celebrated. The author 
offered detailed answers for parents on questions their children might be 
tempted to ask about such topics as why Hanukkah is celebrated for eight days 
or why Jews eat only unleavened bread during Passover.42
Rabbis, psychologists, and educators counseled Jewish parents to observe 
holiday rituals and customs, both old and new, as a means of creating happy 
memories and giving children and adults a sense of belonging to both the Jew-
ish community and American society at large. In the words of psychologist 
Kurt Lewin, such positive affirmations of Jewishness constituted “one of the 
few effective things that Jewish parents can do for the later happiness of their 
children.” Possessed with a firm feeling of “group belongingness,” Lewin and 
others believed, the Jewish child would be better prepared to cope with discrim-
ination and the pressures of modern life. Domestic religious celebrations also 
offered American Jews an important opportunity to demonstrate their affinity 
for the shared values and beliefs at the core of Cold War American culture.43
DISSECTING THE “DECEMBER DILEMMA”
If postwar commentators viewed Jewish holidays as an invaluable opportunity 
to inculcate children and families with pride and security as Jews, then it is 
no surprise that they felt an urgent need to address the “December dilemma,” 
the question of whether and to what extent Jewish parents should permit their 
children to participate in Christmas celebrations. In a new age of increased 
interfaith cooperation, in which public displays of religiosity carried signifi-
cant political weight, and an era of increased sensitivity to children’s mental 
and emotional states, the issue of Jewish engagement with Christmas took on 
new dimensions.44 Seeking a balance between fostering goodwill with Chris-
tians and encouraging an intensification of Jewish family holiday observance, 
most rabbis delineated between public and private Christmas celebrations 
in recommending to parents what their children should and should not be 
allowed to do. In the process, they turned to religious, psychological, and 
social considerations in weighing how American Jewish parents should act.
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Abraham Karp, a Conservative rabbi and author of the 1958 pamphlet 
Our December Dilemma, urged readers to resist the urge and social pressure 
to put up a Christmas tree in their home or to have their children participate 
in Christmas pageants and school celebrations. Karp’s objection was rooted in 
both psychological and religious grounds. Such activities, he warned, could 
engender feelings of inferiority in the Jewish child, especially one who has not 
been raised to appreciate his or her Jewishness and the beauty of Hanukkah 
and other Jewish traditions. Moreover, Karp argued, when Jews decorate a 
Christmas tree or sing carols, they misappropriate Christian religious tradi-
tions in a manner disrespectful to believing Christians.45
Morris Landes, an Orthodox rabbi from Pittsburgh, put forward similar 
pleas to Jewish parents in a 1949 newspaper editorial in which he implored 
them to shun Christmas celebrations to protect their children’s mental health 
and insisted that Christmas was a Christian holiday. The Jewish child who 
yearns to decorate a Christmas tree and receive a stocking full of gifts wants 
most of all to feel a part of something greater than himself, he argued. 
“To give him the tree without all the religious trimmings around it is to give 
him the shadow without the substance and to do irreparable harm to him 
psychologically,” Landes wrote. “To give him both Christmas and Chanukah 
is to add confusion to psychic injury and to pave the way for maladjustments 
later in life.”46
Like Karp, Landes turned to psychology to justify to Jewish parents why 
they must not celebrate Christmas with their children. He implored his adult 
readers to satisfy their children’s emotional needs (and, implicitly, their own) 
through Judaism: “The child craves religion. Let him find it in Judaism. The 
child seeks status, the feeling that he belongs to something. Let him belong to 
the Jewish people.” This notion of attachment could not be cultivated only in 
December, Landes argued, but is the result of regular engagement with Jewish 
holidays throughout the year—decorating a sukkah, or outdoor hut, in the fall; 
listening to the Exodus story at a Passover seder in the spring; and lighting the 
Hanukkah candles in the winter.47
The desirability of interfaith relationships also played a role as rabbis 
considered what Jewish parents and their children should and should not do 
at Christmastime. “It is the genius and greatness of America that differing 
religious groups live together in peace, harmony, and mutual respect,” Karp 
wrote, appealing to a notion of American exceptionalism grounded in theo-
logical tolerance.48 In this spirit, he and other rabbis did countenance certain 
interfaith activities at Christmastime, such as participating in a gift exchange 
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or attending a holiday party, especially when done in a conscious spirit of 
goodwill between friends and neighbors of different religions. However, he 
cautioned, while this atmosphere of tolerance allows Jews to join with mem-
bers of other faiths to mark national occasions, such as Independence Day and 
Thanksgiving, the same set of principles grant Jews the right to celebrate their 
own holidays as well.49
Given the strong pull of Christmas traditions for children, authors 
encouraged Jewish parents to give their children Hanukkah celebrations that 
matched the sensual and material festivity of the gentile holiday. Rose Gold-
stein, writing in Women’s League Outlook in 1951, advised mothers to bring 
“bright lights and starry ornaments” into their home celebrations, with the use 
of electric menorahs to “satisfy the urge to illumine the blackness of winter 
nights.” Goldstein described the process by which she converted a string of 
Christmas tree lights into a decorative assortment of paper flowers, lights, and 
six-pointed Stars of David, suitable for Hanukkah display. She also recom-
mended that families exchange gifts for the duration of the holiday, which 
would add to the joy and excitement of the children, and that menorah-
themed centerpieces and salads in the shape of the menorah be placed on the 
dinner table.50
She and others urged Jewish parents to elevate their family Hanukkah 
celebrations so as to mitigate the very temptation to participate in Christ-
mas celebrations. Rabbi Albert Gordon explicitly reminded parents to “be 
mindful of the fact that your non-Jewish neighbors take time and pains to 
make Christmas an occasion of gladness. Unless you take equal pains with 
the Hanukah party,” he warned, “you cannot hope to make the Festival a 
thrilling experience.”51 To address the religious and psychological issues at 
stake for Jewish children at Christmastime, Gordon and Goldstein called 
on American Jewish parents to invigorate their family Hanukkah celebra-
tions with the introduction of festive decorations, games, food, and gift 
giving. Remaking the holiday in the image of the American Christmas, they 
reasoned, was the ultimate solution to the “December dilemma.”52
CONCLUSION
On May 10, 1961, at the Park Schenley Restaurant in Pittsburgh, Lillian 
Friedberg addressed a local chapter meeting of Hadassah, a Zionist women’s 
organization. Friedberg, the executive director of Pittsburgh’s Jewish Com-
munity Relations Council, chose as her topic for the evening “Preparing Our 
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Children for Living in Today’s World.” Living in a predominantly Christian 
society, Friedberg declared, Jewish children needed a warm and comforting 
family environment, a strong education, and a solid foundation in the values 
of their religion, which she identified as democracy and human rights. Both 
the psychologists of today and the Jewish sages of old agree, she asserted, that 
the child raised in this manner is “fortified by his spiritual heritage . . . [and] 
strengthened by self-acceptance” and “embarked on a normal move toward a 
mature, useful and happy life.”53
Friedberg’s prescription for raising “a good American and a good Jew— 
a complete person”—exemplifies the central themes and arguments of post-
war American Jewish parenting advice.54 Friedberg and others offering child-
rearing recommendations to American Jews relied heavily on psychological 
revelations about child development and mental health, a rhetorical strategy 
that framed the goal of Jewish continuity in appealingly secular and scien-
tific terms. Authors of child-rearing literature also co-opted the ideological 
language of Cold War–era civic religion to convince Jewish parents that as 
good Jews and good Americans, they should choose biblical names for their 
children, celebrate religious holidays as a family, and take measured steps 
toward interfaith goodwill efforts at Christmastime. In an era when religious 
faith versus godlessness defined the gap between good and evil and between 
emotional security and spiritual despair, American Jewish parenting advis-
ers urged mothers and fathers to make religious observance a hallmark of 
their family life. In sum, they offered American Jewish parents what many 
of them wanted: a means for bestowing their children with some measure of 
attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people in a manner that would not 
prevent their full entry and acceptance into mainstream American life.
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Modern Families: Multifaceted Identities 
in the Jewish Adoptive Family
Jennifer Sartori
When the ABC sitcom Modern Family debuted in 2009, it was an instant hit. 
The show’s funny but sympathetic portrayal of the diversity—in both struc-
ture and composition—that characterizes “modern families” clearly struck a 
chord with the American public. Among the branches of the extended family 
at the heart of the show are two multiracial families, a blended family, a gay 
family, and only one “traditional” nuclear family. Today’s families, the show 
suggests, come in many colors, shapes, and sizes, mixing races, ethnicities, 
nationalities, ages, and sexualities, yet they are all still fundamentally families.
What would a Jewish “modern family” look like? As in the familiar joke 
about the Jewish community, like its non-Jewish counterpart, only more so. 
American Jewish families, like the Pritchett clan, are becoming increasingly 
variegated. Although communal discussions of the changes in the Jewish fam-
ily often focus on the “problem” of intermarriage, American Jewish families are 
becoming increasingly “multi” in other ways as well: multiracial, multicultural, 
multiethnic, multinational. Identity for these families can be a complex and 
dynamic dance, bringing together influences that may be complementary or 
contradictory, that may blend seamlessly or be difficult to reconcile.
Adoptive families have been at the forefront of these trends. Because very 
few children adopted into the American Jewish community in recent decades 
were born to Jewish birth parents, the vast majority of adoptees—whether 
adopted transnationally and/or transracially or from white American parents 
of non-Jewish background—inherently bring with them identities that differ 
from those of their new parents. How do Jewish adoptive families respond to 
the issues that arise from these complexities? In particular, how do adoptees 
raised in Jewish families navigate the complicated waters of identity in relation 
to both their adoptive and their birth heritages? How do these two facets of 
their identities interact?
To learn more about this growing population, my colleague Jayne 
Guberman and I are engaged in a multipronged research study, the Adoption 
& Jewish Identity Project.
We began by conducting an in-depth online survey of Jewish adoptive 
parents to which close to 1,000 people responded, yielding 781 usable surveys. 
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Because the survey was conducted online and spread virally, the results are 
not necessarily representative of all Jewish adoptive parents. In particular, the 
respondents were younger than average, yielding more accurate information 
about more recent trends in adoption; whiter than average; and may be more 
strongly identified Jewishly than the norm.1 However, the sample in many 
ways resembles the broader American Jewish population, and we believe that 
the data can yield valuable information regarding Jewish adoptive families.2 
We are also conducting an ongoing effort to gather the voices of young adult 
adoptees raised in Jewish families through a questionnaire, oral histories, and 
other submissions. This essay is drawn largely from these two sources.
Our research has created a portrait of the dramatic changes in Jewish 
adoptive families that have occurred over the past several decades, particularly 
the striking increase in the number of adoptions across racial, national, and 
religious lines. The majority of Jewish adoptees, we have found, regularly find 
themselves navigating multiple identities. Although for some one aspect of 
their identity is clearly primary and others more actively juggle the various 
elements, virtually all find that different aspects of their sense of self come 
to the fore in different contexts. This multifaceted sense of self is continually 
evolving, moreover, with identities developing long past the classic adolescent 
identity crisis.
MAJOR TRENDS IN ADOPTION
In order to comprehend the contemporary Jewish adoptive experience, it 
is necessary first to understand the major trends in adoption over the past 
several decades. Adoption today exists in significant contrast to fifty years 
ago, in both the profile of children being adopted and ideas about adoption, 
adoptive identity, and adoptive parenting.3 For much of the mid-twentieth 
century, the reigning paradigm in adoption was “matching”: matching chil-
dren with prospective adoptive parents so as to create families that would 
seem to be biological or “natural.”4 Adoption experts believed strongly that 
adoptive families would be more “authentic,” and thus more successful, if they 
resembled biological ones. Attempts were made to match in a wide variety of 
ways, not only by race and appearance but also by less visible criteria, such as 
personality, intellectual ability, and religion. Indeed, religion was one of the 
most deep-seated elements of matching, enshrined in law more often than 
any other aspect.5 During this period, most formal adoptions were of white 
newborns adopted by white, middle-class, heterosexual couples; children of 
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color and older children were often seen as “unadoptable” and shut out of the 
system, while parents of color, working-class families, and single parents, seen 
as unsuitable, could not meet agencies’ strict criteria for adoptive parents.
The matching paradigm and the assumptions that underlay it fostered a 
culture of secrecy, stigma, and shame in adoption. If “matching” was success-
ful, adoptive families could “pass” as biological families. That very effort to 
“pass,” however, implied that adoptive families were inferior and that adoption 
was something to be ashamed of and to be shrouded in secrecy, both within 
the family and in the community. All members of the adoption triad (adoptive 
parents, adoptees, and birth parents) were encouraged to act essentially as if 
adoption had never happened. Adoptive parents were counseled to raise their 
children as if they had been born to them, and ties between children and their 
birth families and birth heritages were generally cut completely.6
By the end of the twentieth century, this paradigm had largely broken 
apart. The easy availability of birth control, the legalization of abortion with 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, and the growing acceptance of single motherhood 
caused the number of healthy white American newborns available for adop-
tion to plummet, while demand from prospective adoptive parents continued 
to increase. In response, the definition of “adoptable children” expanded to 
include children from other countries, children of color, children with special 
needs, and older children in foster care.
Transnational adoption, begun as a humanitarian effort in the aftermath 
of World War II, emerged in earnest during the Korean War. The most promi-
nent sending countries have varied over time but are generally poorer nations, 
mostly nonwhite, and often experiencing economic or political dislocation 
or natural disasters. Transnational adoption reached its peak in 2004, when 
22,884 children were adopted into the United States; since then, the number 
has declined precipitously, to 5,647 in 2015.7
From the beginning, many transnational adoptions were also transracial. 
Domestic transracial adoption emerged later, beginning slowly in the 1960s 
and alternately expanding and contracting, shaped by changing racial atti-
tudes, legal developments, and the evolution of ideas about what makes a good 
adoptive family.8 In 1996, with the goal of increasing the number of adoptions 
from foster care by encouraging transracial adoption, the Interethnic Place-
ment Provisions of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA-IEP) prohibited 
agencies receiving federal funds from taking race into account in foster and 
adoptive placements.9 Today, approximately 40 percent of American adop-
tions are transracial, including the vast majority of international adoptions 
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and smaller but still substantial percentages of foster care and domestic infant 
adoptions.10 The number of public adoptions from foster care—very often of 
older children, many of whom are children of color—also increased consid-
erably, as policies shifted from encouraging reunification with birth families 
toward promoting adoption as a route to permanency.11
Accompanying these transformations have been sea changes in ideas 
about adoption and in understanding of adoptive identity. Three interrelated 
trends stand out: (1) an increasing openness both about and within adoption; 
(2) a growing recognition of the role of grief and loss, both personal and cul-
tural, in adoption; and (3) an encouragement of active engagement with birth 
heritages and communities.
The secrecy that used to characterize adoption has been on the wane for 
several decades. Not only is secrecy generally impossible to maintain in cases 
of transracial and older child adoption, but the assault by a variety of nontra-
ditional families on the idea of the inherent superiority of the traditional two-
parent, heterosexual, biological nuclear family has also lessened the incentive 
to “pass” as a biological family. Adoptive parents are now encouraged to talk 
openly and regularly about adoption with their children from a young age 
and are far less likely to hide the fact of their adoptions from their children and 
their communities. Adoptees themselves have pushed, with varying levels of 
success, for access to their original birth certificates, the sealing of which often 
kept their backgrounds and origin shrouded in secrecy.12
Greater openness within adoption has paralleled greater openness about 
adoption. In private domestic adoptions, the vast majority of expectant parents 
now select their child’s adoptive parents, and some level of contact between 
birth and adoptive families is increasingly the norm, ranging from occasional 
mediated contact (for example, a yearly exchange of letters and photos through 
the adoption agency) to regular direct contact (for example, phone calls, Skype 
chats, and in-person visits). Adoption experts now believe that such contact, 
when circumstances allow, is healthier for all members of the adoption triad.13
Adoption has also shifted from being seeing as a win-win situation for all 
concerned (in which a needy child receives a comfortable home, adoptive par-
ents—often assumed to be infertile—receive a child, and a pregnant woman 
resolves a crisis and moves on with her life) to one that, while often filled with 
joy and love, is also characterized by loss and grief. While adoptees indeed gain 
new families, they also lose birth parents, extended family and community, 
cultural heritage, access to medical history, and often their place in the racial 
and/or ethnic group of their birth.14 Adoption experts now argue that grieving 
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such losses is natural and that recognition of them can be a healthier response 
than repressing them.
Connected to both of these trends has been a shift in emphasis toward 
the importance of knowledge of personal roots, whether biological, ethnic, 
or historical. The previous attitude that an adoptee who craved information 
about or contact with his or her birth family and heritage was maladjusted has 
largely given way to a sense that such a need is natural and deeply ingrained 
in humans.15 In contrast to previous generations of adoptive parents, who 
were often counseled to raise their children as if they had been born to them, 
“best practices” in adoption now encourage parents to foster connections to 
their children’s heritages and communities of origin. Such recommendations 
are often aimed especially at those who have adopted transracially and/or 
transnationally, as cultural competency and relationships with individuals of 
the child’s race are seen as crucial to healthy racial and ethnic identity forma-
tion.16 These developments have brought questions of multiple and blended 
identities (which previously often simmered under the surface) to the fore for 
many adoptive families.
MAJOR TRENDS IN JEWISH ADOPTION
How do Jews fit into these trends? Overall, American Jews appear to adopt at 
approximately twice the rate of non-Jews. In 2000, about 5 percent of Jewish 
households with children had an adopted child in the home, compared to 
2.5 percent of American households overall; with that 5 percent having risen 
from only 3 percent in 1990, the percentage may well be even higher today.17
Not only have the numbers of Jewish adoptive families risen, but the char-
acteristics of those families have also changed substantially. Perhaps the most 
striking demographic finding of our parent survey is the pronounced increase 
in adoptions across boundaries of identity, far greater than the already consid-
erable increase in such adoptions among the American population as a whole. 
Survey respondents had adopted from the 1950s through the 2000s, allowing us 
to track change over time. In keeping with the “matching” paradigm, from the 
1950s through the 1970s white Jewish families generally adopted white Ameri-
can newborns. All the children adopted in the 1950s and 1960s and 74 percent 
of those adopted in the 1970s were white; 94 percent of children adopted dur-
ing these three decades were adopted domestically (65 percent through private 
adoptions, 29 percent through the public foster care system). These white 
American newborns, moreover, not infrequently had at least one Jewish birth 
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parent: of children adopted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 36 percent had a 
Jewish birth mother, and 15 percent had a Jewish birth father.18
By the early twenty-first century, the numbers had changed dra-
matically.19 Only a tiny percentage of adoptees were born to Jewish parents 
(4 percent had a Jewish birth mother, 3 percent had a Jewish birth father), 
and the numbers of transracial and transnational adoptions had skyrock-
eted. A full 66 percent of respondents who adopted between 2000 and 2009 
did so transnationally; by striking contrast, only approximately 15 percent 
of American adoptions overall in the same period were transnational.20 
Similarly, the percentage of nonwhite children adopted into Jewish families 
increased steadily each decade, to 65 percent in the decade 2000–2009 and a 
full 76 percent between 2010 and 2012.21 Of the children adopted by survey 
respondents between 2000 and 2012, 34 percent were white, 32 percent were 
Asian or Asian-mixed, 17 percent were Latino or Latino-mixed, and 15 percent 
were black or black-mixed.22
IDENTITY FOR JEWISH ADOPTEES
American Jewish adoptive families, then, increasingly cross lines of race, cul-
ture, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. How, if at all, does Jewish identity 
make the experiences of these adoptees distinct from those of adoptees raised 
in non-Jewish families? How do their racial and/or ethnic identities and their 
affiliation with or knowledge of their communities and cultures of origin 
impact their Jewish identities? In short, how do these adoptees negotiate the 
often complex relationships between their birth and adoptive heritages?
Although these issues of identity are by no means absent for domestic 
same-race adoptees, they are generally most overt for transracial and/or trans-
national adoptees and their families. The complexities begin in childhood, 
when parents play a key role in shaping their children’s experiences of adoption 
and must make important decisions about their Jewish upbringing and birth 
heritage socialization. Our survey indicates that the vast majority of Jewish 
parents who adopt transracially and/or transnationally have taken adoption 
professionals’ advice to heart and believe that it is important to include ele-
ments of their children’s birth heritages in their lives.23 Indeed, given a list of 
fifteen possible birth heritage socialization practices, most who adopted in 
recent decades reported doing so in multiple ways, ranging from reading books 
to eating in ethnic restaurants to studying languages and developing relation-
ships with people from the child’s community of origin.24
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Parents, however, do not exist in a vacuum. Asked about the responses 
of members of their immediate Jewish communities to their efforts to foster 
identification with their children’s birth heritages and communities of origin, 
the majority of survey respondents reported positive or neutral reactions. Yet a 
substantial minority described disapproving or hostile responses from rabbis, 
synagogue communities, or their own families, and even those who described 
positive reactions sometimes hinted at considerable communal ambivalence. 
These childhood experiences may have a significant influence on adoptees’ 
later sense of identity.
Much of the pushback described by parents appears to stem from familial 
and communal concerns that exposure to a child’s culture of origin will foster 
an identification that will compete with or confuse the child’s Jewish identity. 
Several parents commented specifically that their rabbis and communities 
communicated the distinct message that Jewish education should be primary, 
to the exclusion of any instruction related to their birth heritage. As one survey 
respondent reported, “[Our] rabbi, who is otherwise welcoming to my chil-
dren, has discouraged pursuit of Chinese learning, as he would rather see them 
identify primarily as Jews. I don’t see why they can’t pursue both.” “The Jewish 
community is very supportive . . . but somewhat from a distance,” remarked 
another. “They still project . . . that Jewish education takes precedence over 
other choices (i.e., Hebrew over Vietnamese), which is a difficult choice, and 
VERY hard to do both!!”
More commonly, parents remarked not on a specific incident or episode 
but rather on a more general sense of communal disapproval of or ambivalence 
about their efforts to bring their children’s birth heritages into their lives, or sim-
ply on a lack of awareness. “I get the feeling that others don’t see birth heritage as 
being as important as Jewish heritage. Born of ignorance, I think,” wrote one 
respondent. Some of the many additional comments were “They are wary”; 
“They are clueless”; “They seem . . . puzzled and mildly interested” [ellipses 
in original]; “Not a positive response in this particular suburban community”; 
“They do not seem to think of it as their issue”; “They’re interested but often 
at arms’ length, especially if they are uncomfortable with other cultures”; “With 
interest but not necessarily enthusiasm or approval”; and “Very poorly. It’s either 
Ashkenazi or the highway. I’ve had to leave my synagogue because of it.” Some 
parents remarked on family concerns about “identity confusion” or “conflicted 
identities,” or grandparents wanting the children to be exposed as little as possi-
ble to their birth heritages.25 “Some family members think it is a waste of time,” 
wrote one parent, “since she is a Jewish kid being raised in a Jewish home.”
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Two comments in particular—both from parents who in fact described 
their communities as supportive—highlight the ambivalence that often char-
acterizes the Jewish community’s attitudes toward incorporation of another 
aspect of a child’s identity. One woman with two adopted children of color 
wrote that “I tried to incorporate all I could from my children’s birth heri-
tage as long as it did not contradict Judaism. It is well accepted.” In a similar 
vein, a woman who had adopted from China wrote that her community had 
responded “positively—everyone loved the Chinese vegan food at the bat 
mitzvah.” These parents had clearly tried their best to incorporate their chil-
dren’s birth heritages into their lives in ways that felt fully compatible with 
their families’ Jewish identity, and their communities had embraced their 
efforts. Their comments indicate, however, that adoptive families may find 
that such efforts are accepted only up to a certain point—as long as they do 
not explicitly “contradict” Judaism by, for example, including nonvegan (pre-
sumably treif, or nonkosher) Chinese food.
For some adoptees and their families, such limitations may be unprob-
lematic. Others, however, craving connection with their birth heritage as well 
as their adoptive heritage, may find vegan Chinese food a superficial basis for 
a strong Chinese identity and may chafe under the sense that other elements 
of their birth heritage would be seen as unwelcome. When attachment to 
birth heritage goes beyond vegan Chinese food, whether simply to eating more 
authentic Chinese food or to wishing to explore the Catholic background of 
an adoptee from Latin America, for example, communal responses are likely 
to be far less enthusiastic.
Given Jewish communal concerns about continuity, such hesitation 
about alternative forms of identity is perhaps not surprising. Worried about 
the future of American Jewry, communal leaders—and adoptive parents them-
selves—may emphasize the importance of a strong and exclusive Jewish iden-
tity in the belief that it is most likely to strengthen American Jewry in the long 
run. Such concerns may lead some adoptive parents to shy away from serious 
engagement with birth heritage or community. Although the survey data can-
not prove causality, many of the most common birth heritage socialization 
practices reported by parents were relatively low-commitment activities of the 
type less likely to foster deep attachment to a form of identity potentially “com-
peting with” Jewishness, such as reading books (cited by 78 percent of parents 
of children of color and 73 percent of parents of children born abroad), buying 
arts and crafts (72 percent and 75 percent), and eating in ethnic restaurants 
(68 percent and 70 percent). Significantly fewer parents reported many of the 
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higher-commitment activities that would have a higher likelihood of cultivating 
strong birth heritage identification, such as attending culture camps or classes 
(cited by 30 percent of parents of children of color and 31 percent of parents 
of children born abroad), studying languages (cited by 38 percent of parents of 
children born abroad), and visiting the child’s birth country (cited by 31 percent 
of parents of children born abroad).26
Regardless of their own and their families’ relationships to their birth 
heritage, transracially adopted children not infrequently experience consider-
able questioning of their Jewish identity. Like all Jews of color, Jewish adoptees 
of color are profoundly impacted by the deep-seated presumption—common 
to American Jews and non-Jews alike—that Jews are white. This presump-
tion can be traced not simply to the East European origin of the majority of 
American Jews but also to the pervasive “whitening” of American Jews noted 
by so many scholars, a process that eventually placed Jews securely on the 
white side of the black-white binary historically characteristic of American race 
relations.27 Because of the now widespread assumption that Jewish = white 
and despite the well-documented racial and ethnic diversity within the Jew-
ish community, Jews of color very often find the authenticity of their Jewish 
identities questioned by both Jews and non-Jews, and children of color with 
white parents are by no means immune. When this questioning comes from 
within their own communities, it can be especially devastating. The following 
are a few of the countless examples that emerge from our research:
•  A young woman adopted from China writes that “When I was eight 
years old, a fellow Hebrew school student asked if it was even legal 
to be Asian and Jewish. This hurt deeply, though he meant no harm. 
Eventually, I dropped out of Hebrew school for a number of years.”28
•  A Korean adoptee writes about a childhood experience in her own 
temple, where her family attended services regularly: “There was 
a family in front of us—a mom, dad, and three daughters. . . . 
The three girls kept turning around and staring at us. They would 
whisper to each other and kept talking about the ‘Asians.’ It definitely 
hurt my feelings . . . even more so because I felt like this was ‘my 
temple’ and I belonged here, and if anyone didn’t belong there, it was 
those girls and that family.”29
•  A white mother of a multiracial son comments that “The sentiment, 
‘If you’re Black, you can’t be Jewish,’ came up several times, includ-
ing at [Jewish camp] and at Sunday School. Our son was treated, at 
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times, as an exotic animal, when he desperately wanted to be one of 
the kids. He went from being proud of being Jewish to distancing 
himself from it.”30
While such questioning of their Jewish identity can itself be harmful to a 
child’s emerging sense of self, even more pernicious is the outright racism 
and discrimination that many experience within their Jewish communities. 
One young adult Korean adoptee wrote poignantly about her experience with 
racism as a child: “Most of the racism I have experienced was from within 
the Jewish community. My mom pulled me from Jewish pre-school before the 
second day was over, because the other kids refused to play with me. At JCC 
camp, other campers would make snide comments about me being a karate 
or kung-fu master, I never fit in at Hebrew school, and was an outcast in my 
class for most of my middle and high school years.”31
In our parent survey, we asked parents of children of color if their chil-
dren had experienced discrimination in the Jewish community. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the responses differed by race: parents of black children were 
by far the most likely to say yes (28 percent), followed by parents of Latino 
children (15 percent) and of Asian children (11 percent). Given that research 
shows that transracially adopted children very often do not tell their parents 
about the discrimination they experience, the real rates of discrimination are 
likely considerably higher. And even without any explicit encounters with 
racism, many adoptees of color report having felt different, exoticized, mar-
ginalized, and even outcast within their largely white synagogues, day schools, 
Jewish camps, and other institutions, at a stage of life when children want 
nothing more than to feel like everyone else.32
Despite these sometimes ambivalent responses from families and com-
munities, many of the transracially adopted young adults we have interviewed 
recall their Jewish identity as having been relatively uncomplicated as children. 
Like many transracial adoptees, they experienced a form of “honorary white 
privilege” as children; with their white, generally Ashkenazi parents serving as 
a kind of protective shell, they felt comfortable as Jews within their own com-
munities where they were known and nurtured, especially in cases in which 
their parents had searched very deliberately for welcoming and inclusive con-
gregations and institutions.
The issues of identity often become more complicated for transracial 
adoptees in the teen years and into young adulthood, as they begin to expe-
rience the world outside the partial cocoon of their immediate families and 
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communities. As they go out into the world on their own, they lose the honor-
ary white privilege they experienced as children and are seen for the first time 
fully as individuals of color, rather than as members of a white Jewish family. 
In doing so, they often find aspects of their identity questioned by both the 
Jewish community and members of their community of origin.
If transracial adoptees often find their Jewish identity questioned as 
children, such questioning becomes far more frequent when they experience 
the Jewish community as individuals, not as their parents’ children. Going to 
Hillel, for example, many adoptees of color are met with incredulity and are 
sometimes told that the Korean, African American, or Latin American student 
group meets down the hall. As the white mother of a daughter adopted from 
Korea reflected, “It is always assumed that she is not Jewish, and after a while 
she seemed to feel that they must know something she didn’t. It just wears her 
down when people always give her that ‘WOW! You’re Jewish?’ look.” Under 
these circumstances, many adoptees of color find themselves having to “prove” 
their Jewish identity over and over again, whether by providing detailed 
information about whether and how they were converted or demonstrat-
ing their cultural competency as Jews. As a woman adopted from Colombia 
commented, “I guess you could say I’m not your typical ‘Jew,’ whatever that 
means. As an adult I felt I always had to give an explanation as to how I could 
be Jewish. Or people would need to find a reason for how I am Jewish which 
pushes me away a little from the Jewish community. . . . People tend to not 
see ME when they find out I’m Jewish; all they see are my differences.” Dating 
and marriage in particular can be challenging. As a Korean adoptee remarked, 
“As I’ve gotten older, especially with dating, I’ve found it more difficult. People 
have tried to ‘test’ me to see how Jewish I really am, which is actually quite 
racist and offensive.”33
Conversely, many adult adoptees of color also find their identities ques-
tioned by their communities of origin. Echoing the assumption that Jews are 
white, black, Asian, and Latino communities may question the adoptee’s Jewish-
ness, presupposing another religious identity because he or she is of color. Often 
even more powerfully, they may also challenge the adoptee’s cultural competency 
vis-à-vis black, Asian, or Latino identity, which indeed often is limited because 
of their upbringing. It is thus not uncommon for Jewish adoptees of color 
to report feeling out of place among people of their own racial or national 
background. As a Latino adoptee who began working with Latino youth writes, 
“I became aware of how little I shared in common with Latino students and 
my own Latino identity. It was one thing to identify as Mexican in the small 
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town in Connecticut where I grew up, but here in New York, not speaking 
Spanish and not being aware of Mexican or Mexican-American culture, my 
Latino identity has begun to feel hollow.” Under these circumstances, many 
adoptees feel that they do not fully fit into either their adoptive community 
or their birth community.
Transracial adoptees’ identities continue to evolve throughout adulthood, 
with many feeling that they live at the nexus of multiple identities. Some say 
that they feel very comfortable with their Jewishness, especially within their 
own carefully chosen community or the community in which they grew up 
and feel known. Indeed, some feel most comfortable within a Jewish con-
text, which feels more familiar than their communities of origin, where they 
continue to feel marginal or even rejected. As a young woman adopted from 
China wrote, “I’ve identified primarily as Jewish as it is the culture in which I 
was raised. Most of my role models are Jewish—not Asian.” However, many 
continue to talk about feeling that they need to “prove” their Jewish identity 
repeatedly, especially when they step outside their own community and have 
to demonstrate that they are “really” Jewish.
Many parents who choose a same-race domestic adoption do so assum-
ing that they will not have to face these complicated questions of multiple 
identities. Indeed, among our survey respondents, parents of same-race 
adoptees were far less likely to see their children as having a birth heritage 
different from their own (only 45 percent said their child had a different 
birth heritage, with another 10 percent saying they were unsure, in contrast 
to 91 percent of parents of transracial adoptees believing that their children 
had a different birth heritage). Even those who do identify their children as 
having a different birth heritage overwhelmingly do not see it as important 
to bring that heritage into their lives; a full 97 percent responded that it was 
either not at all important or not particularly important to do so. “Our son is 
the same race as us,” wrote one respondent, “so other than different religions, 
there really wasn’t anything to expose him to”; the implication was that this 
mother would have considered exposing her son to other elements of a birth 
heritage but not religious ones, given potential conflicts with Judaism. “[We] 
have absolutely nothing to do with her ‘birth heritage,’” wrote another. “As 
she is white, there is little to celebrate in the way of her heritage; she is an 
American, apple pie and baseball kind of child.”
Yet for many white adoptees raised in Jewish families, identity is not so 
simple. In part, their struggles stem from an often unacknowledged tendency 
in the Jewish community to conceive of Jewish identity in biological terms. 
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Indeed, this emphasis on “blood logic” in defining and maintaining Jewish 
identity appears to have increased in recent years; as many Jews cease to “do” 
much Jewishly, they fall back on genes, blood, and appearance to articulate 
their sense of their own Jewishness.34 Despite valid conversions and Jewish 
upbringings, many adoptees—white as well as of color—report having their 
Jewish identity questioned because they were not “born Jewish.” “For years 
my cousins all told me I wasn’t ‘really’ Jewish because I’m not ethnically [read: 
biologically or racially] Jewish,” writes a white domestically adopted woman. 
A white Orthodox woman writes that “It’s looked down [on] by the commu-
nity because even though I lived my whole life as a Jew, I’m still considered 
a ‘convert.’”35 And another white domestic Jewish adoptee remembers that 
“When I was older, questions at camp as to whether I was a real Jew since 
I was converted became more common and made me uncomfortable.”36 “Real 
Jew,” “outcast,” “not Jewish enough”—the words come up over and over again 
in our research and demonstrate how deep an impact thinking about Jewish 
blood has on adoptees not “born into” the Jewish community.
For many white adoptees not born to Jewish birth parents, the painful 
sense of biological difference from their family and the Jewish community 
is expressed through a concern about not “looking Jewish.” Virtually every 
transracial Jewish adoptee at some point hears the “light-hearted” comment 
“Funny, you don’t look Jewish” or is told that it “looks wrong” for them 
to be practicing Judaism.37 Same-race adoptees, however, are by no means 
strangers to such remarks. Hair, eye color, and noses come up repeatedly in 
white adoptees’ discussions of their experiences in the Jewish community. 
As a white domestically adopted man comments, “Being a blond haired, 
blue eyed kid at Solomon Schechter is not an easy thing for a young kid to 
do. I [was] plopped into the most homogeneous soup one could imagine, 
and expected to thrive. I was asked why I looked different—I wasn’t really 
sure.” Similarly, a white domestically adopted woman writes, “I have a very 
round ‘button’ nose. And I have been asked if my nose was a Bat Mitzvah 
gift. . . . I personally always wanted to appear and look more Jewish just to 
fit in.” And from the white adopted daughter of a rabbi: “Community was 
hard. I didn’t look Jewish. How did this Rabbi get a little blonde girl with 
a Shiksa nose?”38
Because of the American Jewish community’s emphasis on academic 
achievement, learning disabilities too can be cause for a sense of biological 
alienation from Jewishness. As a white domestically adopted woman remem-
bers poignantly:
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“Jews don’t have learning disabilities,” I mistakenly thought. One 
day I decided that I was not Jewish. I had been adopted by Jew-
ish parents and it was their identity, not mine. I felt alienated and 
disconnected and left the community for many years. I was tired 
of hearing, “well, you don’t look Jewish,” too (what does that even 
mean?!). Today I can proudly say that I may not have been born 
Jewish and I may not have chosen to be Jewish, but Judaism chose 
me and I proudly identify as a Jewish American.
If we understand Jewishness to be a culture as well as a religion (which, as 
indicated by the 2013 Pew Research Center study “A Portrait of Jewish Ameri-
cans,” a majority of American Jews do39), then even domestic same-race adop-
tions into Jewish families are transcultural. As such, it should not be surprising 
that, like transracial or transnational adoptees, some of these adoptees feel 
conscious of bringing another identity into their families and are interested in 
connecting with their birth heritages. Coming from white, typically Christian 
birth families, however, they may struggle to find aspects of a birth culture 
with which to identify that do not seem threatening to their Jewish families 
and communities. For example, unlike Chinese adoptees, who may study the 
Chinese language or immerse themselves in the Chinese or Chinese American 
communities, white domestic adoptees may gravitate to Christmas trees, Eas-
ter bunnies, or a cross, lacking other obvious symbols.
The rabbi’s daughter with the “Shiksa nose” quoted above grew up 
deeply embedded in the Jewish community, yet she writes that “I always 
‘missed’ Christmas. An odd part of me thought that I should be celebrat-
ing Christmas. A small part of me buried somewhere inside thinks I should 
be Christian. I push that away. Have always thought that way since I was 
a kid.”40 Another white domestically adopted woman traces her alienation 
from Jewishness directly to her identity as an adoptee: “In terms of being 
Jewish, to me it just never fit, it never felt right. Like I could have been raised 
in any religion. I remember being young and thinking religion was like a 
part of your DNA, and that since I didn’t share any with my family, maybe 
I wasn’t Jewish. . . . As wonderful as it was to be raised Jewish, I wish I had 
felt a connection . . . Ever.”
For the small number of today’s adoptees with at least one Jewish 
birth parent, Jewish identity is, perhaps not surprisingly, generally uncom-
plicated—or at least no more complicated than it is for nonadoptees. The 
relationship between their birth and adoptive heritages is by and large 
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a nonissue. Yet the way in which these adoptees discuss the relationship 
between their Jewish birth parentage and their sense of their place in the 
Jewish community highlights the complexities that often arise for those not 
born to Jewish birth parents.
Some adoptees know from the beginning that their birth mothers 
were Jewish and comment that it was this knowledge that allowed them to 
feel fully Jewish. As a white domestically adopted man reflects, “I always 
identified as a ‘real’ Jew because the adoption agency my parents used only 
. . . put children up for adoption [for] whom at least the birth mother is 
Jewish. . . . My birth mother was Jewish so I always felt that I was really a 
genuine part of the Jewish community and felt that I fit in. That helped me 
when I attended Jewish day school to not feel like an outcast.”41 The impli-
cation, of course, is that this young man believes that he likely would have 
felt like an outcast had he not had a Jewish birth mother. Similarly, a white 
Orthodox man writes that “I was born Jewish so I didn’t have questions 
and possible . . . cultural differences that other adoptees [have,] converts and 
non-converts alike. Also no one looked at me different because I looked the 
same as everyone else.” And a white domestically adopted woman comments 
that “Knowing my maternal grandma was Jewish also helps affirm that I am 
part of the tribe. I don’t feel as much as an imposter because of this. My feel-
ings of not being worthy of this aspect of my identity shift day to day. . . . 
I just know that ‘legally’ I am Jewish. This has been important to me as I 
have gotten older and felt the need to validate my experience of being a Jew. 
No one else has ever tested me or made me feel I had to prove myself, it 
comes from within.”42
Other adoptees discover later that they were indeed “born Jewish,” and 
the intense relief they often feel highlights the discomfort felt by many white 
adoptees who were not born to Jewish birth parents. “Two years ago, I took 
a DNA test to determine my haplogroup,” writes a thirty-five-year-old white 
woman adopted by Jewish parents. “I did discover some pretty interesting 
things, including the fact that I am biologically Jewish. That was always a big 
question for me!”43 When Jewish adoptees search for their birth parents, it 
is not uncommon for one of their first questions to be “Am I really Jewish?” 
(i.e., were my birth parents Jewish?).44 If we take seriously current understand-
ings of the importance of biological roots to adoptees, such questions should 
perhaps not be unexpected, but they also point to hesitancies about Jewish 
identity based on upbringing rather than birth.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the complexities of the Jewish adoptive experience, it is important 
to acknowledge that many, if not most, Jewish adoptive families succeed in 
crafting personal, familial, and communal identities that work for them, 
even in cases where it may be impossible to fully reconcile various aspects of 
identity. Here the heterogeneity of American Jewry is an asset; with so many 
ways of being Jewish, adoptees and their families can search out communi-
ties and approaches to Jewishness that feel comfortable and welcoming to 
them. For transracial adoptive families, this often involves actively seeking 
out communities of Jews of color where the adoptee of color will not feel 
himself or herself outside the norm. The Jewish people have always been 
more racially and ethnically diverse than Americans commonly recognize, 
and this diversity has only increased as growing numbers of individuals of 
color have joined the Jewish community through conversion and/or mar-
riage. Many multiracial Jewish adoptive families report how important it is 
to them to connect with other Jews of color, often through organizations 
such as the Jewish Multiracial Network and Be’chol Lashon or by specifically 
seeking out congregations, schools, camps, and youth groups with a critical 
mass of nonwhite members.
Challenges and complexities, moreover, can also be tremendous oppor-
tunities for growth and development, and the multifaceted nature of identity 
within the Jewish adoptive family is often a source of great enrichment. Many 
adoptive parents, especially of children of color, comment on how their experi-
ences have broadened and deepened their own sense of Jewish identity. And 
many adoptees draw strength and inspiration from their diverse identities. 
The young adult Chinese adoptee cited above who was asked as a child if it 
was “legal” to be both Chinese and Jewish has grown up to be the president 
of her college Hillel and is strongly committed to issues of social and racial 
justice. “Being an adopted Asian American Jew has shaped my personal 
and career aspirations,” she writes. “I am a sociology major focused on race and 
ethnic relations, and have always been interested in advocating for marginal-
ized populations. I am hoping to write a senior thesis on transracial, transna-
tional adoption and critical race theory.”45 And the family of a Korean adoptee 
whose mother pulled her from Jewish preschool because of racism invested 
considerable resources in raising her with strong identities as both Korean 
and Jewish; she writes that despite the racism she experienced in the Jewish 
community, “I really do cherish my Jewish heritage and feel that, without my 
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Jewish upbringing, I would be a very different and possibly less-well adjusted 
adopted person.”
If the results of the recent Pew survey tell us anything, it is that questions 
of multiple and blended identities will only become more common and more 
pressing in the future as Jewish families increasingly cross a variety of racial, 
religious, and cultural boundaries. As they work to understand and respond 
to the Jewish “Modern Family,” academic and communal observers can learn 
much from the experiences of adoptive families and work hard to become 
more welcoming to those who bring with them other forms of identity, rather 
than seeing those identities as “competing” with Jewishness. In the next phase 
of our research with the Adoption & Jewish Identity Project, we will continue 
to probe these complex issues by gathering the voices of young adult adoptees 
through oral histories and narrative and video testimonies, enabling us to cre-
ate a much fuller picture of the Jewish adoptive experience and the evolving 
meaning of Jewish identity in America.
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The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human 
Embryos Using Cloning Technologies
John D. Loike
INTRODUCTION
Molecular genetics and genetic engineering are some of the most exciting areas 
of modern-day biology. Since James Watson and Francis Crick deciphered 
the structure of DNA, scientists have made great progress in understanding 
human genetics and its role in disease processes. DNA is the universal code 
of life that provides the information for all cells and organisms to function. 
The human genome contains about twenty thousand genes that provide the 
instructions to synthesize and produce almost one hundred thousand different 
kinds of proteins that human beings need to function properly.
One of the most challenging areas of science is applying genetic technol-
ogy in the hope of preventing genetic mistakes from affecting an embryo or 
an individual.1 In recent years genetic technology is also being applied to other 
areas of reproductive medicine, such as human fertility.
Cloning technology received international publicity in 1997 when it was 
used to clone Dolly the sheep.2 The cloning of Dolly was initially hailed as the 
great hope for a biomedical revolution because it offered an innovative method 
to genetically alter sheep and cows to produce expensive biological proteins 
in their milk.3 In addition, there was hope that cloning techniques could cre-
ate perfectly matched tissues that would someday cure ailments ranging from 
diabetes to Parkinson’s disease.4
However, applying cloning technologies to human beings for either repro-
ductive purposes or to generate embryonic stem cells spurred intense ethical 
debates. As this method requires the destruction of fertilized eggs, many cultures 
view this process as unethical. The Catholic Church, for example, believes that 
reproductive human cloning, as in vitro fertilization (IVF), is unethical for two 
reasons.5 First, the destruction of human fertilized eggs is considered akin to 
murder because fertilized eggs have attained the status of personhood.6 Second, 
children must be conceived within a marital context by engaging in marital rela-
tions. These cultural objections to cloning technologies have impacted the rate 
at which research in human cloning has progressed. For much of the last decade, 
federal funding did not support research in human reproductive cloning and 
even limited the generation of embryonic stem cells using this method.
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In this essay, I review the latest technological advances of cloning and its 
potential applications to human disease and in particular to human reproduc-
tion. Then, I discuss, from a Jewish perspective, some challenging bioethical 
issues that emerge from this technology. Finally, I present potential ways to 
resolve some of these contentious issues.
WHAT IS CLONING TECHNOLOGY?
Reproductive cloning can be defined in broad terms as the identical repro-
duction of fragments of DNA, genes, cells, or whole organisms from a single 
ancestor. The term “clone” was coined by H. J. Webber and stems from the 
ancient Greek klon, which is a twig, and probably refers to the fact that a twig 
can give rise to another tree identical to its parent tree. Looking for a word to 
describe small sections of an organism that can be cut off and transplanted 
to form a whole entity, Webber chose the word “clone” for its uniqueness and 
easy pronunciation.
To clone Dolly, Ian Wilmut and his colleagues used a technology called 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).7 In SCNT, the genetic material con-
tained in the nucleus from any cell is transferred or injected into an enucleated 
egg (i.e., an egg whose nuclear DNA has been physically removed) to initiate 
the creation of an embryo (see Figure 1). This reconstituted “fertilized egg” is 
then allowed to develop into a blastocyst in the laboratory and is subsequently 
implanted into a host animal for embryological development, similar to the 
protocol used in IVF. SCNT can also be used to generate a blastocyst from 
which embryonic stem cells can be obtained and maintained in the laboratory.
The clinical application of cloning (specifically SCNT) may have great 
potential to enhance the welfare and health of human beings. SCNT tech-
nologies may be used to enhance our knowledge of:
•  Human organ regeneration from stem cells. Each person completely 
regenerates his or her own skin every seven days by triggering skin 
stem cells to replicate. Everyone has witnessed that any cut can heal 
itself and disappear within two weeks. The skeletal system can also 
utilize its own stem cells to replenish itself every seven years. One 
important future area of medicine lies in understanding how organs 
and tissues of the body creates themselves out of a single stem cell and 
the mechanisms by which specific organ systems are renewed through-
out life. The use of patient-derived stem cells obtained via SCNT or 
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cloning technology offers the possibility to replace or repair damaged 
organs without the need of donor organ transplants.
•  Infertility and the design of new medical solutions for infertility. Cloning 
technology offers the possibility for infertile men or women to use non-
sperm or nonegg cells in creating a healthy embryo. According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, about 6 percent of married 
women fifteen to forty-four years of age in the United States and 18 per-
cent of men are infertile. In many of cases of male infertility, the nuclear 
genetic content obtained from skin or blood cells can be injected into an 
egg to trigger fertilization and the creation of an embryo.
•  Helping women with mitochondrial diseases to have healthy offspring.
In almost all cells of the body, 99.9 percent of the DNA is found 
in a cellular organelle called the nucleus, and less than 0.1 percent 
of the DNA is found in another organelle called the mitochondria. 
Mitochondria serve many functions but is best known as providing 
the cell with the chemical energy necessary to carry out all of its cel-
lular activities. In a sense, they are the battery of the cell. Mistakes or 
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mutations in mitochondrial DNA can result in profound disease states 
that include muscular dystrophy, liver disease, lung disease, and, in 
rare instances, even death at an early stage. Only a few women have 
those types of mitochondria mutations that lead to serious clinical 
symptoms. In the United States, about 12,000 women are candidates 
for intervention to allow them to have healthy children free from 
mutations in their mitochondria. In Great Britain, there are about 
6,500 women. Cloning technology can be utilized to transfer healthy 
mitochondria from a woman donor into the egg of another woman 
who has mitochondrial mutations to produce a healthy child.
NEW INNOVATIONS IN SCNT TECHNOLOGY
However, the development of SCNT using human cells has proven to be an 
exceedingly difficult task.8 Many unsuccessful attempts were made at trying 
to generate a viable human preimplanted embryo or blastocyst via SCNT. In 
fact, it took sixteen years after the report of Dolly appeared in the press for 
Dr. Shoukhrat Mitalipov from the Oregon Health and Science University to 
lead an international team to modify SCNT technology to generate human 
blastocysts and patient-specific embryonic stem cell lines.9 This was the first 
report that successfully applied SCNT to human cells and was an extension of 
their previous studies using SCNT to generate embryonic stem cell lines from 
nonhuman primates. Incorporating innovative technical modifications, Mit-
alipov and his colleagues successfully fused the nucleus obtained from a baby’s 
skin cell with an enucleated egg and applied SCNT technology to generate a 
human blastocyst from which they could isolate and maintain human embry-
onic stem cells in the laboratory.
One innovation involved obtaining the eggs from women who did not 
receive high doses of hormones. Normally, IVF technology requires the phy-
sician to first hyperstimulate a woman with hormones in order to retrieve 
between ten to twenty eggs. Mitalipov discovered that milder hormonal stimu-
lation allowed the retrieval of fewer eggs (only about five eggs), but their qual-
ity was much better than those eggs obtained from traditional hyperhormonal 
stimulation. The second innovation involved the use of gentler methods to 
fuse the donor cell with the enucleated egg.
Mitalipov’s motivation to apply SCNT to human beings was not to clone 
a human being. Rather, it was to obtain patient-derived embryonic stem cell 
lines that can be used to study and potentially treat various human diseases. In 
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fact, his group applied their technology to successfully generate embryonic stem 
cells from a patient with a genetic defect called Leigh syndrome. Leigh syn-
drome is a severe neurological genetic disorder that typically arises in the first 
year of life. This condition is characterized by progressive loss of mental and 
movement abilities (psychomotor regression) and typically results in respiratory 
failure that leads to death within a couple of years. The stem cells from this 
Leigh syndrome patient that were generated using SCNT will enable scientists 
to understand how mutations can lead to Leigh syndrome and then to use these 
cells to screen thousands of drugs in the search for a potential therapy.
Using SCNT to generate embryonic stem cells has broad applications 
for studying a wide variety of other genetic diseases. Patient-derived stem 
cells, generated via SCNT, can be obtained from individuals with Parkin-
son’s disease, Huntington’s disease, Lou Gehrig’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, 
heart disease, and liver disease. These laboratory cultured stem cells would 
be a valuable scientific asset in designing and testing treatments to manage 
or cure these devastating diseases.
While Mitalipov and his colleagues claim that their technology is not 
designed to clone human beings, SCNT technology does in fact have the 
potential to be used to implant a human blastocyst into a woman to create a 
human embryo. What is significant here, from a scientific and Jewish legal (hal-
achic) perspective, is that SCNT allows scientists to use a variety of cell sources 
aside from sperm and eggs to fuse with an egg to create a human embryo. 
From a medical perspective, this technology may create an effective method for 
infertile men who do not produce viable sperm to produce genetically related 
healthy children. In addition, genetic defects in SCNT-generated stem cells 
from patients could be corrected using gene editing technologies. In specific 
situations, these genetically corrected stem cells could be an effective method of 
cell replacement therapy. For example, if people have a genetic defect that limits 
their blood’s capacity to clot, SCNT could be used to generate their own stem 
cells. These stems cells could be reengineered to correct this mutation and then 
reintroduced into these patients to reconstitute their blood-clotting capacity.10
JEWISH ETHICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED  
WITH CLONING TECHNOLOGIES
Ethical considerations of any new technology usually focus on four funda-
mental principles of bioethics.11 The first is autonomy/respect for persons— 
a person’s right to choose and control his or her own life and destiny and 
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the acceptance of individual responsibility for his or her medical choices. The 
second is beneficence—the moral and contractual calling to benefit a person 
who seeks help. The third is nonmaleficence—avoiding intentionally created, 
needless harm or injury to a person through acts of either commission or omis-
sion. The fourth is justice—allocating medical resources fairly.
While many secular bioethicists raise several of the above ethical consid-
erations of cloning, other arguments for why cloning is unethical have been 
raised. Some critics argue that it is unethical for scientists to “play God” by 
engaging in technologies that alter the nature of human reproduction.12 It is 
surprising how many papers written by scientists, many of whom are atheists 
or not religious, use this argument to declare cloning unethical. Other scien-
tists declare that human cloning technology is unethical because of the “yuck 
factor.” Dr. Leon Kass in 1997 explained that the “yuck factor” in bioethics is 
defined as an unethical technology based on an intuitive negative response or 
its evil characteristic.13 In other words, one cannot argue that cloning violates 
any one of the basic principles of bioethics. Rather, for unspecified and simply 
intuitive reasons, this technology is deemed unethical.
In contrast, the Jewish perspective is quite different from those arguing 
against human cloning. Regarding the idea that scientists should not play 
God, the Jewish perspective states that God created an incomplete world 
where human beings are encouraged to partner with God to improve and per-
fect the world.14 This directive is the basis of the commandment of circumci-
sion. The newborn baby boy is physically and spiritually incomplete, and God 
directs the parents to complete the act of creation by having the baby boy cir-
cumcised on the eighth day.15 The famous biblical commentator Rabbi Moshe 
ben Nachmonides states that “God gave man power and control on earth to 
do as he wishes with the animals and insects and everything which crawls on 
the earth, and to build, to uproot what is planted, to quarry copper from the 
mountains, etc.”16 In other words, human beings are commanded to serve as 
partners in God’s creation in order to improve the human condition. Thus, 
Judaism values activities that “play God” as a positive challenge when applied 
to improve the human condition or when used to design a new therapy.
One must also consider that reproductive cloning has biological prec-
edents. Many plant species and single-celled organisms such as bacteria repro-
duce via cloning. Higher-level species such as worms, fish, lizards, and frogs 
undergo a process called parthenogenesis whereby a female can produce geneti-
cally identical offspring without engaging a male partner. Leiolepis ngovantrii, for 
example, is a reptile commonly found in Vietnam that is an all-female species 
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that reproduces via cloning. The female Amazonian ant Mycocepurus smithi is an 
example of an insect species that reproduces via cloning. These ants have repro-
duced via cloning for thousands of years, resulting in the virtual disappearance 
of their sexual organs. Finally, identical twins represent natural cloning occurring 
in human beings. Since cloning is part of the natural process of God’s creation, 
Judaism would allow its therapeutic application to human reproduction.
With regard to the “yuck factor,” there is no Jewish legal principle that 
incorporates a similar concept. In fact, Judaism believes that Jewish law is 
often based on logical and sound reasons. When there are medical benefits 
that justify a new technology, then there is no enforceable prohibition. Thus, 
there are no prohibitions against using SCNT to improve the health of an 
individual.
Another ethical challenge in SCNT technology is related to the status of 
personhood of a preimplanted embryo. As mentioned above, cloning technol-
ogy requires the destruction of many fertilized eggs. How does Jewish law, 
or halachah, view the destruction of fertilized eggs? The general consensus in 
Orthodox Jewish law was expressed by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Con-
gregations and the Rabbinical Council of America in 2004: personhood does 
not begin at conception but rather at some point during gestation.17 While 
Jewish law does not encourage unnecessary destruction of a fertilized egg, it 
recognizes that fertilized eggs may be used in biomedical research in order to 
develop new therapies.
A fourth ethical challenge related to cloning is how Jewish law views the 
possibility of creating human embryos from more than two genetic parents. 
The preferred method of human reproduction in Jewish law is that concep-
tion should occur during marital relations. Moreover, the Talmud (Niddah 30) 
claims that the preferred method to produce children involves three partners: 
woman, man, and God. However, in situations of infertility and disease, Jew-
ish law permits other technologies such as IVF to allow infertile parents to 
have healthy children. This is based in part on the biblical account in which 
Rachel declared to our forefather, Jacob, that she would rather die than remain 
infertile.18 Several biblical commentaries, such as Rashi, use this episode to 
prove that Judaism views infertility as a serious medical condition.19
How does Judaism view the donation of genetic materials in creating 
a child? The normal procedure to create a child is to fertilize a woman’s egg 
with sperm. Using SCNT and cloning technology, it is possible to use non-
sperm cells to “fertilize” an egg. In cases where the husband cannot produce 
sperm, Jewish law would permit physicians to use nonsperm cells to obtain the 
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nuclear material to fertilize an egg. Here is an excellent example where Jewish 
law recognizes the hardships of infertility and permits any safe medical inter-
vention to allow a couple to fulfill the commandment of human reproduction.
What is uniquely innovative in this Jewish law is that scientific consen-
sus can serve as the basis of halachic decisions and can serve as a precedent 
in addressing halachic issues, including those emerging from new reproduc-
tive biotechnologies. The basis of this law is derived from situations where 
halachah must establish whether a patient is seriously or terminally ill or 
has a sickness that is not serious. The halachic status of such patients is 
established by expert physicians and not by rabbis. Similarly, many Jewish 
legal scholars ascribe the intimate relationship of parenthood to genetics,20 
because scientists in our times view the genetic donors of the child as the 
legal parents of the child.
It is important to point out, however, that there are several situations 
where the Jewish definition of family relationships differs from a traditional 
genetic definition.
1.  A child fathered by a non-Jew with a Jewish woman has a genetic 
father and is considered Jewish by virtue of the fact that the mother 
is Jewish. However, halachah does not grant the non-Jewish genetic 
father parenthood status, and no familial halachic relationship exists 
between the genetic non-Jewish father and the Jewish child. The 
child must give the genetic father parental respect, but other laws 
such as inheritance do not apply.
2.  A Jewish man who fathers a child with a non-Jewish woman is not 
granted familial status with respect to the child. Although he remains 
the genetic father, the child is not Jewish according to Jewish law.
3.  Any child who converts to Judaism severs most familial relationships 
with respect to parenthood, fatherhood, and even sibling status.
However, in situations where the genetic materials are obtained from a Jewish 
man and used to reconstitute a fertilized egg obtained from a Jewish woman, 
the child would be the legal child of both parties and would be fully Jewish.
A fifth ethical concern in Jewish law is whether a child produce via clon-
ing technologies is viewed as a mamzer.21 The Hebrew term mamzer [from 
the root meaning “corrupt”] functions as a euphemism for an illicit union in the 
person’s lineage—a bastard or illegitimate child. In Judaism, a mamzer cannot 
marry another Jew because their children would also be considered illegitimate. 
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This Jewish law is based on a verse in the Bible (Deut 23:2), which states that 
“A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the LORD; even to his 
tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation of the LORD.” 
The potential status of a child mamzer in reproductive medicine has been 
discussed: specifically, whether a married Jewish woman can use sperm from a 
nonspousal Jewish man for artificial insemination.22
In response to this issue, there are three different rabbinical opinions:
1.  According to Jewish law, the child is considered a real mamzer (minor-
ity view).
2.  The child is a safek [doubtful] mamzer, and all stringencies of mamzer 
apply (minority view).
3.  The child is not illegitimate at all (the most accepted view in Jewish 
law).23
Several leading halachic scholars, including Rabbi Dr. Moshe Tendler, propose 
that regarding SCNT and cloning, the child conceived is not illegitimate, because 
unlike the classical case of mamzer, no forbidden marital act took place.24
In halachah, the Jewish status of a child is maternally transmitted. If the 
mother is Jewish, then the child is Jewish, regardless of the religion of the father. 
Cloning technologies can create complex legal issues regarding the Jewish status 
of the child. For example, suppose a human embryo is created from genetic 
material from one non-Jewish female and transferred into an egg obtained from 
another Jewish woman. Would the child be deemed Jewish in this situation, 
where two women contribute the genetic information to generate an embryo?
Interestingly, there is no clear Jewish legal precedent to this case. How-
ever, Jewish law has legal processes in resolving situations where there is no 
halachic precedent. This is well documented in the following case. Suppose a 
Jewish couple donates their fertilized egg to a gestational surrogate to allow the 
surrogate to gestate the embryo. The religious status of the child is controver-
sial. Some rabbis believe that the religious status of the child should follow the 
religion of the woman who carries and delivers the child. Others argue that 
the genetic mother should establish the religious status of the child.
Despite the fact that there is no precedent in Jewish law regarding ges-
tational surrogacy, Jewish law provides a tenable solution. Jewish law would 
recommend that the child undergo ritual conversion to ensure the he or she 
has full Jewish status. Converting such a child would thus avoid a plethora of 
complicated Jewish questions.
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A final alleged ethical concern regarding human cloning is that it violates 
the divine gift of free will or divine providence by creating an individual who 
is a genetic copy of someone else. Judaism values the unique individuality of 
each and every person. No two people are alike. Will cloning violate the Jewish 
principle of individuality? This ethical concern is not valid within Jewish law 
for one major reason. Identical twins provide a biological situation whereby 
two individuals have the same genetic makeup. Despite the fact that identical 
twins possess an identical genetic code, they exhibit different behaviors, physi-
cal traits, and health issues due to the varied environmental experiences each 
twin experiences. Thus Judaism, like science, recognizes that personality is 
shaped by both genetics and environment and acknowledges the individuality 
of identical twins or cloned individuals.
FUTURE ETHICAL CHALLENGES
As with any new biotechnology, Judaism supports its clinical application to 
improve fertility or health. Thus, using mitochondrial replacement therapy 
to produce a healthy child from a woman affected with mitochondrial muta-
tions would be encouraged, provided that it is a safe procedure.25 In this 
cloning situation, the nucleus of a fertilized egg is obtained from a wife who 
expresses mutations in her mitochondrial DNA, and this is transferred into an 
enucleated egg that is obtained from a healthy woman donor. This donor egg 
would contain “healthy” mitochondria, allowing the fertilized egg to develop 
into a healthy child.
There remain other situations in cloning that will require rabbinical 
deliberation in the future. For example, if two men donate their genetic 
materials to be transplanted into an enucleated egg, will the child be viewed 
as Jewish even though there is no genetic female involved in the creation of 
this child? At first glace one could speculate that the woman who gestates 
this embryo may be considered the legal mother of the child; therefore, if 
the gestational woman is Jewish, then the child would be considered Jewish. 
However, not all rabbis would agree with this view. As mentioned above, 
there is a debate in gestational surrogacy as to whether the gestation woman 
or the woman who donates her egg is considered the legal mother of the 
child. A final undecided issue relates to the Jewish perspective on cloning a 
single woman using her own blood cells and eggs. Are there conditions in 
which rabbis would deem such cloning as permissible? These are complex 
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issues beyond the scope of this essay, and we await rabbinical scholars to 
adjudicate these situations.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have outlined some of the ethical challenges and resolutions 
regarding human cloning. Good decisions in Jewish law are predicated on 
obtaining valid scientific facts. In addition, Judaism recognizes that any medi-
cal intervention can have serious side effects and provides the patient with 
some autonomy to choose whether to engage in such potentially risky proce-
dures. On the other hand, Judaism does not support unlimited autonomy.26 
A patient who is suffering from an end-of-life illness is not allowed to engage 
in euthanasia. Regarding the autonomous right of a woman to clone herself, 
Jewish law would not support such a procedure without medical justification. 
Finally, Judaism supports the principle that in research and medicine, your 
actions should be guided not by what you can do but rather by what you 
should do.
NOTES
1. B. C. J. M. Fauser, K. Diedrich, et al., “Contemporary Genetic Technologies and 
Female Reproduction,” Human Reproduction Update 17:6 (2011): 829–47.
2. Ian Wilmut et al., “Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,” 
Nature 385 (1997): 810–13.
3. Elizabeth Pennisi, “After Dolly, a Pharming Frenzy,” Science 279:5351 (1998): 
646–48.
4. Philippe Taupin, “Derivation of Embryonic Stem Cells for Cellular Therapy: Chal-
lenges and New Strategies,” Medical Science and Technology 12:4 (2006): RA75–RA78.
5. N. Ohara, “Ethical Consideration of Experimentation Using Living Human Embryos: 
The Catholic Church’s Position on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Human 
Cloning,” Clinical and Experimental Obstetrics & Gynecology 30:2–3 (2002): 77–81.
6. For a review about cloning, see Mohammed Ali Al-Bar and Hassan Chamsi-Pasha, 
“Ethical Issues in Genetics (Premarital Counseling, Genetic Testing, Genetic Engineer-
ing, Cloning and Stem Cell Therapy, DNA Fingerprinting),” in Contemporary Bioethics: 
Islamic Perspective (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2015), 187–207.
7. Wilmut et al., “Viable Offspring.”
232 Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition
8. Henrik Semb, “Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Origin, Properties and Applications,” 
Apmis 113:11–12 (2005): 743–50.
9. M. Tachibana, P. Amato, et al., “Human Embryonic Stem Cells Derived by Somatic 
Cell Nuclear Transfer,” Cell 153:6 (2013): 1228–38.
10. Jennifer L. Gori, Patrick D. Hsu, et al., “Delivery and Specificity of CRISPR-Cas9 
Genome Editing Technologies for Human Gene Therapy,” Human Gene Therapy 26:7 
(2015): 443–51.
11. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001).
12. Ted Peters, Playing God? Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge, 2014).
13. Charles W. Schmidt, “The Yuck Factor: When Disgust Meets Discovery,” Environ-
mental Health Perspectives 116:12 (2008): A524–A527.
14. John D. Loike and Avram Steinberg, “Human Cloning and Halakhic Perspectives,” 
Tradition (1998): 31–46.
15. Abraham Steinberg and Mordechai Halperin, “A Jewish View,” Prospects 32:2 (2002): 
225–36.
16. See Ramban, Bereishis by Nahmanides (New York: Mesorah, 2005), and Genesis 1:26 
and 1:28.
17. “Statement on Stem Cell Research: RCA Reissues 2001 Statement of RCA/OU on 
the Important Topic of Stem Cell Research, as Formulated as a Letter to President Bush,” 
Rabbinical Council of America (October 22, 2014), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article 
.cfm?id=100553.
18. Genesis 30:1.
19. For a discussion on this topic, see Rav Amnon Bazak, “Parashat Hashavua, Parashat 
Vayishlach: Rachel,” Etzion, http://etzion.org.il/vbm/english/parsha.59/08vayish.htm.
20. Yehezkel Margalit, Orrie Levy, and John D. Loike, “Advanced Reproductive Technol-
ogies: Reevaluating Modern Parentage,” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 37 (2104): 
107–41; J. D. Loike and M. D. Tendler, “Creating Human Embryos Using Reproductive 
Cloning Technologies,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 367 (2014): 37–60.
21. Loike and Steinberg, “Human Cloning and Halakhic Perspectives,” 14.
22. J. D. Loike and M. D. Tendler, “Halachic Perspectives of Gestational Surrogacy,” 
Hakirah 16 (2013): 115–32.
23. Avraham Steinberg and Fred Rosner, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics: A Compila-
tion of Jewish Medical Law on All Topics of Medical Interest (New York: Feldheim, 2003).
24. J. Loike and R. L. Fischbach, “New Ethical Horizons in Gestational Surrogacy,” Jour-
nal of Fertilization: In Vitro-IVF-Worldwide, Reproductive Medicine, Genetics & Stem Cell 
Biology 1 (2013): 109; Loike and Tendler, “Creating Human Embryos.”
The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human Embryos Using Cloning Technologies 233
25. J. D. Loike, M. Hirano, M., and H. Margalit, “Three-Way Parenthood: Dealing 
with the Logistics of Embryos Created by Three-Parent IVF Technologies That Avoid 
the Transmission of Mitochondrial Disease,” The Scientist (October 1, 2013); Ruth 
L. Fischbach, Shawna Benston, and John D. Loike, “Creating a Three-Parent Child: An 
Educational Paradigm for the Responsible Conduct of Research,” Journal of Microbiology 
& Biology Education 15 (2014): 186.
26. J. D. Loike and M. D. Tendler, “Halacha and Bioethics,” Journal of Halacha in Con-
temporary Society 16 (2011): 92–118.

235
Multiplying Motherhood: Gestational Surrogate 
Motherhood and Jewish Law
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEWISH LAW AND  
THE JEWISH FAMILY IN A TRANSITIONAL ERA
The relationship between the Jewish family and Jewish family law is more com-
plex that it would seem at first blush. The Jewish family is a cultural, traditional 
notion defined more by culture and history than by legal guidelines. Yet, Jewish 
family law is a complex and detailed system of laws and guidelines that structure 
marriage, divorce, parenthood, and parent-child relationships. Jewish family law 
is a practical legal system ordering the definition of Jewish families and govern-
ing marriage and divorce. In Israel, Jewish law governs marriage and divorce and 
also has exclusive jurisdiction over issues of personal status and Jewish identity.1 
However, in the diaspora Jewish persons abide by the state’s civil laws of mar-
riage and divorce, which may seem to dampen the impact of Jewish family law. 
Still, given the importance of the laws of personal status and their significance in 
preserving Jewish continuity, Jewish family law remains relevant and is exercised 
by rabbinical courts [beit din]. For instance, a Jewish woman needs a get in order 
to remarry according to Jewish law even if she has a civil divorce. And, it is the 
beit din that will ordinarily attempt to resolve disputes about the get.
Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) have posed many challenges 
to traditional Jewish family law and challenged accepted norms. On the 
one hand, using ART has garnered much support from the religious Jewish 
community for helping to solve problems of infertility that can pose severe 
problems for the Jewish family. Having progeny is extremely important under 
Jewish law. The commandment to be fruitful and multiply is a positive com-
mandment upon men, fulfilled by producing at least two offspring.2 Adopting 
a child does not fulfill this commandment. However, reproducing through 
ART—through surrogacy, in vitro fertilization (IVF), or egg donations— 
will fulfill the commandment for a man as long as the male sperm is used in 
reproducing the offspring. Indeed, rabbis have supported such options, cer-
tainly as a better prospect than being compelled to divorce a woman who is 
unable to produce offspring or fails to fulfill the commandment.3
On the other hand, certain concrete legal and ethical dilemmas arise 
when traditional Jewish law is faced with the modern reality of ART.4 Defining 
236 Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition
parenthood when genetics is divorced from intent and gestation, putting 
into place appropriate regulations in order to maximize safety and preserve 
health, and, when using gamete donors, avoiding incest and providing health 
information to children are universal issues and concerns for any legal system. 
Under Jewish law there are added concerns of ensuring that the child is not 
considered illegitimate [mamzerut], which can have serious religious ramifica-
tions for children. Legal authorities, whether religious or civil, must determine 
who and when ART can be used and when it will be funded by the state. These 
dilemmas have resulted in much discussion and debate. Jewish law does not 
have concrete resolutions for all the quandaries that arise, but Jewish law can 
provide inspiration and insight in resolving these dilemmas.
When faced with these new legal and ethical dilemmas, traditional Jew-
ish law struggles because the law was determined through ancient Scriptures 
and decisions, and it can be difficult to use these laws to solve these modern, 
technological dilemmas.5 Yet, when constructing normative frameworks for 
resolving these dilemmas, it is helpful to look to Jewish law for inspiration. 
Still, particularly when exact solutions are not forthcoming from Scripture, 
there is also a need to keep a critical eye on the ramifications of Jewish law 
solutions that may be too narrow and could result in unfair and inappropriate 
consequences. Ultimately, using Jewish law to resolve legal dilemmas can allow 
us to gain from the wisdom of Jewish tradition, but we should take heed to 
avoid harsh and impractical applications in the context of new dilemmas not 
foreseen by Talmudic law.
In this essay, I will focus on the dilemmas surrounding gestational sur-
rogate motherhood. Gestational surrogate motherhood is a process whereby 
an intended father and mother enlist, usually for payment, another women 
to carry an embryo that is not genetically related to the surrogate and is usu-
ally genetically related to both the intended parents, although not necessarily. 
However, for the purpose of this essay, I will assume that the intended parents 
are the genetic parents, as is almost always the case under Israeli law—by 
law for the intended father and in practice for the intended mother as well 
(egg donations in Israel are extremely rare). Determining motherhood and the 
legal permissibility of gestational surrogacy is clearly a new dilemma for Jewish 
law, as the idea of a woman carrying a child who is not genetically related to 
her on behalf of intended parents is not something considered in the Jewish 
Talmudic tradition. However, modern-day halachic authorities and those who 
study Jewish law have found that determining motherhood and opining on the 
permissibility of gestational surrogacy are important for a number of reasons.6 
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First, Judaism is passed to a child through the mother, and thus identifying the 
mother has important practical ramifications in terms of the religious identity 
of the child. Second, the status of motherhood imposes legal rights and obliga-
tions in Jewish family law in terms of custody and support and thus must be 
identified. Third, surrogate motherhood raises broader ethical questions about 
the permissibility of selling gestational services or babies and the potential for 
exploitation of women who act as surrogates. Jewish law, with its broad ethical 
precepts, can weigh in on these important ethical conversations.
In this essay I will consider three questions regarding surrogate mother-
hood that demand resolution: (1) Should gestational surrogacy be permitted 
at all? (2) In a case where gestational surrogacy is permitted, who is the legal 
mother? (3) What is the status of the woman who is not defined as the legal 
mother, given her role in the complex surrogacy process? I will first describe 
these three questions in depth, explaining their legal and ethical ramifica- 
tions and the dilemmas they pose. I will then consider what Jewish law prin-
ciples and decisions offer in resolving these dilemmas. I will focus on Jewish 
law’s emphasis on procreation, discussions surrounding defining motherhood 
in gestational surrogacy, and Jewish law’s precepts regarding the importance 
of human dignity. I will consider practical Jewish law responses by prominent 
rabbis to gestational surrogate motherhood, which often involve recognition 
of multiple motherhood. I will then critique these responses, because multiple 
motherhood is only recognized for purposes of stringency in conversion and 
avoiding illegitimacy as opposed to affirmative recognition of the role of the 
surrogate, who instead has been ignored. I argue that these stringencies can 
make surrogacy difficult for intended parents without affirmatively protect-
ing and acknowledging the status of the surrogate mother. I will then suggest 
how Jewish law’s raising of the possibility of multiple motherhood can be used 
to provide an ethical solution to the dilemmas that this essay addresses by 
embracing multiple motherhood in a more holistic fashion.
In this essay, I offer a unique Jewish law perspective for resolving the three 
dilemmas I present as central to gestational surrogate motherhood. I argue that 
Jewish law perspectives on surrogate motherhood result in the naming of two 
mothers: the surrogate and the egg donor/intended mother. This is either a 
result of rabbincial authorities affirmatively recognizing two mothers, in prac-
tice, due to doubt as to which of the two is the legal mother or because there 
is a significant mix of opinion as to who is the legal mother, and therefore both 
women are considered mothers for Jewish law purposes. Recognition of two 
mothers under Jewish law principles can be seen as giving dignity to multiple 
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women who are engaged in the process of procreation. Recognizing multiple 
mothers is progressive in nature and also conforms to traditional Jewish fam-
ily law. When both the surrogate and the intended mother are recognized and 
dignified with status, the entire process of surrogacy is more in line with ethi-
cal standards and makes commercialization of surrogacy less problematic. And 
Jewish law can still condone contractual or court-ordered assignments of the 
duties of parenthood. Therefore, recognizing the status of two women does 
not foreclose the use of gestational surrogacy. Thereby, traditional Jewish fam-
ily law can help resolve the dilemmas of families in transition, both facilitating 
new family forms and instilling these families with ethical recognition of all 
participants in a manner that promotes human dignity.
A. THE THREE DILEMMAS OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
1. SHOULD COMMERCIAL SURROGACY BE PERMITTED?
The first dilemma is whether to allow surrogacy at all, in particular commercial 
surrogacy, which involves the payment of money to the surrogate mother as 
consideration for the effort of gestating the baby. While noncommercial altru-
istic surrogacy is practiced, such as between family members and close friends, 
it is much more widely practiced as a form of commerce, because purely 
altruistic surrogates are hard to locate and usually involve family members.7 
Moreover, in some countries such as Israel, commercial surrogacy is preferred 
for the professional and less familial nature of the surrogacy relationship.8
There has been ongoing global tension surrounding the permissibility 
of commercial surrogate motherhood.9 While it is permissible in many states, 
there are others that oppose it. Surrogacy promises to fulfill the procreative 
desires of couples or individuals who struggle with infertility or are in need of 
a female womb to procreate. And worldwide there is a plethora of women who 
are willing to act as surrogates, carrying children for money. Gestational sur-
rogacy has been practiced for many years, and there are low levels of litigation 
and high levels of satisfaction with the process.10 Despite these benefits, there 
are a number of ethical reasons for which some countries oppose surrogate 
motherhood. Indeed, these ethical concerns have been extremely influential 
despite the practical benefits of surrogacy.
The first concern is that of commodification. The argument is that 
due to the alleged unsuitability of financial transactions in the intimate ser-
vices of creating a baby, surrogacy should be banned or severely regulated.11 
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Creating a baby involves deeply personal and intimate processes that, some 
argue, should not be sold in the market. The nature of the intimacy in surro-
gate motherhood can be described on a number of interrelated levels. First, 
surrogate agreements involve a long-lasting and intense involvement in the 
bodily integrity of the surrogate. Surrogate contracts assert control over the 
lives of surrogates while they gestate; a surrogate’s body is literally being used 
for someone else’s purposes in a constant and inseparable manner.12 Once a 
pregnancy is initiated, surrogates are literally trapped, physically, into their 
agreements and into their entangled relationship with intentional parents. 
Second, from a biological perspective, gestation involves a real biological 
interdependency over the course of forty weeks that affects both the fetus 
and the surrogate and should not be ignored.13 The surrogate is affected 
on a constant basis by the fetus growing inside her and vice versa. Finally, 
this physical involvement and interrelatedness are coupled with long-lasting 
emotional connections.14 Such emotional connectedness and the human-
ity involved in these commercial transactions can create high-level disputes 
and suffering. Surrogate mothers have reported feeling devastated when 
their involvement in the process is minimized. Gestating a fetus may not 
lead to motherhood, but it is also not like building a cabinet. Commercial-
izing the singular, long-term nature of the gestational process is complex. 
When human life is changing hands, the nature of these transactions should 
be considered to ensure that the interests of the children and the parties 
involved are being protected.
Due to the intimacy involved in surrogacy, a major critique of com-
mercializing surrogacy is that such a market inappropriately commodifies 
the human body as a form of baby selling or as a form of selling gestational 
services.15 As one scholar puts it, by commercializing the womb, “we poten-
tially do harm to ourselves and to human flourishing if we treat something 
integral to ourselves as a commodity, i.e., as separate and fungible.”16 Allow-
ing ourselves and our body parts to be traded for money forces us to perceive 
ourselves in terms of our own monetary worth. Surrogates thus might view 
themselves and their bodies merely in terms of their saleable worth and not 
for their essential value as part of humanity. Thus, commercializing intimacy 
is critiqued as problematic, because selling intimacy compromises the personal 
and emotional nature of that intimacy and treats female body parts not as an 
end in themselves but as a means to an end. Moreover, it is argued that the 
intimate nature of the surrogacy relationship warrants consideration to protect 
vulnerable parties from the emotional harm that such intimate contracts can 
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cause. As one scholar noted, the commissioning couple does not just enter 
into a contract with the surrogate: they embark on a relationship with her.17 
Human emotions, pain and suffering as well as joy, often revolve around com-
mercial surrogate transactions and can be devastating to participants whose 
expectations are not met.
Another commonly voiced concern about surrogate motherhood is that 
it exploits poor women who do not have other means of earning money.18 
Commentators previously predicted that these contracts would employ poor 
women as an underclass for the privileged. Concerns are also expressed that 
brokers take advantage of surrogates and make too much money from the 
use of the surrogate’s body.19 Images of Brave New World scenarios in which 
the rich hire the poor to incubate their children with much sacrifice and little 
profit abound in reaction to surrogacy.20
An additional ethical objection raised is that of patriarchy. Some femi-
nists argue that using a woman’s body in order to produce children on behalf 
of a biologically related father subsumes a woman’s body for patriarchal pur-
poses. Radical feminists argue that the consent to carry children for intended 
parents is compromised by the patriarchal system in which surrogates live.21 
This critique is highly intertwined with the concerns about commodification 
of surrogates and their exploitation.
2. WHO IS THE LEGAL MOTHER IN SURROGACY?
Because gestational surrogate motherhood separates the two primary indica-
tors of motherhood—birth (gestation) and genetic connection—much schol-
arly effort has been invested in identifying the legal mother when a child is 
born of gestational surrogacy.22 Moreover, as engaging in a surrogacy contract 
involves intentional contracting to create a baby for specific parents, the issue 
of intent and contractual enforcement are also serious considerations.
Genetic connection is perhaps the most obvious choice for determining 
motherhood. It is how fatherhood is determined in modern times and there-
fore provides a gender-neutral indicator of parenthood.23 Moreover, genetic 
connection has always been considered an essential indicator of parenthood, 
as creation of the child comes about by the mixing of sperm and egg. There-
fore, it is many people’s instinct to argue that it is genetic connection that 
determines parenthood. However, if genetics determines motherhood, then 
women who receive egg donations would not legally be considered mothers of 
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the children they birth. Despite the woman giving birth and gestating the fetus 
for the entire pregnancy, the fact that the egg was not produced from her own 
body would negate her legal motherhood. In order to differentiate surrogacy 
from egg donations, legal standards must then rely on intent to determine 
motherhood. Moreover, focusing on intent as the indicator of motherhood 
would facilitate the use of traditional surrogacy in which the surrogate is also 
the genetic mother. Alternately, babies born from traditional surrogacy could 
be adopted by intended parents. Of course, if categorized as a full adoptive 
process, the surrogate would have the ability to retract her consent to relin-
quishing parental rights until after the birth of the child.24
Moreover, choosing genetics over gestation as the marker of parenthood 
ignores a uniquely feminine aspect of parenting: gestation.25 Essentially, as 
fatherhood is defined by genetic affiliation, a focus on genetics assumes that 
motherhood originates from genetics as well, despite the more complex man-
ner in which a mother-child relationship is traditionally formed. Ignoring 
gestation, a forty-week continuous process of physical nurturing and complex 
interdependence, fails to recognize an involved and biologically significant 
process that is uniquely feminine. This focus on gestation is not, as some 
critiques have argued, due to a belief that women should gestate their own 
children26 but rather recognition of the unique and valuable contribution of 
gestation when it is provided.27
Attempts to point to intent as creating a legally identifiable motherhood 
relationship are difficult to distinguish from simply enforcing contractual 
agreements. And enforcing contractual agreements regarding motherhood 
seems to belie notions that such relationships should not be bought or sold 
in the marketplace.28 For instance, in the seminal case of Johnson v. Calvert, 
the court determined that in the context of gestational surrogacy, natural 
motherhood should be based on intent and not as a matter of contract.29 But 
there is no real logical distinction between determining motherhood based on 
preconception intent and determining motherhood based on a contract pre-
pared to detail and certify such intent. The contract may not be enforceable 
per se according to the court, but if parenthood is based on intent, then it is 
the contract that will determine parenthood. The discomfort with contracting 
for parenthood in adoption and surrogacy cannot be hidden by the language 
of intent. Adoption and surrogacy are often distinguished, because while 
an adoptive baby would have been born regardless of the legal transfer of the 
baby, a baby born of surrogacy is conceived due to the contract. However, a 
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baby conceived through sexual relations for the purpose of adoption would 
still be subject to adoption regulations. Thus, intent alone cannot distinguish 
adoption from surrogacy.
Intentional arguments for parenthood are also undermined in contexts 
in which, despite agreements, biological donors or surrogate mothers func-
tion as parental figures. For instance, in the case of K. M. v. E. G., the egg 
donor, who was also the partner of the intended mother, agreed not to lay 
parental claims to the child in a clear and explicit agreement.30 Yet, she raised 
the child with the intended mother after the children were born. Courts in 
such circumstances legitimately do not want to deny the genetic mother her 
attachment to the child. Ultimately, when intentions break down or when 
practices do not track contractual intentions, we are still left with the biolog-
ical indicators of genetics and gestation, and such affinities persist. Although 
in K. M. the court attempts to differentiate between the contractual waiver 
of parental rights, which is invalidated, and intent to raise the children in 
a joint home, which is adopted as a crucial indicator of parenthood, this 
distinction is hard to decipher. And ultimately, it is the genetic relation-
ship added to the joint parenthood that ensued that seems to persuade the 
court. Indeed, had E. G. waived parental rights and not raised the child with 
K. M., it is highly doubtful that she would have succeeded in her parental 
claim. Intent alone by contract is then rejected when other elements such 
as actual parenting and genetics are present. Surrogacy thus creates a puzzle 
without an easier answer. The bottom line is that intent, genetics, gesta- 
tion, and functional care all matter in determining parental ties, and it is 
difficult and perhaps artificial to separate one out as the exclusive indicator 
of legal parenthood.31
However, while intellectually interesting, such puzzles do not make fami-
lies. What creates families are emotional ties that are often based on genetics 
or gestation but are also based on intent and functioning as a parent. Usually 
it is only the intended parents who want to raise the child, and no one else 
claims any rights or is tagged with obligations. But other persons may be 
involved as well. Surrogate mothers, gamete donors, extended kin, grandpar-
ents, and third parties who function as parents because they believe they are or 
because they have taken upon themselves the responsibility to do so may all be 
involved in raising and providing for children in a variety of ways. The more 
important question is how to treat these more complex familial ties that do not 
conform to traditional notions of the nuclear family and two clear, biological, 
exclusive parental figures.
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3. WHAT SHOULD THE STATUS OF THE SURROGATE BE IF SHE  
IS NOT CONSIDERED THE MOTHER?
The third dilemma in the context of surrogate motherhood is—even presum-
ing that the intended parents are those who will raise the child, as they almost 
always do absent horror stories of intended parents who abandon handicapped 
children32—what is the status of the surrogate, how should she be treated, and 
what rights does she retain?
To truly consider this final dilemma, the history of surrogacy in countries 
that have allowed it and the social science data need to be analyzed to deter-
mine how surrogates manage the surrogacy process. Empirical studies, which 
have sought to track the realities, concerns, and overall experiences of surro-
gate mothers and intended parents, have coalesced around a number of basic 
and important findings.33 While empirical studies have not been as numerous 
as one might have predicted given the onslaught of controversy and discus-
sion surrounding surrogacy, a reasonable stockpile of empirical data has been 
compiled since 1983, when surrogacy emerged as a fertility option.34 What is 
particularly striking about these empirical findings is their consistency.
On the one hand, according to empirical studies, overall levels of litiga-
tion have been low and levels of satisfaction with surrogacy high, attesting 
to the overall success of surrogates in detaching themselves from the babies 
they carry. The vast majority of surrogate mothers do not attest to bonding 
with the babies they gestate to the extent that many predicted.35 While most 
surrogates assert that parting with the baby is a difficult separation, it does 
not appear to be as traumatic as expected. Indeed, given the thousands of 
surrogacy contracts that are entered into each year, the lack of litigation is 
remarkable.36 When asked, surrogate mothers do not generally indicate that 
the babies belong to them; rather, they feel that they are providing a meaning-
ful and valuable service for the intended parents. While this appears to be true 
for both gestational and traditional surrogates (who are also genetically related 
to the baby whom they care on behalf of intended parents), it seems especially 
true for gestational surrogates who do not have a genetic connection to the 
fetus, as they consider the baby in the womb to be someone else’s based on 
genetic affiliation.37
On the other hand, the surrogates do not feel like legal strangers vis-à-vis 
the intended families either. Instead of the close bond that researchers expected 
surrogates to develop with the baby, the predicted emotional connection seems 
to be forming between the surrogate mother and the commissioning couple.38 
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Studies indicate that because pregnancy lasts nine months and prenatal care 
can be intensive and involved, it is the long-term engagement between sur-
rogate and intended parents that creates emotional bonds, reflecting the very 
intimate nature of the agreement.39 Surrogates and intended parents tend to 
experience the pregnancy and labor together and become emotionally and 
intimately involved in each other’s daily lives and relationships. Moreover, 
many describe postbirth relationships that continue between the adults, which 
involve but are not necessarily focused on the baby.40
Indeed, it is this bond between the surrogate and the intended parents 
that appears difficult to erase after the birth of the baby and that may cause 
emotional heartache as well as logistical and legal complications.41 When 
relationships are good, many surrogates express a high level of contentment 
with the process postbirth. They are most satisfied with the process when 
they develop a connection with intended parents whom they feel appreciate 
their important contribution in helping them to create a family.42 The more 
such feelings are reciprocated and the better the relations between surrogate 
and intended parents, the better the surrogate tends to feel about her experi-
ence and the lower the level of distress or exploitations she reports. Empirical 
studies demonstrate that when surrogates feel that the intended parents are 
distant and that the level of relationship did not meet their expectations, the 
surrogates are likely to express dissatisfaction and frustration with the process, 
testifying to exploitation and low sense of self-worth. In the short term, many 
surrogates contend that it is important to see the child born of the agreement 
and to be acknowledged by the new family during and after the birth. But 
overall, surrogates’ expectations appear to be that the relationship will last well 
past the birth, perhaps in perpetuity.
Many surrogates express that they want to feel appreciated and thanked 
for their investment in time and effort beyond receiving payment. While they 
work for money, many surrogates express altruistic motives as well, and no 
amount of money could fully compensate women for the level of commitment 
they must make. In describing their work, surrogate narratives use concepts of 
gift giving and mission to accentuate the more altruistic side of their endeav-
ors and to de-emphasize the commercial contractual nature of their work. 
Evidence suggests that surrogates want to be acknowledged for the altruistic 
aspects of their actions as well as paid for the commercial aspects.43
In sum, commercial surrogates work for money but also create deep 
emotional attachments with intended families. How should the law or eth-
ics treat these complex relationships? What protections exist for surrogates 
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who form these attachments? Some legal systems try to separate the attachment 
from the work to the greatest extent possible by not allowing surrogates to 
interact with intended parents or the babies once they are involved. Others 
allow only altruistic surrogacy and expect that surrogates and intended fami-
lies have ongoing familial or friend-based relationships. But can commercial 
surrogates be recognized for both the commercial service they provide and the 
intimate relationships that are involved?
B. JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVES  
ON SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
Jewish law has unique insights to contribute to these three dilemmas. 
First, Jewish law has a distinctly strong focus on procreation in relation to 
other interests. Second, unlike under secular legal systems, Jewish law cannot 
use intent or contract as an indicator of parenthood, which is a natural sta-
tus with religious significance. Finally, Jewish law puts high emphasis on the 
human dignity of each man or woman.
1. BALANCING INTERESTS: THE STRONG  
RIGHT TO PROCREATE UNDER JEWISH LAW
As compared to other legal systems, Jewish law puts a very high value on pro-
creation.44 The Jewish law commandment to be fruitful and multiply found 
in the book of Genesis has been a major source of procreative energy for the 
Jewish people.45 This commandment, which applies only to men because 
childbearing is considered to be a danger to women’s health and thus cannot 
be commanded upon her, is usually understood to be fulfilled if a man fathers 
two children.46 This commandment has been particularly influential in Jewish 
legal decisions. Indeed, the commandment has been used to stretch Jewish law 
to embrace the use of ART.47 Since the inability to bear children is adequate 
grounds to divorce one’s wife and failure to fulfill the commandment can be 
considered a serious infraction of Jewish law, using ART, including surrogacy, 
to reproduce the male seed has been accepted in many Jewish religious com-
munities.48 Israel’s surrogate motherhood agreements law was one of the first 
and most progressive of its kind to officially sanction and enforce surrogate 
motherhood agreements.49 The commandment upon men to reproduce led 
noted rabbinic leaders, such as Rabbi Nechemia Goldberg, to allow Orthodox 
couples to use surrogate mothers in Israel under the Surrogate Motherhood 
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Law, despite numerous important rabbinical authorities’ expressed belief that it 
is the gestational, surrogate mother who is the legal mother under Jewish law.50
Thus, while other systems create a certain balance between the fear of 
commodification and exploitation and the value of procreation, under Jewish 
law it is logical that the balance be weighted toward procreation and allowing 
surrogacy. Family life and reproduction are essential, and a judgment can be 
made that the risks of exploitation and commodification can be borne and 
limited through regulation for the benefit of fulfilling religious command-
ments and sustaining religious life.
2. SPLIT OF OPINION OVER THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF MOTHERHOOD
The leniency in allowing surrogate motherhood in order to fulfill the com-
mandment to procreate does not cancel the need to determine legal parentage 
under Jewish law. Under Jewish law, the establishment of parenthood relates 
to the fulfillment of halachic obligations, issues of personal status, and civil 
law. With regard to religious obligations, the issue of parentage is relevant for 
matters of the father’s obligation to “be fruitful and multiply” and the obliga-
tion of the child to honor his or her parents. The personal status of the child 
is relevant for determining the permissibility of certain marriages (e.g., there 
are laws against incest). Parental status is also relevant for determining Jewish 
status, parental obligations to children in regard to custody and support, and 
issues of inheritance.51
Jewish law sources are divided on the issue of who is the legal mother: 
the woman whose egg produces the baby or the woman who gestates the baby. 
Some authorities consider the egg donor or genetic mother to be the legal 
mother. Rabbi Shlomo Goren bases his determination on an argument in the 
Talmud in which two voices argue as to the time when souls are given.52 He 
concludes that the soul is given from the time of counting or numbering 
the intended persons and not from the time of their creation. Therefore, at the 
earliest stage possible, the time of insemination, the identity of the child is 
already determined by its genetic makeup. He also argues that fatherhood and 
motherhood are defined in the same manner, from the first drop of seed from 
both male and female upon fertilization. Rabbi Itamar Warhaftig also asserts 
that logically it is the egg donor and not the surrogate mother who should be 
considered the mother.53 His logical basis for this conclusion is that it is the 
genes of the genetic mother and father that will determine the characteristics 
of the child and that the womb of the surrogate is nothing more than the place 
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of growth. Furthermore, he argues that conceptually, if not practically as of 
yet, gestation could even be done in a laboratory. In his opinion, genes are the 
only essential human contribution.
Other authorities consider the gestational surrogate to be the legal 
mother of the child. Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Rabbi Eliezer 
Yehudah Calev are two significant authorities who have determined that the 
woman who gestates the fetus is the legal mother. Rabbi Goldberg looks to 
Talmudic sources to identify motherhood with birth.54 The Talmud explains 
that twin brothers, who are non-Jews and subsequently convert, have no 
obligations in chalizah or yibum [levirate marriage] and are not obligated to 
refrain from marrying each other’s wives because upon conversion to Juda-
ism, all prior familial relationships are legally severed according to Jewish 
law. However, twins who were conceived when their parents were non-Jews 
and were born to a Jewish woman (she converts while she is pregnant) are 
not obligated in chalizah and yibum but are obligated not to marry each 
other’s wives. Since motherhood is established upon birth, Rabbi Goldberg 
argues, the obligations that are derived from lineage to their mother still 
hold. If motherhood were determined by genetic input or upon conception, 
the conversion of the mother would have severed her ties to her children and 
their ties to each other. However, after the twins’ birth they are still consid-
ered brothers from their maternal lineage in that they are prohibited from 
marrying each other’s wives.
Alternately, Rabbi Calev and others point to an aggadic interpretation 
[homiletic tale] of the biblical story of Rachel and Leah.55 The allegorical 
source refers to an intrauterine transfer of Dinah from the womb of Rachel 
to the womb of Leah and an intrauterine transfer of Joseph from the womb 
of Leah to the womb of Rachel. Subsequent references in Scripture refer to 
Dinah as the daughter of Leah and to Joseph as the son of Rachel, despite the 
supposed switch. Ostensibly, this tale indicates that each child has a single 
mother and that the mother is the birth mother, not the genetic mother. This 
analogy marks parturition rather than gestation or egg donation as the estab-
lishing variable of motherhood. While some authorities will not use allegory 
in matters of determining Jewish law, many other authorities have held that 
if the allegorical interpretation does not conflict with other legal sources, it is 
acceptable to learn from these sources. In addition, Rabbi Ezra Bick offers a 
conceptual orientation to the issue from a broad overview of Jewish law.56 He 
posits that Jewish law should give special consideration to the legal status of 
the surrogate as the birth mother due to the law’s sensitivity to and emphasis 
248 Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition
on the differences between men and women. This understanding provides a 
broader philosophical background to the more legalistic determinations that 
have been made.
Although establishing parenthood based on intent or contract is foreign 
to Jewish law,57 contracts can be used to transfer obligations or appoint guard-
ians.58 However, even so, for issues of conversion and inheritance motherhood 
is inalienable.
Due to the conflict of opinions, both of which are based on insights by 
well-regarded rabbis and differing sources, ultimately both genetic and gesta-
tional mothers are considered to be legal mothers due to doubt and uncer-
tainty. In practice, conversion is required both for children who are born 
of non-Jewish surrogates and for children who are born of non-Jewish egg 
donors.59 In order to be sure that a child is Jewish and not of compromised 
personal status [mamzerut],60 both women are deemed to be “mothers” for 
purposes of personal status (preventing incest) and religious identity.
Indeed, Rabbi Mosh Shternbach, a prominent jurist and halachic 
authority in the Ultra-Orthodox community in Jerusalem, has decreed that 
in the case of gestational surrogacy, both women must be considered legal 
mothers of the child.61 His argument is not just due to uncertainty whereby 
both woman are considered mothers due to lack of clarity as to which of the 
two women is the legal mother; it is also due to an affirmative need to recog-
nize both women as legal mothers. He argues that women have two parts in 
producing a child, providing the egg and birthing the child, and both create 
the motherhood status. He says that since both women create the child, both 
have the legal status of mother. Multiplying motherhood, according to Shtern-
bach, is not a logical impossibility.
In American law, on the other hand, the idea of multiple motherhood 
is frowned upon because it potentially threatens and violates the exclusive 
parenthood rights of the intended mother in surrogacy.62 In the United States, 
the right to conceive and to raise one’s own children has been deemed essential 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Raising one’s own child is a matter of rights to 
the child, even if custody is ultimately decided according to a “best interests” 
standard.63 Both parents have standing to assert their rights to custody of the 
child and have rights to visitation.
But under Jewish law, parenthood is less a right than an obligation, 
and thus violating parenthood rights is not a cause for concern.64 Indeed, 
Michael Broyde writes that although rabbinic discussions on surrogate moth-
erhood have centered on the definition of the legal mother for various ritual 
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obligations, he argues that these ritual issues tend not to be the crucial ones to 
the couple or the surrogate mother seeking such children.65
Broyde argues that when maternal identity is legally in doubt or in dis-
pute and paternal identity is established, maternal custody should be granted 
to the wife of the father regardless of who is determined to be the legal mother 
under Jewish law. He offers two basic rationales for this determination. First, 
the obligation to financially support children is assigned primarily to men. 
Second, he explains that basic custody law holds that child custody should be 
determined according to the best interests of the child. Given the reality in sur-
rogate motherhood that the intended parents are those of greater means and 
have initiated the conception of the child, Broyde argues that it would almost 
always be in the child’s best interest for the intended parents to have custody.
However, while the basic principles stated by Broyde above may be sub-
stantial enough to usually lead rabbinical figures to give custody of the child 
to the father, it should be pointed out that the presumptions of the Talmud 
are that under certain situations the legal mother would have sole custody 
of the child.66 The Talmud embraces three rules that generally govern child 
custody, which are adjusted according to factual findings of best interests of 
the child. First, custody of all children under the age of six is to be given to the 
mother; second, custody of boys over the age of six is to be given to the father; 
and third, custody of girls over the age of six is to be given to the mother. 
Moreover, financial means are not the only factor in considering what custody 
arrangement is in a child’s best interest.67
These three guidelines have been widely interpreted to be simply pre-
sumptions. Rather, the overarching standard for determining custody should 
be the best interests of the child as determined by the beit din.68 And under 
a best interests analysis that does not have to bend to parental rights, Jewish 
law authorities can be creative in custodial provisions that ensure what is best 
for the child.69 Broyde’s claim that the best interests of the child will always 
be with the legal father and intended mother is controversial even if usually 
accurate. It may be best for a child to have connections with all three biolog-
ical parents, even if the primary duty of support rests with the father. Empiri-
cal studies do support that as long as tension levels are not high, multiple 
caregivers can be good for children’s interests.70 Most studies refer to mothers 
and fathers, but if other potential caregivers are available to give care and 
such care is helpful and not causing strife, there is support indicating that 
multiple caregivers beyond parents are good for children.71 Not all parents are 
able to care for children, and many other kind family members or third parties 
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take up significant portions of the obligations of custodial care. Here, we are 
dealing only with the possibility of two mother figures with potential obliga-
tions. Given that the obligation to parent and support a child can be divided 
or upheld by one of two parents and that multiplying parenthood is not a vio-
lation of exclusive rights, Jewish law seems well placed for engaging multiple 
parental figures. According to Rabbi Shternbach, because both women are 
legal parents, both could have the obligations of motherhood, and the child 
would have rights and obligations to both mothers.
Recognizing gestation as relevant to creating motherhood as opposed to 
intent or genetics is a contribution from Jewish law that is relatively rare. For 
the most part, gestational surrogates are treated by legal systems as incubators 
and wombs for hire.72 Recognizing the biological, involved, and significant 
contribution that gestation plays in creating a child provides valuable insight 
from Jewish law. The emphasis on the unique contribution of gestation in 
Jewish law could serve as a solid platform for recognizing the role of surrogate 
mothers and giving credence to the importance of pregnancy and childbear-
ing, the biological domain of women.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN JEWISH LAW
Human dignity is a central tenet of Jewish law. In the beginning of the book 
of Genesis we learn that man is created in God’s image.73 This is expressed 
in various more specific laws, including the obligation to respect the dead, to 
respect the human body, and to treasure every human life even if command-
ments need to be broken. Even prisoners and slaves must be treated with 
dignity under Jewish law.74 Man is created in God’s image, and thus each man 
must be treated with dignity and sanctity. Moreover, each man has a separate 
identity and significance in and of himself.75 The Mishnah tells us that if one 
man is lost, it is as if the whole world is lost, and for every man who is saved, 
it is as if the whole world is saved.76 It is as if the whole world was created for 
each individual man. This idea of the individual worth of each man has also 
been used to derive the principle of equality between men in Jewish law.
Moreover, respecting human dignity is not just a right belonging to the 
individual; it is a duty upon each individual to preserve one’s own health as 
well as the lives of others.77 It is even a duty upon the individual who would 
otherwise prefer to denigrate himself for money or other ends. Thus, a man 
is not allowed to harm himself or his own body. In Jewish law a man cannot 
actively cause his own death even if he is suffering and on his deathbed.78
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Accordingly, it is important that the surrogate, as a human, be treated 
with dignity and be protected from shame, vulnerability, and heartbreak due 
to the surrogacy arrangement. It is not worthy for humans to be treated as 
wombs for rent or as commodities—each man must be treated as an end in 
himself, not just a means of production. Just as people cannot sell themselves 
into permanent servitude under Jewish law, a surrogate cannot sell her self-
worth and dignity.
However, in Jewish law the idea of human dignity is not essentially tied 
to commodification. Human dignity can be preserved despite commercial-
ization. For instance, in Jewish law, baby selling is less problematic than in 
other legal systems. Prohibitions against the selling of a person in Jewish law 
relate to the selling of a person into servitude.79 In surrogacy arrangements, 
the child is not sold into slavery, and neither is the surrogate. Ostensibly, the 
prohibition against receiving money for the sale of persons is based on a fear 
of control over another human being in slavery and is not a blanket prohibi-
tion against transferring a child for consideration, and renting out a womb is 
not impermissible.80
Still, human dignity can be protected through regulations that recognize 
status and limitations on commodification so as to prevent the woman from 
being sold into servitude. She must retain sufficient autonomy over herself 
and be treated with dignity. This can be accomplished through regulations 
that limit the nature of surrogacy arrangements and how much control of 
herself she can agree to forfeit—human dignity is a duty and a right, and 
even if willing, no one can forfeit the right in a contract to refuse to live with 
dignity—as well as to refuse medical treatment if unwanted, to eat and sleep 
in a manner that is comfortable, or to give birth naturally instead of through 
medical intervention. Surrogacy arrangements have confined a woman’s ability 
to travel and have demanded that she live in hostels, eat prescribed foods, and 
take prescribed medications.81 Surrogacy arrangements preclude natural birth 
childbirth and even medical treatment that prioritizes the life of the fetus over 
the life of the surrogate.82 Such contractual provisions or surrogacy arrange-
ments should be regulated in order to preserve the dignity of the surrogate.
C. CRITIQUE OF THE JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE
The religious Jewish community, even the Ultra-Orthodox community, has, 
under certain circumstances, permitted surrogacy in order to allow infertile 
couples to procreate and fulfill their religious obligations. The Israel Surrogate 
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Agreements Law contains many provisions that attempt to incorporate aspects 
of Jewish law in order to avoid problems that might arise within the religious 
communities in Israel.83 In Israel, surrogate motherhood has been expressly 
permitted by some of the most respected rabbinic authorities. Both the Sep-
hardic chief rabbi, Rabbi Bakshi Doron, and Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Gold-
berg, a rabbinical court judge and highly regarded halachic posek, have given 
their approval to the law.84 Rabbi Borshtein, director of the Puah Institute of 
Halachah and Reproductive Technology in Jerusalem, has stated that under his 
guidance a number of women have received private permission from various 
Orthodox halachic authorities, permitting the procedure and contract as it is 
designated in Israeli law.85 In fact, the first couple to use the Israeli Surrogate 
Contracts law was a religious couple. However, others have voiced objections 
to the surrogate motherhood process due to misgivings about alienating child 
rearing from the sanctity of marriage and the marital bed and out of concern 
about the technology that facilitates it.86
In a private meeting with the Surrogate Agreements Approvals Com-
mittee appointed by the law, Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg explicitly 
condoned the law and made no mention of the surrogate mother’s rights or 
claims to the child.87 When asked by the committee who is the mother in 
a case of gestational surrogacy where the intended mother has donated her 
ovum, Rabbi Goldberg responded that this is a new issue and must be deter-
mined on the basis of analogies to related sources of halachah but cannot be 
determined with full certainty.88 Therefore, he insisted that both mothers need 
to be treated as mothers for the sake of lineage to avoid any determination of 
mamzerut.89 When asked whether he would permit a woman who sought his 
approval to use a surrogate mother, he answered that he would allow it if the 
woman could not have a child otherwise.90 While Rabbi Zalman Nechemia 
Goldberg’s conversation with the committee is the only written acceptance of 
the Israeli law by a renowned authority on Jewish law, there is an understand-
ing among the religious communities that such procedures may be permis-
sible, depending on a couple’s specific circumstances and with direct approval 
of a rabbinic authority.
Although Jewish law authorities have recognized the surrogate mother 
as a legal mother, they have been willing to allow surrogacy despite the sur-
rogate’s potential status. The obligations and concerns of lineage can be man-
aged and dealt with in order to allow fulfillment of the command to procreate. 
Motherhood status is natural and inalienable but can still be managed in the 
context of potential complications. Although halachic authorities could have 
Multiplying Motherhood: Gestational Surrogate Motherhood and Jewish Law 253
insisted on recognizing the surrogate as the legal mother and perhaps having 
a formal adoption or guardianship process set up to transfer obligations, such 
for malities have been overlooked in accepting the Israeli law.91
Indeed, while allowing surrogacy, Jewish law authorities have not given 
much thought to what would become of these second mothers. Even if their 
motherhood is somehow recognized for purposes of conversion or the ability 
to marry and the status of mamzerut,92 no positive position has been taken 
in order to recognize and protect these women from potential commodifica-
tion or exploitation. According to significant Jewish authority, these women 
are mothers of the children they bear, yet rabbis seem more concerned about 
lineage, marital status, and whether or not the child is Jewish than in con-
sidering how to protect the woman who is a legal mother of the child, even 
if the intended mother is also a mother. Could she have rights to custody or 
visitation? Does she have a right to see the child? Could she be obliged to care 
for or support the child? Must contracts ensure that her dignity and human-
ity are preserved? What specifically does the need to protect the surrogates’ 
dignity mean under Jewish law? These more human aspects of surrogacy are 
not spoken of by Jewish law authorities despite the surrogate’s status as legal 
mother. While part of Jewish law concerns must contend with legal status and 
Jewish identity, it is disappointing that the recognition of multiple mother-
hood in this context has not been used to also explore the emotional impact 
of surrogacy on the surrogate mother and to protect her dignity in the process.
D. GUIDELINES FOR RESOLUTION BASED  
ON JEWISH LAW PRINCIPLES
As described above, Jewish law provides certain solutions for the three dilem-
mas of gestational surrogacy that I have posed. Jewish law would lead to the 
conclusions that commercial surrogacy should be allowed but only to resolve 
infertility in particular cases and only if the surrogate is property recognized 
and protected. The legal mother according to Jewish law is perhaps surpris-
ingly best understood as being both women, and multiplying motherhood 
is not particularly problematic under Jewish law. Complications of having 
multiple natural mothers must be dealt with in any event, and any support 
and custodial obligations can in theory be divided and multiplied as well. 
Finally, as all persons must be treated with dignity, the surrogate, who is also 
a legal mother, should be protected and given recognition for her status and 
emotional attachments with the intended family.
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However, Jewish authorities have been more concerned with preserving 
a child’s status and Jewish identity than with recognizing the legal status and 
dignity of the surrogate. Jewish sources, however, provide good reason to rec-
ognize and protect the surrogate and can be relied upon to create a humane 
and regulated surrogacy system.
Under Jewish law, there are essentially two categories of ramifications for 
legal parenthood, the first technical and the second human. The first category 
concerns the status of the child and his or her Jewish identity and ability to 
marry under Jewish law—mamzerut. These are basically technical concerns 
due to the status of the surrogate as a mother that need to be dealt with to pre-
serve the Jewish identity and personal status of the child. The second category 
concerns more human issues regarding the relationship of the surrogate to the 
child and intended family as well as her human dignity as a legal mother.
Jewish law already has recognized two mothers for the sake of personal 
status and Jewish identity. Jewish families who use non-Jewish surrogates or 
non-Jewish egg donors must convert their children to Judaism, according to 
most halachic authorities. Converting a baby to Judaism, at least in accor-
dance with Orthodox restrictions that monopolize conversions in Israel, is 
not a simple procedure.93 Generally, the parents must promise to raise the 
child in an observant Jewish environment, providing Jewish education and 
exposure to Jewish practice. For secular Jews, getting through this process of 
conversion can prove difficult.94 And without conversion, these babies will 
not be able to marry in Israel. Even if heterosexual couples can succeed in 
navigating this process, homosexual couples, frequent users of international 
surrogacy, may experience more difficulties. Moreover, in order to avoid the 
status of mamzer, which would also make the child unable to marry under 
Jewish law, both women are considered mothers and thus cannot be related to 
the other (i.e., kin cannot act as surrogates for their kin). This first category of 
ramifications of multiplying motherhood creates hardship and confusion for 
those using surrogacy to procreate and puts burdens on parents to protect the 
personal status of the child born of surrogacy.
The second category of ramifications of the surrogate as legal mother 
should also be considered under Jewish law. This second category of ramifica-
tions regards the duty and rights of the legal mother and the dignity of the 
surrogate as a legal mother. As a legal mother, the surrogate may have duties 
imposed upon her for the care of the child. As there are two mothers and pre-
sumably also a father, such duties would be divided among the legal parents. 
As discussed above, the legal father has the primary financial duty toward 
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his young children, but mothers also have duties of financial support and of 
care.95 These duties can be contracted away to a willing person but not before 
the child is born, because that child would not yet be in existence. Under Jew-
ish law a contract cannot be made for a thing that is not yet in existence.96 
Moreover, if the child becomes needy, such contracts would not be enforce-
able, as the child must be financially supported by his or her legal parents.97
With regard to custody, under Jewish law the principle of best interests 
governs, although for younger children a mother is presumed to be the best 
caregiver.98 Even if a surrogate is recognized as a second mother, a surrogate 
would not be the sole or even primary custodial parent. Presumably, as per 
the contract, the intended parents would support and raise the child as pri-
mary custodians. If a dispute arose, the intended parents would likely win 
primary custody under a best interests analysis.99 This may not always be the 
case, depending on the circumstances.
However, what of the possibility in Jewish law for multiple custodians? 
Even if one parent receives the primary custodial obligation, contact or visita-
tion with other parents or kin can be relevant in making custodial arrange-
ments under a best interests standard.100 A surrogate could be given visitation 
or allowed contact with a child or even be appointed as a guardian of the child. 
A surrogate has a potential duty to the child and so may be recognized as a 
secondary guardian or secondary custodian.
A guardian under Jewish law is usually a legal parent but can be another 
kin appointed to care for and support the child.101 And a guardian need not 
be the primary custodian of the child but can be another kin relation who 
manages the child’s affairs.102 Often a guardian is a kin of the child in times of 
crisis who has the ability to manage the assets of the child. Jewish courts prefer 
kin to act as guardians as opposed to strangers.103 While authorities used to 
prohibit appointing a woman, even a mother, as guardian, modern authorities 
recognize women’s and mothers’ authority as guardians of their children.104 
Such guardianship or custody can also be based on emotional attachments that 
serve the best interests of the child.105 While such possibilities for legal status 
unrelated to financial duties have not been fully developed under Jewish law 
by halachic authorities, the potential exists within the Jewish law framework 
for multiple guardians and custodians in complex situations, and kin relations 
are given priority over legal strangers.106 Indeed, it has been said that a person 
who takes upon himself to care for a child may obtain the benefit of being a 
guardian to that child.107 Accordingly, a surrogate who takes upon herself the 
task of gestating that child and thereby becoming a legal mother may claim a 
256 Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition
benefit of being a guardian to that child. Because the best interests standard 
has been increasingly relevant under Jewish law and because Jewish law courts 
have discretion to appoint guardians in children’s best interests, such a pos-
sibility exists.108
There is also little discussion of visitation rights under Jewish law, as cus-
tody is considered an obligation and not a right. However, Jewish courts 
applying Jewish law regularly award visitation to a noncustodial parent under 
a best interests standard. Custodial decisions are based on best interests and 
not rights. However, if contact with multiple caregivers is deemed to be best 
for children, visitation arrangements can be ordered by Jewish law courts. 
And contact with multiple caring maternal figures may be good for children 
depending on the situation, particularly if the parties can work in a coopera-
tive manner. If the surrogate had already developed connections with the child 
through consent of the intended parents, a court could consider awarding 
visitation rights to this second mother in the best interests of the child.
However, the possibility that the surrogate could be a legal guardian 
or have legal visitation rights imposed upon unwilling intended parents is 
unlikely under a best interests standard, given current social norms about the 
importance of two parents and the nuclear family. Most likely, as with an aunt 
or other relative, the surrogate would be dependent on the consent of primary 
custodians to have access to the child if she wanted it. Even without her legal 
rights of custody, being explicit about her status as a secondary legal mother 
can affect the nature of her relationship to the intended family and the child. 
According to the empirical studies cited above, the mere recognition that sur-
rogates are more than a disposable womb for hire and have made a serious 
contribution to the creation of the baby and thus are worthy of respect and 
acknowledgement would likely be sufficient to cure the sense of abandon-
ment, frustration, and exploitation that surrogates feel. Surrogates indicate 
that they expect a continued relationship with the intended family as a natural 
consequence of strong relationships that developed during the surrogacy pro-
cess. As a secondary kin figure to the baby, recognized according to the law as 
much more than a mere incubator but as a second mother, such a relationship 
becomes more acceptable and reasonable. Following the lead of Jewish law 
and recognizing the significant contribution of the surrogate in a regulated and 
limited way can be used to resolve the dilemma of the emotional attachments 
formed during surrogacy. Unlike Western values that perceive such recognition 
as a violation of parental rights, the duties involved to bring children into the 
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world and raise them should not involve excluding other important figures in 
a child’s life.
Of course, best interests with regard to custody governs. And if the sur-
rogate and the intended parents are in tension regarding the surrogate’s role, 
then involving the surrogate in a continued manner in the child’s life against 
the objections of the father and his wife could be problematic. However, 
affirmative recognition of the status of the surrogate as secondary mother or 
kin under Jewish law can enable recognition and encourage good relations 
between the parties.
Although her status as a second legal mother can feel threatening to 
the procreating intended parents, almost like a concubine or second wife 
must have been threatening to a primary wife in biblical times or perhaps in 
polygamous relationships even in modern times, the duties involved under 
Jewish law are to procreate and to raise the child appropriately. And as dis-
cussed above, she is unlikely to have legal rights that she could impose on the 
custodial father and mother. Still, the presence of a third party in the process 
is due to infertility, and the presence of the third party cannot be erased even if 
it would be emotionally easier. The surrogate needs to be acknowledged, pro-
tected, and included in the process as a partner and not treated as a disposable 
incubator. This is a complex family system, no doubt, but so is the surrogacy 
process itself. And pretending that the surrogate does not exist as a human 
partner and does not continue to exist after the child’s birth may simplify the 
process for intended parents but does not give sufficient heed to the relevance 
of the gestating surrogate and her dignity.
Moreover, the Jewish law principle of human dignity demands the sur-
rogate’s recognition, protection, and inclusion. Recognition, protection, and 
inclusion humanize the surrogate and make her relevant not just for personal 
status and conversion issues but also as a human involved in the process of pro-
creation. Human dignity is not respected if a person is used as a mere womb 
and then discarded. Jewish law authorities should not be concerned only with 
possible religious infractions and assuring personal status of the child but 
should also be concerned with protecting and recognizing the surrogate and 
her status as secondary mother in the process of gestational surrogacy. Con-
tractual provisions should ensure her dignity and humanity under Jewish law. 
Contractual provisions that excessively constrain her freedom, demean her, or 
fail to sufficiently account for her role in the procreation by not allowing her 
to even see the baby should not be tolerated.
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E. CONCLUSION
Jewish family law, like any system of family law, must recognize complex fam-
ily networks in the modern era. Based on tradition, Jewish law can be used to 
widen its scope to enlighten families in transition.
In this essay, I rely on Jewish law for inspiration and seek creative reso-
lution to complex problems. I pose dilemmas that exist in modern, secular 
thinking about surrogacy and then look to Jewish law principles to seek resolu-
tions. I am not descriptively seeking to answer concrete problems in the man-
ner of religious poskim or to describe their positions based on their religious 
authority. However, I rely on the principled decisions of such authorities to ask 
questions and resolve ethical tensions and dilemmas. I suggest solutions based 
on Jewish law principles that can enlighten and enrich our thinking about 
these dilemmas. Thereby, I look at Jewish law principles broadly and suggest 
resolutions for modern families that I believe can be derived from Jewish law. 
And I also criticize current narrow thinking about the relevance of Jewish 
law and suggest that the inquiries and resolutions be carried further.
I acknowledge that I am attempting to bridge modern intellectual inqui-
ries and empirical studies with traditional halachic decision making that is 
made on a case-by-case basis and that such a bridge may seem irrelevant or 
ephemeral. Such inquiries, however, can provide powerful insight for resolu-
tion of modern dilemmas. The line between law and ethics, as well as prin-
ciple and legal decision, is not necessarily black and white. Beyond providing 
concrete solutions in divorce and marriage law, Jewish law and ethics can be 
a guiding force for the resolution of modern dilemmas in Jewish family law. 
Jewish law can preserve its traditional precepts while still inspiring the modern 
family in transition.
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